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The electric power system is affected by numerous inefficiencies. Operation of the power 
grid uses intricate mathematical models to schedule supply and demand instantaneously, and 
complex settlement mechanisms to charge and pay participants. This dissertation focuses on four 
aspects of electric market design and operation endeavoring to improve economic and 
operational efficiency. Each chapter utilizes bottom-up engineering-economic models to simulate 
power grid operations. The overall goal of the dissertation is to analyze electric market 
inefficiencies and examine proposed alternative designs and policies.  
The dissertation begins with characterizing the electric system and the role and challenges of 
renewable energy in Chapter 1. Then Chapter 2 proposes a new method for pricing electricity in 
organized wholesale markets, called the Dual Pricing Algorithm. The current pricing method is 
non-confiscatory but does not capture the full cost of operation in marginal prices. The 
proposed method achieves these two aims while also providing further transparency. Chapter 3 
examines potential benefits of three adjustments in reserve procurement procedures, and 
estimates economic efficiency using a European test system. Each adjustment improves current 
practice, either in the quantity of reserves needed, the procurement method, or the degree of 
coordination with neighboring countries. The results demonstrate coordination among countries 
shows greatest consistent benefits among the three adjustments. Chapter 4 examines integration 
of carbon policies into real-time markets when the emissions system encompasses a sub-region 
of the larger electricity market, comparing five alternative models. Findings suggest that there is a 
trade-off between emissions and cost, with no one dominant method to identify and manage 
leakage from the regulated system. Chapter 5 analyzes degrees of coordination between 
 
 iii 
neighboring systems for both day-ahead and real-time energy markets. The simulations for a test 
case find that coordinating in real-time without coordination in the day-ahead market results in 
higher costs compared to not coordinating at all.  
These chapters examine trade-offs, whether they are between ease of implementation, 
economic efficiency, renewable integration, or emissions reductions. Overall, the dissertation 
contributes a framework for assessing market design improvements, and demonstrates to system 
operators and decisions makers that coordination between neighboring regions can increase 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Electricity is a unique and essential commodity. Unlike other commodities, electricity cannot 
be economically stored for long periods of time. There are no warehouses or tanks to hold it, 
and storage resources like batteries are not yet economically viable on a large scale. Because of 
this limitation, electricity demand must instantaneously be met by supply, and customer demand 
at a retail and wholesale level expect power delivery with high reliability. Additionally, electricity 
cannot be transported by any chosen path; it follows the laws of physics. These complexities 
pose a challenge to electric grid operators, who aim to manage the grid both reliably and at least 
cost. The twentieth century saw advancements in grid technology, and these advancements were 
honored by being called the major engineering accomplishment of that century by the National 
Academy of Engineering.  
However, in recent decades, the electric system has not changed as drastically as other 
systems, such as communications. There is a common story in electricity: Alexander Graham Bell 
would not recognize modern telephones or the wireless network, but Thomas Edison or George 
Westinghouse would feel familiar with most of the components and operating procedures of 
modern electric systems [1]. In the last twenty years, that story is beginning to change. Wind and 
solar generation are fundamentally changing grid operations, advanced metering infrastructure 
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and solid state electronics allow vastly improved state identification and control of the network, 
and customers are becoming more engaged in controlling their personal electric demand. Market 
forces are being introduced into what was formerly a vertically integrated, monopolistic industry, 
leading to new participants, trading arrangements, and control procedures. The combined 
physical and financial responsibilities of operating the electric grid are being impacted both by 
existing inefficiencies leftover from the grid of Edison’s era and new challenges from modern 
technology.  
This dissertation addresses some of the challenges arising from existing inefficiencies and 
new technologies. The chapters that follow propose methods to improve fundamental elements 
of power system modeling in a way that is both economically efficient and eases the integration 
of renewable energy or reduces emissions. The analyses are divided into four chapters, Chapters 
2–5. Chapter 2 identifies an inefficient practice of allocating “lumpy” (non-convex) costs among 
market participants and proposes a new method to determine prices and more efficiently allocate 
costs. Chapter 3 suggests three improvements to reserve procurement, allocation, and activation 
focusing on the Dutch grid. Next, Chapter 4 examines models for integrating carbon emissions 
allowances into real-time operational decisions and pricing. Finally Chapter 5 compares current 
and proposed methods of coordinating operating decisions between regions to increase the net 
benefits to each. Given that costs are allocated haphazardly, present reserves are poorly 
quantified, carbon policies might not effectively reduce emissions, and neighboring regions fail to 
coordinate effectively, these chapters aim to develop methods to reduce these inefficiencies.  
1.1 MOTIVATION 
1.1.1 Existing Inefficiencies  
Operation of electric grid has changed dramatically over the past 20 years due to 
restructuring of supply, transmission, and retail sales [2]. Due to the intensive capital costs of the 
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power system, vertically integrated utilities owned and operated the generation, transmission and 
distribution of electricity until the 1990s [3]. Beginning in the late 1990s, the electric system in 
much of the U.S. and elsewhere in the world was restructured, with each segment operated by a 
different entity in what became known as an unbundled power system [4]. In addition, customers 
in some states were able to choose their own retail provider rather than using the local utility. 
These changes allowed for the creation of wholesale markets for electricity. Seven markets were 
created across the U.S., each developing under different rules over time, rules which are still 
undergoing modification to this day.  
Pricing electricity is one issue that has been frequently reformed over time. Many markets 
began using a zonal model for pricing, similar to what is used in Europe today, where a large 
region has a single wholesale electricity price. Today, all seven organized U.S. markets use nodal 
pricing which distinguishes prices throughout the network given congestion, or colloquially, 
electric traffic. Electricity pricing has been continually reformed, with a great deal of recent 
attention addressing whether prices reflect the full cost of production [5]. Given the complex bid 
structure of power plants, academics and professionals alike are proposing new methods to price 
electricity. Several markets have already reformed their pricing schemes for some generators, 
with three others expected to propose reforms in the next year [6].  
An additional contribution to inefficiencies comes from the multiple markets that have 
developed side-by-side in both the U.S. and Europe, because they have needed to address trade 
and coordination with their neighbors. Regional and national policies can make coordination 
difficult, since each can have different priorities and means of operation [7]. In Europe, each 
country operates its own real-time or balancing market, even though there are shared 
transmission lines between neighboring countries. In the U.S., many regions operate 
independently with minimal coordination with their neighbors. Operators in the Western U.S. 
coordinated some cross-regional trades, and in 2014, began an effort to co-optimize their real 
time operations under the umbrella of the Energy Imbalance Market, organized by the California 
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Independent System Operator [8]. These efforts to coordinate have the potential to benefit all 
parties if studied and enacted efficiently; however, there is no guarantee coordination in just one 
market will positively impact the rest. The importance and desire to coordinate has grown larger 
as renewable resources have entered the generation mix. 
1.1.2 Inefficiencies from New Technologies 
The recent growth of renewable energy has also posed many challenges for the electricity 
sector, which has received the attention of many policy makers, researchers, and the public [9], 
[10]. Power generation has been fairly predictable in system operations throughout the 20th 
century; if a system operator requests 30 MW from a generator, that generator could produce 30 
MW with high reliability. However, increased penetration into the market from renewable energy 
has added variability and uncertainty to the supply side. In this context, “variability” refers to 
volatility of the non-dispatchable net load (load minus renewable generation); “uncertainty” is 
defined as forecast errors or the unknown future output of net load. With uncertain forecasted 
generation, new market mechanisms will be necessary to ensure the electric grid is flexible 
enough to respond to fast changes in generation. 
One method used to manage unexpected changes in generation is through operating 
reserves, or extra capacity held in case of unforeseen need for increased (or sometimes 
decreased) supply. Reserves have traditionally been held in case generation or transmission 
components of the electric grid go unexpectedly offline.  They have not traditionally been 
configured to accommodate the quick changes needed when renewable energy forecasts are 
incorrect. This need might be met by traditional methods, but is likely to require additional 
means of procurement. With regional renewable integration goals, most markets are looking to 




Another great challenge for market design is internalizing environmental costs, including 
those arising from air, water, and solid waste. A particular focus recently has been the cost of 
greenhouse gas emissions [2]. Many states and countries prioritize greenhouse gas emission 
reductions, but determining the proper method to price or penalize the emissions is not 
straightforward. There are many questions as to the best way to reduce total emissions and who 
should pay for that reduction [11]. Further complications arise as neighboring states or countries 
introduce different policies. The interaction of different policies may not produce expected 
outcomes, furthering the need for coordination and study [12]. 
Given the existing inefficiencies in the electric grid and the new ones brought about by 
renewable energy, a 1988 quote from Fred Schweppe et al. in Spot Pricing of Electricity it just as true 
today as it was then.  
“The r e  i s  a  n e e d  f o r  f undamen ta l  c hang e s  i n  t h e  way s  s o c i e t y  v i ews  e l e c t r i c  e n e r g y . ”  
([13], page xvii) 
Electricity is essential for modern society; whether reading this dissertation on a screen or 
printed on paper, electricity was necessary for the production of the text. It is often considered 
an essential good, something necessary for modern life. However, most have little exposure to 
the production, distribution, and consumption of electricity beyond paying an electric bill. 
Difficulties in production and pricing are obscured from most consumers who have little notion 
of the existence of a wholesale market for electricity, nevertheless one operated every five 
minutes. In portraying a future market for electricity, Schweppe et al. describe a market in which 
both supply and demand participated. Today, supply plays an active role and demand is passive.  
The quote might also suggest that power experts today should reevaluate how they view the 
electric grid. New technology is constantly being developed that has the potential to impact grid 
operations. Researchers and industry professionals alike can aid in reimagining a grid that meets 
the needs of all participants and ensures a sustainable future. This dissertation examines a small 
piece of the complex electric system and address inefficiencies therein. The main contribution of 
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this dissertation is to suggest improvements to electricity markets in order to integrate more 
renewable energy into the electric system and provide the proper price signals for the market 
moving forward. The chapters introduce new modeling methods to make each aspect of the 
electric power system more efficient and provide illustrative applications. The remainder of 
Chapter 1 introduces the four topics in Chapters 2–5 through Sections 1.2–1.5. Section 1.2 
describes the issues around wholesale electricity market pricing. Section 1.3 focuses on proposed 
adjustments to reserve markets. Section 1.4 probes the concerns surrounding emissions and 
carbon leakage in regional networks. Section 1.5 explains issues that arise from cross-regional 
trade and consolidation of markets in between day-ahead and real-time markets. Section 1.6 
discusses the tools used within the dissertation and the scope of the remaining chapters.  
1.2 ELECTRICITY MARKET PRICING 
Chapter 2 focuses on electricity as a commodity, one that can be purchased and sold in a 
variety of contexts. Many people are most familiar with the prices they pay to a local utility on 
their home’s monthly electric bill. These are known as retail prices for electricity, and usually 
regulated by a state Public Utilities Commission.1 Although there are many options for retail rate 
design (e.g., time-of-use, flat rate), these prices are not determined from a competitive market 
auction.  
Beyond retail prices, there are wholesale prices of electricity. Wholesale prices are generally 
not available to end-use consumers, with some exceptions for large industrial loads, such as 
factories. Wholesale prices can be private information, for instance, due to negotiations or 
bilateral contracts between a utility and a power plant, or can be publicly available. For example, 
there are futures prices for electricity, which result from trade on public exchanges such as the 
                                                     
1 In some states there is an option for retail choice, or allowing customers to choose an alternate 




Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). Wholesale prices are also determined through auction markets, 
where buyers and sellers submit bids and offers through one of the seven electricity market 
auctions in the U.S. These auctions are operated by nonprofit entities known as Independent 
System Operators (ISOs) or Regional Transmission Operators (RTOs). Six of the seven markets 
are regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).2  
By the 1936 Federal Power Act, federally-regulated markets must provide just, reasonable, 
and not unduly discriminatory prices for all forms of generation, including alternative energy 
resources [14]. Given this broad mandate, all seven markets in the U.S. have created different 
pricing mechanisms, although they have many similarities. Operating electricity markets and 
finding a price for electricity is a difficult problem both economically and mathematically. From 
classic Econ. 101 [15], a supply/demand graph can be drawn showing an increasing supply curve 
based on marginal costs and a decreasing demand curve, left graph in Figure 1-1. However, 
thermal generators incur both marginal and fixed operating costs in every period they operate3. 
This makes the total supply curve ‘lumpy’ or non-convex. With fixed costs incurred during all 
operational periods, it is not clear what the resulting price should be. The right graph in Figure 
1-1 shows one possible visualization of a non-convex supply function, where there is a quantity 
under which it would be uneconomic to operate (“economic minimum operating level”), and the 
marginal cost of supply is a step function. This particular function happens to be quasiconvex.4 
However, not all marginal cost functions for electricity markets are quasiconvex. The convexity 
and quasiconvexity of the function depends on the input parameters, including whether the costs 
are increasing or have a quadratic term.  
                                                     
2 The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is completely contained within the state of 
Texas without interstate alternating current (ac) transmission lines. Because there are no 
interstate sales between ERCOT and another state over ac lines, it is not regulated by FERC.  
3 Fixed operating costs are not annual, long-term, or investment costs; they are costs incurred in 
every period that the plant operates. They are sometimes referred to as no load costs.  
4 For any two points in a quasiconvex function, all points in between will be no greater than 





Figure 1-1 Classic supply and demand curve (left) and one visualization for a non-convex supply curve 
(right) 
 
Mathematically, the optimization problem of deciding which generators to turn on and off 
for the following day is a difficult problem, called a mixed integer linear (or, more generally, 
nonlinear) problem (MILP). Unlike the classic supply demand problem, the solution to an MILP 
does not produce “a totally satisfactory dual,” or price [16]. There are alternative possible 
definitions of the price that result from the dual problem and dual variables when there are 
binary or integer variables [17], [18]. Both economics and mathematics do not provide 
straightforward answers to price non-convex markets, which has created a host of proposals for 
electricity pricing. Due to the difficulties in non-convex markets, existing pricing proposals can 
result in prices that might not be non-confiscatory, revenue neutral, and incentivize efficient 
investments. A description of these issues, along with a new pricing mechanism is developed in 
Chapter 2. Examples and a discussion of desirable properties of pricing mechanisms follow the 
detailed mathematical description. The contribution of this chapter is a new proposal to price 




















1.3 IMPROVEMENTS IN OPERATING RESERVE MARKETS 
As the penetration of renewable energy grows in Europe and across the world, ease of 
integration is becoming a growing concern. Many European countries have set targets for 
renewable penetration, with an overall European goal of 20% by 2020 and 27% by 2030 [19]. As 
part of the European 2020 goal, The Netherlands has a binding 14% renewable energy target. 
Improving reserve requirements is one means to lower the cost of renewable integration and 
reduce wind curtailment in order to meet the 14% target.  
Reserve is the additional capacity held on the system in case of errors in forecasts of load or 
generation, or transmission outages.  Traditionally, changes to generation would entail a 
generator tripping offline, which could be due to a disturbance or required maintenance. Without 
additional backup capacity, a large loss of power might cause the system operator to ‘shed load’ 
or cut power to a portion of the system. With enough backup power online, the loss of a single 
generator might not cause any issues. However, renewable energy outages are different in scale 
and quality; for instance, they can be correlated [20]. If a large storm causes wind turbine 
operators across Europe to feather or lock the turbine blades (in order to ensure safety), the 
power lost might be higher than the loss of any one thermal generator. 
There is also a more basic concern over renewable forecast uncertainty. Although 
forecasting has improved, German studies found that forecast error from a day-ahead forecast 
can be in the range of thousands of megawatts, and averages 4.5% of installed capacity [9], and 
can average about 20% of forecasted wind. As the penetration of renewable power increases, 
there will be forecast uncertainty for a large portion of generation in addition to demand. 
Holding additional reserves can prepare the system for such forecast errors.  
Chapter 3 explores three adjustments to the current reserve procurement strategy in the 
Netherlands in order to reduce total operating costs and expand renewable integration. The first 
adjustment is changing the size of the reserve requirement to be calculated daily, as opposed to 
current practice where it is determined seasonally. The second is co-optimizing energy and 
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reserve through a market, whereas current practice procures reserve through long-term contracts. 
Finally, the last adjustment is coordinating the allocation and activation of reserves between 
Northwest European countries, updating from current practice where each country acts 
individually. The three modifications can be made individually, in paired combinations, or all 
together. These combinations are simulated using a European network model with a focus on 
economic and renewable benefits for the Netherlands. The contribution of this chapter is the 
method of reserve market analysis and accompanying modeling of each type of improvement. 
The application also contributes an assessment of the reserve markets in the Netherlands based 
on economic efficiency and renewable integration.  
1.4 PRICING ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES IN 
REGIONS WITH ASYMMETRICAL POLICIES 
Carbon emissions are a leading cause of climate change [21]. One of the major sources of 
carbon emissions is from power plants, primarily coal, gas, and oil fueled plants; in 2016, 1,821 
million metric tons of CO2 was emitted from the U.S. electric power sector [22]. Reducing 
emissions from fossil fuel power plants is a high priority for many countries and regions around 
the world. In the U.S., there are several states and regions that have implemented carbon 
reduction policies, including the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the Northeast and the 
cap-and-trade program in California [23]. In 2016, a landmark international agreement, the Paris 
Climate Agreement, aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and global temperature rise was 
adopted by 174 countries. Although the agreement could have had an impact on national carbon 
reduction policies, the U.S. withdrew from the agreement in 2017 [24]. Even without the 
authority of the Paris Climate Agreement, existing reginal carbon policies are still in effect and 
will continue to influence the electric power system.  
Carbon policies, such as cap-and-trade, have an impact on both planning and operational 
decisions of power system operators. In the case of cap-and-trade policies, power plants must 
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hold enough allowances to cover their emissions. Those allowances can be acquired either by 
purchase or free allocation, depending on the exact policy demand. The allowances purchased in 
most existing cap-and-trade systems can impact the marginal cost offers of generators. If all 
states in a regional market implemented a cap-and-trade system, generators in that region could 
incorporate the cost of the allowances into their marginal cost bid. This would be a first-best 
option; the cost of carbon would directly impact dispatch and prices through generator bids into 
the market. However, not all states have implemented a carbon reduction mechanism. In the 
Eastern U.S., this has not caused many issues because of the methods states chose to implement 
cap-and-trade. Some are beginning to analyze options, but none have implemented market 
software changes to date [23], [25]. 
California, on the other hand, is unique because it operates a regional real-time market that 
extends to resources beyond California’s borders. Generators in surrounding states sell power 
into the California market in addition to their own local utilities. California has also implemented 
a cap-and-trade policy through Assembly Bill 32 (AB32) [26]. Being concerned that emissions 
from neighboring states would increase due to capped emissions in California, the California Air 
Resources Board (CARB) determined that emissions from imports should be accounted for 
when dispatching the regional real-time market [27]. Their concerns can be categorized into 
carbon leakage and contract shuffling. 
Carbon leakage has been defined as the increase in emissions from an unregulated region, 
which can be expressed as a ratio between the change in emissions in the unregulated region and 
the change of emissions within the regulated region [28]–[30]. This definition might not capture 
the accuracy of the overall reduction. For example, the cap-and-trade system might claim that 
total emissions inside and outside the region have been reduced by x (including an accounting 
for carbon associated with imports), but if total emissions in the regional electricity market are 
only reduced by y, and y<x, then x – y have “leaked” out. An alternative definition is proposed in 
this chapter, which compares the accounted for emissions reduction within the regulated region 
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and from imported power subject to the regulatory system, with the actual total reduction in 
emissions. This alternative definition is used because some pollutant trading systems attempt to 
penalize estimated emissions associated with imports in an attempt to prevent leakage.  In other 
words, leakage could be defined as just those emissions increases outside the regulated region 
that are unaccounted for by the regulated region. Each of the two leakage calculations provides 
different results and insights on the net emissions effect of alternative system dispatch models 
that try to limit leakage in different ways. 
In California, the set of plants covered by a carbon policy is a subset of plants that 
participate in the real-time integrated market. Plants outside of California might be dispatched to 
directly or indirectly serve California load because they are less expensive, but might cause overall 
higher emissions. Although leakage is calculated for carbon in California within this chapter [11], 
emissions leakage applies broadly to other pollutants and regulation. Possible examples can 
include sulfur leakage in the case of the Title IV Clean Air Act SO2 trading program, where 
Canada or Mexico export more power to the US to replace shut-down high sulfur coal plants, 
and those county’s sulfur emissions go up. Another example is carbon emissions in states 
neighboring the Northeast’s Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) region, where 
neighboring states emissions might increase due to exports while RGGI states shut down their 
coal-fired plants [31].  
The concept of contract shuffling is a related but distinct idea that contributes to incorrect 
accounting of emissions associated with imports under the second definition of leakage.  
Contract shuffling occurs when low emitting plants outside a regulated region that would have 
operated even without the emissions regulations (e.g., California’s AB32 cap-and-trade system) 
are designated as exporting to and serving the regulated region. The plants are supposedly 
displacing imports to the regulated region from higher emitting plants elsewhere outside the 
regulated region (here, California), but in fact there is no change in operations, only a change to 
who “provides” the imports. There is then an illusion that imports have become cleaner when it 
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is not necessarily the case; contract shuffling is the quantification of the extent to which this 
occurs. While the higher emitting plants are not directly serving California customers, 
California’s demand for imports is increasing net demand in the non-regulated region and thus 
contributes to the demand for the dirtier plants’ output.  
Both carbon leakage and contract shuffling are difficult to address in an electricity market 
encompassing multiple regions with different environmental rules, and these challenges are 
relevant to many parts of the country and world. No single answer has emerged for how to 
count, model, and price the externality. California has been in the lead in defining new 
approaches to attempt to account for leakage and contract shuffling associated with imported 
power, and in this Chapter, the effect of alternative approaches upon costs, emissions, leakage, 
profitability, and other market outcomes is simulated. 
In particular, Chapter 4 analyzes five possible methods that a system operator could 
implement to trade emissions between regions to reduce carbon leakage and contract shuffling. 
The methods have trade-offs between lowering total emissions, reducing costs, and maintaining 
price incentives for each player. In comparing the methods, the chapter contributes to literature 
on pricing environmental externalities when trading partners place different value on the 
externality. The comparison notes the trade-offs and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of 
the five methods.  
1.5 TRADE BETWEEN NEIGHBORING REGIONS IN 
TEMPORALLY-DIFFERENTIATED MARKETS 
Electricity auctions are administered in different time frames. Markets have developed in this 
way for many reasons. Many thermal generators have long startup times that require advanced 
notice. Other fossil fuel generators, especially natural gas, must secure fuel contracts the day 
prior to delivery. There is also uncertainty in the load forecast (customer demand), and reliability 
can be ensured through contingency model runs. One day prior to operation, an auction is run 
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which determines the schedule and prices for the following twenty-fours. In some markets, one 
hour prior to operation another auction is run to determine advisory updates to the day-ahead 
schedule [32]. At least one additional auction is operated before delivery, which is fifteen or five 
minutes ahead of delivery to balance supply and demand given the updated forecast [4]. Often, 
however, modeling of electricity markets simulates a market in a single time frame rather than 
considering their multi-settlement nature. However, day-ahead and real-time markets can interact 
with each other and impact trade between regions.  
Chapter 5 examines the inefficiencies with trade between neighboring regions between the 
day-ahead and real-time markets. The interactions between these markets might become more 
stressed due to renewable energy; wind and solar can be plentiful in one region and due to 
uncertainty with actual generation output, not be delivered in real-time. The assumptions about 
trade between the two markets can impact the success of renewable integration. Because of this, 
some markets have consolidated to simulate one large region rather than several smaller ones. In 
the Western U.S., California has begun an integrated real-time market (as mentioned in Section 
1.4). Europe has also implemented integrated models with price coupling between regions. There 
are many different combinations of day-ahead and real-time integration schemes, many of which 
might lead to inefficiencies in the overall market even if one time frame is efficient (i.e., the day-
ahead is efficient but the day-ahead and real-time together are not). This chapter simulates two 
regions using different trading policies in two market time frames to determine the impact of 
trade in the different time periods.  
1.6 TOOLS AND SCOPE 
Electricity markets are unique in that they combine tools from electrical engineering, 
operations research, and economics. Electrical engineering provides understanding of the 
fundamental physics of the power system, and the reliability and cost issues that might arise if 
operated sub-optimally. The backbone of market operations is mathematical optimization 
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modeling from operations research. Optimization tools are used in power system planning, and 
day-to-day and real-time operations. While optimization models are often considered tools, 
algorithmic and computer science developments can become vitally important for speeding up 
simulation run times. Finally, economics plays a major role in both planning and operating the 
electric grid. The costs used in planning and bids using in operations are evaluated through 
financial means. Electricity markets necessarily involve participant behavior, and modeling is 
necessary to examine a participant’s ability to exercise market power, form coalitions, and 
respond to incentives.  
Power grid operators are also auctioneers, managing uniform price auctions every five 
minutes. The auctions are shaped by physical constrains but governed by economic principles. A 
cultural anthropologist studying electricity wrote, “…electricity alters our conventional 
understandings of commodities, economics, and markets” [33]. Electricity is a field that brings 
these three disciplines together, where engineers find themselves working in market design and 
economists learn the basics of power flow. The projects described in the chapters attempt to 
bridge the fields, bringing theory and applications from each into the different projects. The 
models used in each chapter are fundamentally operations research (optimization) models with 
economic objective functions and constraints that represent physical laws and limits and policies.  
There are four projects in this dissertation, organized into Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5. The new 
pricing proposal is described in Chapter 2. Pricing is introduced in Section 2.1 followed by a 
description of the fundamental economic principles that are the foundation of the pricing 
scheme in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 reviews current literature on the proposed and existing pricing 
schemes and evaluates them side-by-side in a table. Section 2.4 elaborates on the assumptions 
made, both about market rules and bidding behavior of demand. A detailed model formulation 
along with mathematical justification and proofs is detailed in Section 2.5. It begins with the 
basic unit commitment problem, its dual, and the modifications made to the dual to create the 
proposal, the Dual Pricing Algorithm (DPA). Formulations for other major pricing proposals are 
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in Section 2.6. Examples using the DPA are explained in Section 2.7, along with comparison to 
existing pricing methods. Section 2.8 discusses some of the implications of the DPA and trends 
seen in the examples.  
Improvements to reserve markets in the Netherlands are the focus of Chapter 3. The topic is 
introduced in Section 3.1, with details about how European and U.S. markets differ. Background 
information about European and Dutch reserve markets is found in Section 3.2, along with a 
review of current literature on reserves, reserve requirements, and studies on reserve 
coordination. The modeling framework for the reserve market is explained in Section 3.3, with 
details about each of the three suggested improvements. The results of the study are shown in 
Section 3.4, focusing on how the simulations total operating costs increase or decrease, the 
amount of wind curtailment, and trade between regions. The conclusions of the study are 
interpreted in Section 3.5, with a focus on which improvement would provide the greatest 
impact and the limitations of the study.  
Chapter 4 evaluates the impact of greenhouse gas allowances on electricity markets. Section 
4.1 introduces both topics and 4.2 provides background literature on carbon policies and details 
on the California cap-and-trade system. The models for greenhouse gas emissions are explained 
and formulated in Section 4.3. A small case study of the Western U.S. is provided in Section 4.4 
with results showing the trade-offs between emissions and costs. Finally, Section 4.5 discusses 
the strengths and weaknesses of the five models.  
The evaluation of trade and coordination between balancing areas is can be found in 
Chapter 5. An introduction to the issues of coordination in time between two regions can be 
found in Section 5.1, with a literature review in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 formulates and explains 
mathematical formulations for day-ahead and real-time markets. Section details the three 
simulations being compared for each of the day-ahead and real-time markets. The simulations 
results are in Section 5.6, and the conclusions about coordination and trade are assessed in 
Section 5.7, where total system costs are one of the main drivers of comparison.  
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The broad conclusions that can be drawn from the projects comprising this thesis are 
presented in Chapter 6. Each of the analyses suggests one or more improvements that can be 
made to electricity markets in the U.S. or Europe. One of the main messages of the studies is 
that there are significant benefits from coordination and a need for appropriate pricing. Possible 
future research building on these analyses is explored in in that chapter. Finally, the Appendix 






CHAPTER 2  
MULTI-PERIOD DUAL PRICING 
ALGORITHM IN NON-CONVEX ISO 
MARKETS 
 
Generation cos ts  in e l ect r i c i ty  markets  are  non -convex functions  o f output ; as  a 
result ,  pr ice s  may not  be monotonical ly  non -decreas ing  with demand .  Further, 
suppli er  revenues  may not  cover  al l  variable  cos ts .  Consequently ,  i t  can be  di f f icult 
to  def ine  a s ingle  pri ce  at  each node th at  results  in a balance  o f  supply  and demand. 
There fore ,  most  organized power  markets  in the  U.S. currently  pay a two-part  pr ice 
at  each node,  consist ing  o f  a publi c  marg inal  pric e  and a private  make -whole 
payment tailo red to each generator who would o therwise  incur  variable  cos ts  that 
exceed the ir revenue.  The expense o f these  make -whole payments , also  cal led upl i f t  
payments,  is  usually  allocated evenly  across  all  cus tomers .  This  al locat ion method 
does  not  take into  cons iderat ion who benef it s from the  addit ional  cos ts .  This  paper 
proposes  an al ternat ive  algor ithm for  pri ces  in a non -convex market  and a means to 
al locate those  pri ces  to  market  parti c ipants  called the  Dual Pri cing  Algori thm 
(DPA). Basic  princ iples o f  market design are used as  the foundat ion for the new 
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approach in an auction market that is  revenue neutral and non -conf iscatory .  The 
general  f ramework  presents  a cost  allo cation s cheme that  achieves  the  maximum  
market  surplus  and can be fur ther  modif ied to  cons ider  equi ty  obje ct ives  def ined by 
the  sys tem operator.  
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
In many commodity markets, supply and demand curves provide a single market clearing 
price. In electricity markets, the non-convexities in bid and offer functions can make the 
traditional single market clearing price insufficient for generators to recover their variable costs 
(e.g., costs of start-ups) [34]. Markets in the U.S. currently provide make-whole or uplift 
payments for generators to ensure that they will, at a minimum, recover their operating costs.5 
Unlike the single market clearing price in markets with only marginal costs6, supply in U.S. 
electricity markets can bid operational fixed costs and receive payment with a two-part price: a 
single price in time and space and a discriminatory private uplift payment. The system operator 
recovers the uplift payments in most cases by allocating it to customers, and it is often evenly 
distributed among consumers on a per MWh basis, even though not all consumers contribute to 
the need for such a payment [5]. When costs are allocated too broadly they dilute the price and 
location signal needed to stimulate investment in better alternatives, such as transmission 
infrastructure or more efficient generators. The outcome of the spot market has implications for 
both bilateral contracts and investment decisions. For multiple markets to be efficient, they must 
signal each other via public or transparent information. Meaning, prospective entrants to the 
market should have enough information about potential revenue sources to make an entry or 
investment decisions.  
                                                     
5 The focus of this chapter is U.S. markets. European markets differ by region, and are generally 
purely financial. The market mechanism offers more complex bidding, but does not consider 
power flow; see [62] and [63].  
6 These are known as convex markets, defined in Section 2.2. 
 
 20 
 Day-ahead markets aim to find the surplus (consumption benefits minus costs) 
maximizing schedule for supply (including generator commitments) and price responsive 
demand.  Because of non-convexities in generator costs, a mixed integer linear program called 
unit commitment (UC) is used.7 In most markets, after the efficient dispatch has been 
determined, a pricing run determines the price of electricity at each hour and node (or bus) in the 
market. Pricing practice by most independent system operators (ISO) reruns the unit 
commitment model fixing the binary on/off decisions and relaxing the minimum operating level 
of the fast-start generators to zero [35].  
The locational marginal prices (LMPs) result from the dual variable or shadow price of the 
node balance constraint. The uplift payment to a generator is determined ex-post based on its 
total economic loss, and varies between day-ahead and real-time (i.e., a real-time profit cannot 
compensate for day-ahead losses).8 The independent system operator in the mid-Atlantic, PJM, 
notes that uplift average $389,000/day, but can be higher depending on conditions; during the 
cold weather even in January 2018, uplift costs increased to $4.3 million/day [36]. The LMPs are 
public and non-discriminatory, while the uplifts are discriminatory and private, lest they divulge 
specific generator information.9 This public-private split means market participants and investors 
only know part of the information necessary to enter the market, resulting in a resulting in a 
weakened investment signal.  
                                                     
7 Unit commitment objective functions can be difficult to solve because they are usually 
discontinuous. Some unit commitment formulations might result in objective functions that are 
quasi-convex, which are easier to solve compared to non-convex problems.  
8 As defined here, ex-post pricing means that prices are determined after the optimal unit 
commitment schedule has been determined; for LMP pricing, prices are based on the marginal 
resource’s marginal cost. Prices determined before the scheduling run might not be incentive 
compatible for supply [230] or cause system operators to change the dispatch based on prices 
[231]. Ex-post prices are consistent with schedules, including any operator actions.  
9 Uplift payments are generally determined over a twenty-four hour period, and generators would 
be able to determine if they are receiving a payment given enough insight into their own output. 
In order to determine if they receive a payment, they would need to know the dispatch, bid 
function, and prices from the day-ahead market (including reserve market bids and quantities), 
and actual output and prices from the real-time market. Using this information, they would be 
able to calculate if they are operating at a loss; the amount of the loss is the uplift payment.  
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Over the last few years, many ISOs have decided to change or update aspects of their 
wholesale pricing mechanisms. Additionally, FERC has published a Notice of Proposed Rule 
Making (NOPR) on the topic of price formation. As part of the price formation process, each 
ISO submitted responses to a FERC Order Directing Reports requesting information on their 
pricing philosophy and treatment of certain variables in the unit commitment problem. Although 
not active at the time of submission, every ISO has determined an alternate to LMP pricing for a 
subset of units. These units can broadly be described as ‘fast start’ units, or those who can 
quickly startup when called upon to perform. Midcontinent ISO and ISO New England relax the 
binary variable in the pricing run, while PJM, New York ISO, and the CAISO10 relax the 
minimum operating level and change the energy bid in the objective. These changes to pricing 
indicate that the LMP alone might not be able to send an incentive compatible price signal to 
market participants. Current implementations of fast start pricing have not necessarily changed 
prices significantly. MISO found that only 3% of prices changed from the baseline pricing 
method (LMP). This is partially due to the subset of resources that can set the price; only 
resources considered ‘fast start’ can set the price, and therefore the impact will be limited. A 
further discussion of price signals can be found in Section 2.2, and formulations for several 
alternative pricing schemes can be found in Section 2.6. 
The combination of LMP and socialized uplift allocation has also caused poor investment 
signals. Historical examples on Cape Cod and in the upper peninsula of Michigan show that 
marginal pricing mechanisms can hide or misallocate funds  [37], [38]. The Canal Units on Cape 
Cod were run daily due to their long startup times and other regional specifications. The 
generators only supported customers on Cape Cod, i.e., without Cape Cod demand, the 
generators would not be needed. However, the costs associated with operating the units were 
allocated to all of Lower Southeastern Massachusetts. This region as a whole did not benefit, and 
                                                     
10 The CAISO mechanism is called constrained on generators (COGs), which are voluntary for 
generators and are not currently utilized by any generator.  
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it was found that costs should have been allocated primarily to Cape Cod [37]. Had the costs in 
Cape Cod been higher, it is possible an alternative source or upgrade could have been installed. 
In a similar case in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, the Presque Isle Power Plant generated a 
majority of power for Michigan residents and was used for reliability in Michigan. Instead of 
allocating costs to Michigan, Wisconsin utilities were also charged. In the case that followed, this 
allocation was found unjust and unreasonable [38]. Both cases would benefit from an allocation 
methodology that assigns costs to responsible parties. The proposed method attempts to follow 
basic economic principles in order to create an efficient market.  
With the underlying principle of maximizing social welfare and building on the description in 
[39], the proposed dual pricing algorithm outlined in this chapter aims to provide an alternate 
approach to efficient prices and cost allocation of make-whole payments. This paper provides a 
detailed explanation and justification for the single-period pricing method proposed in [39], and 
details the current literature on non-convex pricing. It also contributes a non-trivial extension to 
multiple periods and many supporting examples. The algorithm is based on the dual formulation 
to the post-unit commitment problem, hence it is called the Dual Pricing Algorithm. Unlike 
other pricing mechanisms, this algorithm allocates all costs, maintains market surplus, is non-
confiscatory, and revenue neutral. These principles are examined in detail in Section 2.2. Section 
2.3 discusses previous literature. Section 2.5 explains the multi-period dual pricing algorithm, and 
Section 2.6 describes several alternate pricing mechanisms. The results, discussion, and 
conclusions are in 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9.  
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2.2 FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES  
2.2.1 Market Surplus and Secondary Principles 
The basic principle of market design underlying the Dual Pricing Algorithm (DPA) is 
efficiency, as measured by the maximization of market surplus, where market surplus is the sum 
of consumer surplus, producer surplus (profit), and congestion surplus [40]–[42]. From this basic 
principle, three other guiding principles are developed below. Market scheduling software (day-
ahead and real-time) attempts to determine the efficient unit commitment schedule and dispatch 
for resources in electric markets. Because of the non-convexities, the market clearing price is not 
guaranteed to cover the startup and fixed operating costs for any individual generator [43]. In 
order to guarantee that both generation and demand are not incentivized to leave the market 
(have non-negative profit and value), we include non-confiscation as the first of three secondary 
principles for the DPA (after the primary principle of maximizing market surplus). Non-
confiscation ensures that both suppliers and demand will at least break even if they are part of 
the efficient dispatch; in other words, we ensure bid cost recovery. Any costs that a generator 
bids into the market are guaranteed to be repaid. There are exceptions to this rule in current 
markets, which would not be impacted by the DPA. For instance, if a participant is found to 
have market power or bid beyond a certain percent of a baseline, then the bid can be mitigated 
back to the baseline. Depending on the case, the generator might only be guaranteed recovery of 
the baseline bid. This principle is related to the idea of incentive compatibility and supporting 
prices [44]. A generator should not find it profitable to self-schedule into the market given the 
market prices and rules. This issue is discussed in more detail in Section 2.5.6. 
The second principle is revenue neutrality, which implies revenue adequacy in the market. 
Specifically, we propose that the market should give out what it takes in; this applies to all energy 
and uplift payments from both supply and demand. The ISOs are non-profit organizations, and 
therefore should not plan to profit from market interactions.  Any surpluses (such as congestion 
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surpluses) are distributed either back to consumers or to holders of financial transmission rights 
[45], [46].  
Third, the market should incentivize efficient participation and investment; this principle 
must hold in order to adequately build resources that will improve overall market efficiency. 
Efficient participation in the short term requires a pricing mechanism that supports the optimal 
schedule and ensures full bid cost recovery. The latter is guaranteed through the non-
confiscation principle, and supporting the optimal schedule is a non-trivial assurance. In order to 
accomplish this goal, any mechanism that increases the price beyond marginal costs must 
dissuade participants from ‘chasing’ higher prices. Further details of the DPA’s method of 
incentivizing participants to stay on dispatch can be found in Section 2.5.6.  
Similar to incentivizing efficient dispatch, incentivizing efficient investment is a difficult task. 
A new entrant to the market, either generation or consumption, must consider their ability to 
clear the market. The uplift payment is private information; this therefore introduces an 
additional revenue uncertainty when a potential entrant is contemplating an investment decision. 
In most markets, the only public information is the price: the LMP or energy price. LMP is one 
valid signal for investment in a convex market, but it may be too low for a non-convex signal. A 
new entrant can consider whether their marginal cost bid will beat the LMP, but this information 
alone is not a good indication if they will be selected for the optimal dispatch. A potential plant 
might have a higher marginal cost, but can still clear the market with a lower fixed cost bid. 
Although rigorous quantification of entry and efficient investments is difficult (and outside the 
scope of this dissertation), it has been explored by [47]. According to [48] the investment 
criterion for consumers (or producers) under optimal spot pricing and convex costs is to invest 
in new resources if it lowers costs (or increases profits), and this occurs if and only if the 
investment lowers total system costs. Pricing with LMP and make-whole payments under non-
convex costs could cause the investment criterion to fail for some efficient investments.  
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Price volatility and the presence or absence of monotonically non-decreasing price-demand 
relationship are two issues that arise in the non-convex pricing literature [49], [50]. Volatility 
often refers to rapid increases and decreases over time, which can also be the case for prices 
under LMP pricing. However, in this context volatility usually refers to changes in price as over 
increasing levels of demand. To economists, the volatility of efficient prices is of little concern. 
Prices should reflect the relationship between supply and demand and should include any 
volatility due to congestion, scarcity, or non-convexities. However, electric markets often 
suppress volatility in favor of ‘stable’ prices or fixing a scarcity problem with an out-of-market 
correction [51]. A pricing mechanism with a monotonically non-decreasing price-demand 
relationship might not reflect the true costs of the system, resulting in inefficiencies. Demand in 
many industries benefit from quantity discounts, or bulk purchases for a lower price. However, 
prices resulting from monotonically non-decreasing methods11 can never reflect the cost savings 
due to higher generation production. This paper strives to create a pricing algorithm that 
supports market efficiency, and therefore we do not limit the method to one which will produce 
stable prices or prices that are monotonically non-decreasing with demand. The following two 
sections discuss discriminatory pricing and assumptions made in the formulation. 
2.2.2 Uplift Allocation: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing  
An even distribution of uplift payments can provide misleading signals for investment. Even 
allocation entails splitting the needed lump payment among customers based on their total 
consumption (total uplift payment divided by demand in MWh). The DPA aims to allocate uplift 
in a discriminatory fashion among supply and demand, justifying the payments and charges with 
a scheme defined by Ramsey in 1927 [52]. This is often called the inverse elasticity pricing rule, 
or value-based pricing, because less elastic demand curves have a total higher valuation per unit, 
equal to the integral of the demand curve divided by quantity demanded. Its use requires 
                                                     
11 Methods like convex hull pricing, described in Section 2.3. 
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knowledge of cost and demand functions. Ramsey’s result shows that in the presence of fixed 
costs, the efficient result can be discriminatory pricing in proportion to demand elasticity. It can 
be argued that the language of the Federal Power Act would define it as not unduly 
discriminatory since it is efficiency enhancing. 
The result was extended by Boiteux in 1956 for electricity markets, differentiating between a 
public and private price [53]. Ramsey-Boiteux pricing separates the single Ramsey price into a 
public price charged to all demand and a private discriminatory price that is different for each 
consumer based on that customer’s elasticity; the total price paid is the sum of the two.  The 
public price is the marginal cost (if less than average cost) and the public portion results in 
revenues that make up for any fixed costs not covered by the public price.  Demand that is more 
inelastic, with a higher marginal value, will pay more of the fixed cost. Described in detail in 
Section 2.5, the DPA introduces uplift payments and charges for both demand and generation. 
In order to maintain non-confiscation for both parties, uplift is distributed according to the bids 
and offers placed in the market.  
2.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on non-convex pricing in electricity markets can broadly be divided into 
proposals that advocate for a single market clearing price, and those that impose two- or multi-
part pricing. U.S. markets today use multi-part pricing; a clearing price and side payments, 
including uplift payments. The difficulty in side-payments is determining how the market 
operator should recover its costs by allocating them among other market parties. Most schemes 
do not include specific allocation instructions, leading to inefficiencies such as the historical 
examples mentioned in 2.1. Alternatively, a single market clearing price is one known by all 
participants inside and out of the market. The price must be high enough to cover all costs of all 
resources in the market so as to be non-confiscatory. Given the difficulties in non-convex 
pricing, it is important to evaluate potential implications of new pricing methods.  
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O’Neill et al. provided a foundational model for two-part pricing of electricity that supports 
the optimal schedule [43]. The locational public price paid by all market participants at a given 
location is determined from the dual variable of the node balance constraint in a linear 
programming model of the UC problem that results from fixing the values of the binary 
variables at their optimal level. The second part of the price is determined from the dual variable 
that fixes the binary variables to their optimal schedule; a generator will only receive this payment 
if they suffer a loss (a negative value in the formulation in Section 2.5.1).12 This value is the cost 
to cover a generator’s fixed operating costs. Markets today use an approach similar to [43], with 
exceptions for subsets of generation, such as fast-start generators [5].  
However, the O’Neill et al. approach suffers from having many alternative prices 
(degeneracy) in general.  Subsequent research focused on finding prices with other desirable 
properties.  Convex hull pricing, proposed in [54] and [55], minimizes total uplift by creating the 
convex hull of the total cost function so that costs are a non-decreasing convex function of load. 
Researchers in collaboration with the Midcontinent Independent System Operator have 
suggested solution techniques for the convex hull in [56], [57], and have implemented an 
Extended LMP (ELMP), which relaxes the binary condition on the unit commitment variable, 
allowing it to be between zero and one [58]. Bjørndal and Jörnsten modify the prices from [43] 
to create less volatile prices and uplift charges [50]. Using the same example modified in [54], 
they show increasing stability of average prices compared to [43].  
Other models attempt to internalize uplift prices with zero-sum transfers, or payments 
between all participants or all generators that sum to zero. These include a “general uplift 
approach” using a quadratic objective in [59] and [60], and a “minimum zero-sum uplift” model 
that ensures that all generators break even in [49]. The method in [49] ensures that profitable 
generators do not to increase their profits by transferring additional payments to unprofitable 
                                                     
12 A positive value from this formulation could be interpreted as a penalty assessed against a 
generator that is constrained off if it decides to turn on. 
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generators. Van Vyve proposes a non-confiscatory pricing method with separate and allocated 
uplift payments in [44], which results in average cost pricing if demand is inelastic. The authors 
in [49] also demonstrate average cost pricing for inelastic demand given two types of suppliers.  
Finally, three methods attempt to create a single price that can cover both marginal and fixed 
costs. In [61] they use the solution technique of Lagrangian Relaxation to create a Semi-
Lagrangian Relaxation, which relaxes node balance constraint and adds it to objective with a 
penalty price. That price is found by iterating to obtain the same objective as the original MIP 
and raising the clearing price to cover any fixed costs. In [62], the authors use both the primal 
and dual constraints to increase the clearing price to provide non-negative profits to all 
generators. Additional literature addressing non-convex pricing in electricity markets that does 
not directly suggest a new methodology can be found in [63], [64], and an additional method that 
solves a binary Nash game [65]. 
In a review article, Liberopoulos and Andrianesis analytically compare many non-convex 
pricing methods to determine the relative prices, payments and profits that result from each 
method [49]; they that find no method dominates with respect to their pricing criteria. In a 
similar vein to their comparison table, Table 2-1 shows a comparison of many of the methods 
described above. The columns show individual methodologies and the rows describe economic 
principles used to evaluate each method. These principles are the same as those described in 
Section 2.2, principles that are fundamental for the proposed pricing mechanism: maximizing 
market surplus, non-confiscation, revenue neutrality, and maintaining the optimal dispatch. 
Methods where uplift payments are determined outside of the model do not guarantee revenue 
adequacy (and therefore neutrality), since there might not be enough surplus from demand to 
pay the side-payment. All methods account for non-confiscation of supply offers; however not 
all explicitly account for non-confiscation of demand bids. The third row indicates whether or 
not the demand side was explicitly incorporated or if non-confiscation of demand is enforced 
through the pricing mechanism by itself. Many methods might be able to incorporate demand 
 
 29 
side participation in modeling but have not accounted for their participation in the publication. 
Transparency is designated in the fourth row. Any mechanism which includes uplift has a 
discriminatory and private payment; unless the payments are made public, the pricing scheme 
cannot be considered wholly transparent. The DPA can be adjusted or conditioned to provide 
either a single or two-part price, making transparency dependent on conditioning. The 
penultimate row describes the uplift present in the problem, whether it is allocated internally or 
determined after the pricing run (ex-post),13 or zero for single part pricing. Although not 
documented directly in Table 2-1, all methods but the second are adjusted to incorporate fixed 
costs in some form into the price (to help the unit recovery costs), whereas the price resulting 
from [43] will be a unit’s marginal cost. The last row defines a mathematical category for the 
pricing problem proposed, with one category defined loosely as “LP+”. This category is meant 
to encompass math programs that can be linear, but are nontrivial to determine at each 
implementation. The remaining categories are linear (LP), mixed integer program (MIP), convex 
program (CP), and non-linear program (NLP).  
Table 2-1: Comparison of Non-Convex Pricing Methods 























Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
Revenue neutral Y N N N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Includes demand 
side  
Y N N N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Maintain optimal 
dispatch 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
Transparency Y N N N N N Y/N Y Y Y 
Uplifts Ex-post Ex-post Ex-post Ex-post Ex-post Internal Internal None None None 
Pricing problem 
type 
LP LP CP LP LP+ NLP LP LP LP+ MIP* 
* Combination scheduling and pricing run, linearized MINLP; all other methods are post-UC pricing runs 
 
                                                     
13 System operators in most markets first determine the generation schedule and then determine 




The table does not necessarily suggest a single dominant method, but can be used as an 
evaluation tool for the pricing schemes. Since no method is best in all criterion, there are trade-
offs.  A market designer can prioritize the criteria and select a method that best meets the needs 
and objectives of the market and its stakeholders.  
Methods for non-convex pricing must recover any make whole payments through some 
allocation system. A simple approach would levy a fixed $/MWh fee to all loads. Few of the two-
part pricing methods explicitly describe how uplift costs will be allocated, and there is little 
allocation literature focused on electricity. A general discussion of the theory and applications of 
cost allocation to many industries can be found in a series of essays edited by Young [66]. 
Electric market literature on cost allocation is mainly focused on transmission investments, such 
as a comparison of methods for cost allocation of transmission lines [67], [68]. As discussed in 
Section 2.2.2, we use Ramsey-Boiteux pricing to determine cost allocation through demand 
elasticity.  
2.4 ASSUMPTIONS  
There are several assumptions made in the model and algorithm. Each assumption is 
described briefly in this section, with further explanation of the impact of each in the discussion 
in Section 2.8.  
2.4.1 Demand-Side Bidding 
Although common in electricity market modeling, demand in this formulation is not 
infinitely valued, i.e., demand is assumed to be responsive to price. We assume that consumers 
bid their true value into the market; although it is possible that the bid is large (>> supply offer), 
it is not infinite. With completely inelastic (fixed) demand, methods like Ramsey-Boiteux cannot 
be used capture any flexibility for assigning payment of fixed costs, meaning there would be no 
advantage to discriminating among different consumers when recovering costs. Any costs that 
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arise from the market (such as uplift) are guaranteed adequate because there is no value assigned 
to demand, i.e., demand is modeled as completely inelastic. In an experimental design, the 
authors in [69] show that demand side bidding reduces the exercise of market power and brings 
prices to a competitive level. Although the implementation is simple, in that we assume that 
demand bids are step functions, this is not a limiting assumption, as the procedure can be 
adapted to continuous downward sloping demand. Advances in demand side participation is not 
the focus of this pricing method, and well researched details on necessity, benefits, and 
experience can be found in Chapter 2.6 of [70]. 
The approach does not require an elastic demand side, but the market is more efficient when 
demand is elastic and demand-side participation is taken into account. Demand-side participation 
has become the focus of a great deal of research and interest in recent years, although the 
authors agree that it will take many years for the majority of demand to become elastic [71]–[73]. 
Mathematically, any variable the represents unserved load in market models can be considered to 
be a proxy for demand bids: load will not consume (be curtailed) if it reaches some value, albeit a 
very high value. DPA can be easily applied even if a majority of demand bids at a high value (e.g., 
$10,000/MWh).  
Many markets today allow for price responsive demand, although participation is low. The 
actual percentage of load bidding into markets is difficult to estimate [74]; CAISO saw between 
500-1000 MW bid in near the cap in each month in the latter half of 2016 [75]. NYISO offers 
economic based demand response programs, with more information available in [76].  
2.4.2 Single-Node System 
The DPA model is intentionally simple in order to examine the new mechanism without 
introducing the complications of a network. Interpreting pricing from a network model would 
also involve consideration of the impact of congestion. All examples in Section 2.7 are single-
node or can be considered a copperplate network. The addition of an electric network and other 
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generation constraints can be added in future research. Their addition is not necessarily 
straightforward, since complications arise: how should uplift be allocated across a network, can 
ramping constraints be properly represented, will reserve prices impact energy prices?  
2.4.3 Penalties and Lost Opportunity Costs 
The DPA method enforces administrative penalties rather than lost opportunity cost (LOC) 
payments to incentivize following the operator dispatch signal. There can be many types of lost 
opportunity costs in electricity markets. If generators are dispatched for reactive power support, 
voltage support, reserve, or other ancillary services, they are generally eligible to receive some 
type of lost opportunity cost payment. In these cases, the generators are asked to deviate from 
normal operations by the system operator and receive payments as reimbursement for gross 
margins they could have received if they were allowed to follow the original dispatch orders. 
These payments are due to operator action and, in the case of operating reserves, are 
automatically calculated by the market software, and are unaffected by the DPA method. 
Since following the efficient dispatch along with the LMP may cause participants to forego 
additional profits, specific rules are required to ensure generators maintain output. As part of the 
DPA procedure, administrative penalties are calculated to disincentivize generators from 
deviating away from the dispatch signal. In addition to the penalty, any redispatch costs due to 
uninstructed deviations should be paid by the generator. A further discussion of penalty 
definitions and additional market rules is presented in Section 2.5.6. 
2.5 MODEL FORMULATION AND SETTLEMENTS 
In this chapter, we explain the derivation of the DPA constraints using a multi-period 
model, first explaining the canonical unit commitment model and dual problem. The multi-
period model is an extension of the single-period model originally published in [77]. Although 
they are not equivalent, the following presents the derivation of the multi-period case together 
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with some observations on the single-period model. Section 2.5.1 explains a basic unit 
commitment model and its dual problem. The settlement that is obtained from the basic model 
based on [43] is explained in Section 2.5.2. Modifications made to the dual problem to formulate 
the DPA are described in Section 2.5.3, and additional constraints to manage non-unique prices 
are in Section 2.5.4. The full DPA formulation is in Section 2.5.5, with additional rules explained 
in 2.5.6. 
2.5.1 Unit Commitment Model and Dual  
The formulation in (2-1)-(2-7) is the canonical unit commitment problem from [43]. Without 
transmission, reserve, and other generator characteristics, the unit commitment problem 
becomes a simple model that, as the name suggests, commits generators for the following day 
and used in real-time commitment for short start units. The objective in (2-1) is to maximize 
social welfare or market surplus. Both demand bids and generator offers are included, where 
generators can bid startup and fixed operating costs. Constraint (2-2) matches supply and 
demand in each time period. The generator minimum and maximum operating limits are in (2-3), 
and (2-4) defines the logic for the startup variable. Constraint (2-5) places bounds on the 
maximum and minimum dispatch for demand. Finally, (2-6) and (2-7) define the variables 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
and 𝑧𝑖𝑡 to be binary, making this model a mixed-integer linear program. Chapters 3 and 4 will 
explain a more complex unit commitment model, which also includes generator ramping, 
minimum up and down times, transmission, and reserve constraints.  
max ∑ (∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑡 − ∑ (𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝑂𝐶𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑆𝑈𝑧𝑖𝑡)𝑖∈𝐺𝑖∈𝐷 )𝑡∈𝑇   (2-1) 
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑡 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑖∈𝐺𝑖∈𝐷




𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑢𝑖𝑡 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇  (2-3) 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 ≤ 𝑧𝑖𝑡  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑡 ∈ {2. . 𝑇}  (2-4) 
0 ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑑𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐷, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇  (2-5) 
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𝑢𝑖𝑡 ∈ {0,1} ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇  (2-6) 
𝑧𝑖𝑡 ∈ {0,1} ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇  (2-7) 
The formulation in (2-8)-(2-14) is the post-unit commitment pricing run. The post-unit 
commitment model is the second model the market software runs, where the scheduling run in 
(2-1)-(2-7) is the first. There are many other runs that can occur, including models for market 
power mitigation, where supplier offers can be modified if they are suspected of attempting to 
exercise market power, and runs to ensure reliability. The literature of mixed-integer 
programming has proposed several alternative definitions of dual problems for MILPs, so a 
determination must be made about how to define prices. In all U.S. markets for slow generation, 
as in  [43], marginal prices can be calculated from the LP that arises when the binary variables are 
fixed to their optimal solution from the scheduling run. The major differences in this model 
compared to the scheduling run are constraints (2-13)-(2-14), which fix the binary variables (𝑢𝑖𝑡 
and 𝑧𝑖𝑡) to the optimal value from the unit commitment problem. The variables in the right 
column are the dual variables for each constraint. Variations on this pricing method used in 
actual markets are described in Section 2.6.  
max ∑ (∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑡 − ∑ (𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝑂𝐶𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑆𝑈𝑧𝑖𝑡)𝑖∈𝐺𝑖∈𝐷 )𝑡∈𝑇   (2-8) 
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑡 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑖∈𝐺𝑖∈𝐷
= 0 ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 𝜆𝑡 (2-9) 
𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑢𝑖𝑡  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑛  (2-10) 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 ≤ 𝑧𝑖𝑡  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑡 ∈ {2. . 𝑇} 𝛿𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝑈 (2-11) 
0 ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑑𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐷, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 𝛼𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 (2-12) 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 𝛿𝑖𝑡
𝑢  (2-13) 
𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖𝑡
∗  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 𝛿𝑖𝑡
𝑧  (2-14) 
The dual formulation of the pricing run can be found in constraints (2-15)-(2-20). Parallel to 
the above model, the right column shows the primal variables associated with each constraint in 
the dual problem.  
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min ∑ (∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛼𝑖𝑡




𝑧 )𝑖∈𝐺𝑖∈𝐷 )𝑡∈𝑇    
(2-15) 
𝜆𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≥ 𝑏𝑖𝑡  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐷, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 𝑑𝑖𝑡 (2-16) 
−𝜆𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝛽𝑖𝑡

















𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≥ 0 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺⋃𝐷, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇  
(2-20) 
2.5.2 Settlements Derived from the Dual Problem 
Using the dual formulation, we can formulate the dual pricing algorithm using the economic 
principles discussed in Section 2.2. From strong duality14 of the primal and dual post-unit 
commitment linear programs, the optimal primal and dual solutions (if both are feasible) must 
satisfy:   
∑ (∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑡 − ∑ (𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝑂𝐶𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑆𝑈𝑧𝑖𝑡)𝑖∈𝐺𝑖∈𝐷 )𝑡∈𝑇   
= ∑ (∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛼𝑖𝑡




𝑧 )𝑖∈𝐺𝑖∈𝐷 )𝑡∈𝑇 . 
(2-21) 
For generators, the dual constraints for the dispatch and commitment variables in (2-17) and 
(2-18) must be modified to reflect the startup decision in order to enforce non-confiscation in 
the pricing method. In current markets, the price paid by the ISO is 𝜆𝑡
∗∗, or the dual variable of 





∗ = 0 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (2-22) 
If 𝑢𝑖𝑡








𝑚𝑖𝑛∗∗ = 0  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺+, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (2-24) 
Using (2-22), (2-23), and (2-24) in (2-18), a one period model (excluding 𝛿𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝑈) produces the 
classic economic result that profits are revenue less costs, or  
                                                     
14 Strong duality occurs when both the primal and the dual problems have optimal solutions, 






∗∗ − 𝑐𝑖𝑡) − 𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝑂𝐶  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺. (2-25) 
That is, 𝛿𝑖𝑡
𝑢∗∗ is the LMP payment less the marginal and fixed costs incurred. Unfortunately, 
there is no guarantee that 𝛿𝑖𝑡
𝑢∗ is non-negative, that is, non-confiscatory. In the multi-period case, 
we sum together the 𝛿𝑖𝑡
𝑢∗∗ constraints in (2-18) for all periods to create (2-26) and sum the startup 
periods of (2-19) to obtain constraint (2-27). The sum of (2-26) and (2-27) then define a total 
linear profit function for the operating periods in (2-28). Both (2-23) and (2-24) are again 
substituted into (2-18), producing a total profit function for a multi-period model in (2-28), 
where 𝜏𝑖 is the number of time periods in which the generator starts up (𝑡 ∈ 𝑇|𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 1), 𝑇
𝑟 is a 
dynamic set that refers to the total run periods (all startups to shutdowns, 𝑇𝑟 = {𝑡 ∈ 𝑇|𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 1}). 
𝛥𝑖
𝑢 = ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑡
𝑢∗∗
𝑡∈𝑇𝑟 = ∑ (𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ (𝜆𝑡
∗∗ − 𝑐𝑖𝑡) − 𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝑂C)𝑡∈𝑇𝑟   ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺
+ (2-26) 
𝛥𝑖
𝑧 = ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑡
𝑧∗∗
𝑡∈𝑇 = −𝜏𝑖𝑐𝑖




      = ∑ (𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ (𝜆𝑡
∗∗ − 𝑐𝑖𝑡) − 𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝑂𝐶)𝑡∈𝑇𝑟 − 𝜏𝑖𝑐𝑖
𝑆𝑈  
∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺+ (2-28) 
Similar to the single period result, (2-28) provides the classic economic result that the total 
profit under LMP pricing for generation is the payment received less the variable and fixed costs.  
In the cases when the generator is turned off, or 𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗ = 0, we can write a separate profit 
condition; rearranging (2-17), we have  
𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥∗∗ ≥ 𝜆𝑡
∗∗ − 𝑐𝑖𝑡 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺
0, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇. (2-29) 
Substituting (2-29) into the startup condition of (2-18), and summing over time as described 
in (2-28), we obtain 
Π𝑖 = ∑ (𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝜆𝑡




𝑆𝑈 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺
0 (2-30) 
We have the following four potential outcomes for 𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗  that demonstrate the need for make-




∗ = 1 in one or more periods and 𝛥𝑖
𝑢 + 𝛥𝑖
𝑧 < 0, then a make-whole 
payment, −(𝛥𝑖
𝑢 + 𝛥𝑖
𝑧), in addition to the LMP payment, which does not cover the 
offered cost, is needed to avoid confiscation.  
 For periods when 𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗ = 1 or when 𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗ = 0 in one or more periods and 𝛥𝑖
𝑢 + 𝛥𝑖
𝑧 > 0, 
then the LMP and a penalty or an LOC payment is needed to incentivize generators 
to stay on dispatch.  The LMP with penalty provides enough disincentive to price-
chasing and self-scheduling behavior. 
 When 𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗ = 0, ∀𝑡 (the generator is not dispatch in any period) and 𝛥𝑖
𝑢 + 𝛥𝑖
𝑧 ≤ 0, then 
the LMP sends the correct price signal. The generator would not profit from an 
LMP payment. 
As described in [43], there are two basic pieces of the settlement: the price (𝜆𝑡
∗∗) and the 
make-whole payment (𝛥𝑖
𝑢 + 𝛥𝑖
𝑧). Without make-whole payments, the results from the post-unit 
commitment problem can be confiscatory. Due to the non-convexities in the market, there is 
also a third part of the settlement, which can be imposed as a penalty or a payment.  If 𝜆𝑡




∗∗ > 𝑐𝑖𝑡15 and 𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗ = 0 then the generator faces a lost opportunity cost; if it had 
been online or been dispatched to its full capacity, it could have made a profit. In order to 
discourage a generator from changing its output or committing themselves in the next period or 
market (expecting the price to stay the same), a payment or penalty can be imposed that is the 
cost of the lost opportunity. We will assume here that the penalty for self-scheduling is high 
enough to prevent inefficient dispatch and the dispatch signal is a quantity signal. The penalty 
would be at minimum the value of the lost opportunity cost.    
This subsection describes the basic pricing scheme from [43], with an extension to multiple 
periods. The result is non-confiscatory for supply but does not specify a make-whole payment 
                                                     
15 A full valuation would consider the average incremental cost of operating, not necessarily the 
marginal cost alone, since fixed operating costs would not be recovered if the generator chooses 
to self-dispatch or commit themselves into the market. However, this evaluation is dependent on 
the generator and their behavior and expectations.  
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allocation method that is non-confiscatory for demand. The next subsection modifies into the 
primal and dual constraints to uphold the economic principles from Section 2.2 (including non-
confiscation) to construct the Dual Pricing Algorithm. Note that there are no side payments for 
demand, because there are no binary variables for demand bids; however, if future demand bids 
consist of binary variables, the formulation can be adapted to include any fixed operating costs 
incurred.  
2.5.3 Transforming the Dual Problem into the Dual Pricing Algorithm 
In this subsection, the Dual Pricing Algorithm is developed from the primal and dual 
constraints for the post-unit commitment problem. We now add constraints to the equilibrium 
conditions on the market-clearing quantity to reallocate the market surplus and ensure non-
confiscation of supply and demand. Consequently, the new price, 𝜆𝑡
DPA, is no longer necessarily 
the LMP. In order to ensure non-confiscation, new uplift payments and charges are introduced 
in the algorithm. Both supply and demand can be charged uplift, and similarly can be paid uplift. 
The market operator announces the price and settles the uplift payments and charges with each 
market participant, both generators and consumers.  
The DPA scheme guarantees non-confiscation of generator supply offers. We demonstrate 
above that the profit as defined in (2-25) and (2-28) can be negative.  To ensure non-confiscation 
in the DPA, we introduce an uplift payment, 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑝 , and uplift charge, 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑐 , that can be impose for 
each market participant. We can redefine the profit condition in and (2-28) with non-
confiscation of the profits Π𝑖  as 
𝛱𝑖 = ∑ (𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ (𝜆𝑡
𝐷𝑃𝐴 − 𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑝
− 𝜇𝑖𝑡




𝑆𝑈 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺 (2-31) 
where we substitute 𝜆𝑡
𝐷𝑃𝐴 for 𝜆𝑡




𝑐 ) in each period. 
For supply, the profit or non-confiscation condition now is 











∗∗ in the complementary slackness condition from (2-16), i.e.,  
𝑑𝑖𝑡




𝑐𝑑) = 0 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐷, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (2-33) 
This relationship is then summed over the commitment period to account for all payments 
and charges. The net value, 𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝑏𝑖𝑡 − 𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝜆𝑡
∗∗, for 𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0 can be defined as 
Ψ𝑖 = ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑡






 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐷 (2-34) 
The net value must be nonnegative to ensure non-confiscation, enforced by  
Ψ𝑖 ≥ 0 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐷
+ (2-35) 
Since the market surplus is positive, the uplift payments and charges simply reallocate market 
surplus.  Uplift payments and charges are participant specific, avoiding confiscation of any one 
participant. Without discriminatory uplift pricing, make-whole payments recovered uniformly 
across demand could result in confiscation.  
For demand bids 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷0 not selected (i.e., 𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ = 0), the net profit is zero, Ψ𝑖 = 0.  This is true 
for any feasible solution to the non-convex post-unit commitment market model.  Substituting 
𝜆𝑡
𝐷𝑃𝐴 for 𝜆𝑡
∗∗ in (2-16) and setting 𝛼𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 0 because 𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ = 0, we obtain the following lower bound 
on the DPA energy price. 
𝜆𝑡
𝐷𝑃𝐴 ≥ 𝑏𝑖𝑡 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐷
0, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (2-36) 
This implies the new 𝜆𝑡
𝐷𝑃𝐴 will be high enough to ensure an out-of-market bid will not 
consume. In other words, unserved load will prefer not to self-dispatch or take recourse actions 
that will lower the market surplus. 
Since the DPA scheme is run post unit commitment, the criteria to maintain market surplus 




∗ ); therefore constraint (2-37) is 









To ensure revenue adequacy, we balance the uplift payments and uplift charges through the 
following revenue neutrality condition. As noted for other pricing methods in [49], this type of 
constraint is called a “zero-sum uplift” constraint.  
















2.5.4 Conditioning  
The prices that result from the DPA are in general non-unique. Therefore, a choice can be 
made from the alternative prices based on the preference of the operator and market 
participants. The price has no coefficient in the objective function, allowing it to vary through a 
range of prices (shown in the example in 2.7.1.b). Specific allocation criteria can be embedded in 
the model and produce conditioning such as perceived equity or increased transparency. 
Conditioning or tuning are broad terms that refer to the additional constraints added to the DPA 
formulation to create unique prices or modify the price to resemble operator preference. If the 
region wishes to keep prices close to the dispatch LMP, the DPA can maintain close prices and 
additionally allocate the uplift. If the market operators prefer a single market clearing price with 
no uplift payments, the algorithm can be modified to determine a single price. By providing 
tuning capabilities, we acknowledge that factors outside of the mathematical formulation or 
economic theory can drive decision making.  
There are several types of constraints that can be employed to condition the price. The ones 
proposed here use surplus and slack variables to push the DPA price close to the LMP and 
produce a unique price; however, a different base price (other than the LMP) can be used if 
preferred by the system operator. The constraints can either assign the surplus and slack 
variables to individual periods or use a single set of variables for all periods. The impact of these 
constraints can be seen in examples in Section 2.7.  
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We offer two options to ‘tune’ the price.  Both condition the LMP by keeping the new price, 
𝜆𝑡
𝐷𝑃𝐴, close to the dispatch LMP, 𝜆𝑡
∗, with penalties for deviations. To minimize the relative 
deviation, we construct (2-40), and (2-45) in the next section. In (2-40) there is a single surplus 
and slack variable for the entire run time, while in (2-45) there are surplus and slack variables for 
each period. Using these constraints can either concentrate high prices in one period or 
distribute them across all periods. The second option in (2-39) minimizes the absolute deviation 










∗∗ − 𝜆𝑢𝑝 + 𝜆𝑑𝑛 = 0 ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (2-40) 
If an operator was concerned about price spikes, we also may want to condition the uplift 
payments.  Many possibilities can be considered. One possibility is to limit the maximum 
allowable payment and charge by the constraints listed in (2-41) and (2-42).  However, this may 














𝑐𝑑max ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐷
+, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (2-42) 
2.5.5 Dual Pricing Algorithm (DPA) Formulation 
We now formulate the DPA model using the modifications of the dual problem described in 
Section 2.5.1, with one conditioning constraint to make the prices unique. The objective in (2-43) 
minimizes the uplift payments made by both generation and demand. Constraint (2-44) is the 
uplift revenue neutrality constraint and (2-45) is one option for price conditioning. Constraints 
(2-46) and (2-47) are the generation profit and demand value respectively. A demand bid lower 
bound on pricing is in (2-48), and (2-49) and (2-50) ensure non-confiscation. Finally, (2-51) 
contains the nonnegative variables.  




































𝑑𝑛 = 0 ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (2-45) 
Ψ𝑖 = ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑡






 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐷+ (2-46) 
Π𝑖 = ∑ (𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ (𝜆𝑡
𝐷𝑃𝐴 − 𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑝
− 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑐 ) − 𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝑂𝐶 ) − 𝜏𝑐𝑖
𝑆𝑈
𝑡∈𝑇𝑟
 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺+ (2-47) 
𝜆𝑡
𝐷𝑃𝐴 ≥ 𝑏𝑖𝑡  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐷
0, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (2-48) 
Ψ𝑖 ≥ 0 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐷
+ (2-49) 











𝑑𝑛 ≥ 0 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐷⋃𝐺, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (2-51) 
 
Theorem 1. If there exists an optimal solution to the primal unit commitment problem, that is, 
the maximize market surplus problem, then there is a feasible solution to DPA. 
Proof.  A feasible solution to (1) is obtained with 𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 0 and 𝑀𝑆 = 0. From the 
post-unit commitment problem and summing together (2-44), (2-46), and (2-47), we have 
𝑀𝑆∗ = ∑ Π𝑖𝑖∈𝐺 + ∑ Ψ𝑖 ≥ 0𝑖∈𝐷 . 
From complementary slackness of (2-3) with the binary fixed at its optimal value, there are 







𝑚𝑎𝑥∗∗ > 0 and 𝛽𝑖𝑡




𝑚𝑎𝑥∗∗ = 0 and 𝛽𝑖𝑡














𝑚𝑖𝑛∗∗. From complementary slackness 
of (2c), 𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ (𝜆𝑡
∗∗ − 𝑐𝑖𝑡) = 𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ (𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥∗∗ − 𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑛∗∗). As shown in (2-28), 𝛥𝑖
𝑢 + 𝛥𝑖
𝑧 is the linear surplus of 
generator 𝑖 ∈ 𝐺. From complementary slackness of (2-16), 𝑑𝑖𝑡






𝑚𝑎𝑥∗∗ ≥ 0 since 𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗  and 𝛼𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥∗∗ are both nonnegative. 
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We partition 𝑖 ∈ 𝐺 into three sets 𝐺′ = {𝑖 ∈ 𝐺: 𝛥𝑖
𝑢 + 𝛥𝑖
𝑧 ≥ 0 and 𝑢𝑖𝑇𝑟
∗ = 1}, 𝐺′′ = {𝑖 ∈ 𝐺: 𝛥𝑖
𝑢 +
𝛥𝑖
𝑧 < 0 and 𝑢𝑖𝑇𝑟
∗ = 1}, and 𝐺′′′ = {𝑖 ∈ 𝐺: 𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗ = 0}. 𝛱𝑖 = 0 for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝐺
′′′. 
𝑀𝑆∗ = ∑ 𝛱𝑖𝑖∈𝐺 + ∑ 𝛹𝑖𝑖∈𝐷 =  
∑ 𝛱𝑖𝑖∈𝐺′ + ∑ 𝛱𝑖𝑖∈𝐺′′ + ∑ 𝛹𝑖𝑖∈𝐷 ≥ 0  
∑ 𝛱𝑖𝑖∈𝐺′ + ∑ 𝛹𝑖𝑖∈𝐷 ≥ − ∑ 𝛱𝑖𝑖∈𝐺′′   
Let 𝜆𝑡
DPA = 𝜆𝑡









𝑐 )𝑡∈𝑇  and  













= 0 on the LHS, 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑐 = 0 on the RHS, and substituting for 𝛱𝑖  and 𝛹𝑖 : 
∑ (𝛥𝑖
𝑢 + 𝛥𝑖
𝑧 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑐





𝑖∈𝐷,𝑇   
≥ − ∑ 𝛥𝑖
𝑢 + 𝛥𝑖
𝑧 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑝
𝑡∈𝑇𝑖∈𝐺′′    
Then we can select payments and charges:  





𝑧) > 0. This satisfies (2-48) for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐺′′. 
For all 𝑖 ∈ 𝐺′ select 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑐  and 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑑 such that,  
 ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑖
∗𝜇𝑖
𝑐
𝑖∈𝐺′ + ∑ 𝑑𝑖
∗𝜇𝑖
𝑐𝑑
𝑖∈𝐷𝑡∈𝑇 = ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑝










𝑡∈𝑇 ≤ ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝛼𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥∗∗
𝑡∈𝑇  for 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷.  
The selection criteria are equivalent to (2-44), (2-49), and (2-50).  
From strong duality of the post-unit commitment problem and its dual problem, we know that 
 𝑀𝑆∗ = ∑ 𝛥𝑖
𝑢 + 𝛥𝑖
𝑧
𝑖∈𝐺 + ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝛼𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥∗∗




𝑖∈𝐺′ + ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝛼𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥∗∗
𝑖∈𝐷,𝑡∈𝑇 ≥ − ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑇𝑟
𝑢∗∗ + 𝛿𝑖𝑇1
𝑧∗∗
𝑖∈𝐺′′ .  
Therefore, the generators 𝑖 ∈ 𝐺′ and demands 𝑖 ∈ 𝐷 have enough linear surplus to satisfy (2-49) 
and (2-50). 




∗ = 0, complementary slackness requires 𝜆𝑡
∗∗ ≥ 𝑏𝑖𝑡, so (2-48) is satisfied and the DPA 
has a feasible solution. ∎ 
2.5.6 Rules for Uninstructed Deviations 
A new pricing rule cannot be implemented in isolation. Consideration of generator and 
demand behavior must be explicitly incorporated into the price or developed alongside market 
rules. Given the chance, all market participants will act in their own best interest and not that of 
the social optimum. When a generator sees a price above its marginal costs, it will be inclined to 
produce as much as possible to increase profits. Similarly, rational customers will want to 
consume more given lower prices. The latter issue is addressed in constraint (2-48). The former 
leads to a discussion of uninstructed deviations, or colloquially, price chasing, and methods 
needed to maintain the efficient dispatch.  
There are two main methods utilized to ensure market participants stay on dispatch: lost 
opportunity costs and penalties defined by market rules. The use of either should make a 
participant indifferent between deviating from the dispatch signal and maintaining the optimal 
dispatch. For ease of understanding, the following simple example will illustrate the issue. Two 
generators and two loads have the characteristics in Table 2-2. 
. 
2.5.6.a Lost Opportunity Costs: Demonstrative Example 
Unit commitment would dispatch Generator A to 30 MW and Generator B to 70 MW. The 
LMP would be $40/MWh, which is the cost of Generator A. Both Generators A and B would 
receive uplift payments, $500 and $1900 respectively. To examine the impact of opportunity 
costs and penalties, we first compare the outcome using an existing pricing method, namely, 
Midcontinent ISO’s ELMP. This method relaxes the binary variables in (2-6) and (2-7) rather 
than fixing them to the optimal level as was done in (2-13) and (2-14). In the problem above we 
can relax the binary constraints and determine the single period ELMP, $65/MWh. 
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Table 2-2: Characteristics of example market participants  
Participant 








Generator A 40 500 0 98 
Generator B 60 500 70 100 
Demand 1 1000 - 0 80 
Demand 2 67 - 0 20 
 
Under ELMP, Generator A would be paid a price of $65/MWh, much higher than its 
marginal costs, and yet it is not dispatched to its maximum. The generator would understandably 
be incentivized to produce at its maximum capacity to capture further profits. Any pricing 
method that raises the price above the traditional LMP will need to designate a method to 
disincentivize this behavior. If Generator A deviated from the dispatch signal, it would make an 
additional $1575. The operator can either pay Generator A $1575 or penalize Generator A $1575 
if it deviates. Both actions should have the same impact, either should incentivize Generator A to 
maintain the 30 MW dispatch signal.  
Assuming an even distribution of the opportunity cost payment, demand would be required 
to pay an additional $15.75/MWh. Due to the high marginal bid of Demand 1, it will see a small 
decrease in total value. Demand 2 will be asked to pay more than its marginal bid (payment of 
$80.75 > $67). Although Demand 1 would still maintain positive surplus, Demand 2 suffers a 
loss. While there is enough consumer surplus to support the prices, Demand 2 does not have 
enough value to pay the new price. The method of paying a lost opportunity cost is confiscatory 
if uplift is socialized.  
If the operator instead chose to impose a penalty with a value of $1575, the Generator 
would not see benefit in increasing output and the market would remain revenue adequate. 
Penalties also do not impact confiscation of demand. This is a stylized example, and changes to 
the bids and offers would necessarily change the outcome. This simple example explains part of 
the motivation for using penalties; there are cases in which paying lost opportunity costs are not 
revenue adequate and result in confiscation. New proposals for pricing must consider all impacts 
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to the market; both penalties and lost opportunity costs can result in the same incentive for 
generators, but the latter does not ensure bid cost recovery for all participants.  
One of the reasons the DPA uses penalties over lost opportunity costs is to ensure non-
confiscation and revenue adequacy. The example above showed confiscation, while the example 
in Table 2-3 shows revenue inadequacy.  















1 45 60 A 30 900 0 200 
   B 40 100 10 200 
 
With the parameters given in Table 2-3, the basic unit commitment market would clear with 
Generator B supplying all demand for Buyer 1, and Generator A remaining off. This occurs 
because of the high startup costs for Generator A. The market clearing price is $40/MWh (due 
to Generator B), and the market surplus is $200. Because the market clearing price is above the 
marginal cost of Generator A, it will be incentivized to startup unless a penalty is imposed or a 
lost opportunity cost is paid. The penalty or cost should be greater than $1100 (= 200 MWh * 
($40/MWh - $30/MWh) - $900); however, there is not enough market surplus to pay Generator 
A. Therefore, the market is revenue inadequate if a lost opportunity cost is used. Again, this is a 
simple example, but shows the undesirable characteristics of lost opportunity costs.  
In the case of completely inelastic demand, the market will always be revenue adequate 
because all costs can be levied on demand. Any uplift or lost opportunity cost will be paid 
through the ‘unlimited’ demand side value. This proposal models a two-sided market to show 
that this is not the case if the market is elastic, even if it is only partially elastic. While this is also 
true for uplift payments, the following example shows how lost opportunity costs are not 
guaranteed to be revenue adequate. There is not always enough surplus in the market to cover an 
additional lost opportunity cost payment. 
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2.5.6.b Lost Opportunity Costs: Current Practice 
There are many types of lost opportunity costs currently used in electricity markets. If 
generators are dispatched for reactive power support, voltage support, reserve, or other ancillary 
services, they are generally eligible to receive lost opportunity cost payments. In these cases, the 
generators are asked to deviate from normal operations by the system operator, and receive 
payments as reimbursement for money they could have received if they were allowed to follow 
the original dispatch orders. These payments are due to operator action, and are different than 
those discussed in Section 2.5.6.a.  
We are specifically discussing (active) generator deviations from the optimal dispatch signal 
sent by the operator; meaning it is an intentional deviation often called “uninstructed 
deviations.” Most markets discourage this practice through penalties. At publication, only ISO-
NE pays lost opportunity costs. All other ISOs choose to penalize generator deviations beyond a 
dead-band [35], [78]–[82]. NYISO confiscates the energy, meaning they do not pay for the 
additional energy produced. MISO already has thresholds for ‘uninstructed deviations’ and is 
considering updating the rules and penalties based on suggestions from their market monitor. In 
the 2016 State of the Market Report, the market monitor suggests that improving these penalties 
“will improve suppliers’ incentives to follow MISO’s dispatch signals and will, in turn, improve 
reliability and lower overall system costs” [82]. In addition to confirming the argument presented 
in 2.5.6.a, the references above show that the use of penalties in the DPA is a continuation of 
most ISOs’ current practice and not a significant change to current electricity markets.  
2.5.6.c Lost Opportunity Costs: Clarification of  Methodology and Liquidated 
Damages 
Any auction market follows a set of rules. If a participant chooses to enter the market, they 
must agree to follow and conform to the rules. Each electricity market operator establishes rules 
in their tariff. In order to bid and be cleared in the market, these rules must be followed. If a rule 
states that a participant must follow the dispatch signal for the periods in which it actively bids 
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into and is cleared in the market, then it should not need additional incentives to follow the rule. 
Rather, there should be consequences for failing to follow the policies. The consequences we 
propose consist of a penalty and payment for liquidated damages.  
The example above demonstrated one example penalty, and this section will further define 
the quantitative method proposed to impose penalties. The basic procedure uses the value of the 
lost opportunity cost payment as a penalty. Any additional profit that a generator would make by 
deviating away from the optimal dispatch should be the total value of the penalty. A 
straightforward calculation is  
       ∑ 𝜆𝑡
𝐷𝑃𝐴(𝑃𝑖
max − 𝑝𝑖𝑡
∗ )𝑡∈𝑇 .           (2-52) 
For the quantity of energy generated above dispatch signal, the generator would receive the 
LMP rather than the DPA. In the case of the example above, if Generator A deviated and 
produced an additional 10 MW, the 10 MW would be compensated at $40/MWh. In addition to 
the penalty and the lower price, we contend that any generator that deviates also pay the 
redispatch costs, or liquidated damages.  
Generally, contracts that involve the future exchange of money or the promise of 
performance have a liquidated damages stipulation. A liquidated damages payment is monetary 
compensation for a loss from a breach of contract. This stipulation establishes what must be 
paid if a party fails to perform as promised. In contract law, liquidated damages are considered 
reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the nonperformance (breach of 
contract). In the case of electricity markets, the liquidated damages payment would be the 
rebalance costs due to a generator’s deviation from their optimal schedule. The deviation would 
be a breach of contract, and the harm to the system is the rebalance costs. 
In total, the DPA will be composed of several elements and accompanying rules. The energy 
price and uplift payment or charge is the primary result of the DPA formulation. To discourage 
uninstructed generator deviations, the excess power generated will only receive the LMP as an 
energy price. In addition, there will be a liquidated damages stipulation requiring the generator 
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pay any rebalance costs. The combination of prices and market rules should incentivize a core 
economic principle from Section 2.2: efficient participation and investment. 
2.6 ALTERNATIVE PRICING METHODS 
2.6.1 Extended LMP 
As discussed in Section 2.3, there are many alternative proposals for pricing methodology. 
While most ISOs have implemented some form of alternative pricing for fast-start units, the 
most prominent is called Extended LMP, implemented by Midcontinent ISO with similar 
methods used by New England ISO [35], [58], [83]. Due to the difficulties implementing convex 
hull pricing, the convex hull is approximated by relaxing the binary commitment variables. The 
method is under its second update (ELMP 2.0), and therefore the formulation shown below is a 
single period approximation, not an exact replicate of current practice. The examples in Section 
2.7 compare DPA prices to ELMP, therefore we offer a brief explanation of the method. 
Constraints (2-53)–(2-57) are the same as the unit commitment and post-unit commitment 
problem. The difference lies in the relaxation of the binary variables in (2-58)–(2-59). By relaxing 
the commitment, the minimum capacity of the generator can dip below 𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 , and fixed costs can 
be incorporated into the price. The new price will minimize uplift and lost opportunity cost 
payments, but not eliminate uplift or ensure non-confiscation [84].  
max ∑ (∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑡 − ∑ (𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑡
𝑂𝐶𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑆𝑈𝑧𝑖𝑡)𝑖∈𝐺𝑖∈𝐷 )𝑡∈𝑇   (2-53) 
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑡 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑖∈𝐺𝑖∈𝐷
= 0 ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 𝜆𝑡 (2-54) 
𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑢𝑖𝑡  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑖𝑛  (2-55) 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 ≤ 𝑧𝑖𝑡  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑡 ∈ {2. . 𝑇} 𝛿𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝑈 (2-56) 
0 ≤ 𝑑𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑑𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐷, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 𝛼𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 (2-57) 
0 ≤ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ≤ 1 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 𝛿𝑖𝑡
𝑢  (2-58) 
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0 ≤ 𝑧𝑖𝑡 ≤ 1 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 𝛿𝑖𝑡
𝑧  (2-59) 
2.6.2 Average Incremental Cost Pricing 
The minimum single price to recuperate all fixed operating costs is the average incremental 
cost of the marginal unit. Any price below the marginal unit’s average incremental cost will result 
in an uplift payment. Although average incremental cost pricing is not implemented in any 
market, it is a useful method for comparison because it results in no uplift. It is also helpful to 
compare the prices from average incremental cost pricing because the DPA often produces 
equivalent prices. There is no rigorous proof for this statement, primarily because it is an 
observation from working examples and not necessarily always equivalent. Unlike other pricing 
methods which will necessarily produce certain prices (see Table 2-4), the prices resulting from 
the DPA uphold the economic principles explained in Section 2.2 without a constant direct 
correlation to the cost function of the marginal generator. In a simple model with a single period, 
single node, and no other generation characteristics (i.e., ramping, reserve, etc.), the LMP will be 
the marginal cost of the marginal generator.  
Table 2-4 Characteristics from Other Pricing Methods   
 
LMP ELMP AIC 


























2.7 EXAMPLES  
We explore several examples to illustrate the capability and flexibility of the DPA. The first 
section shows examples for a single-period model, demonstrating some fundamental concepts 
for DPA pricing and comparing with popular examples in the literature. The next section shows 
the prices that can come from multi-period models. These examples show how pricing in a single 
period context does not always easily extend to multiple periods, meaning multi-period pricing 
can be more complex and is not single periods added together.  
2.7.1 Single Bus, Single Time Period Examples 
2.7.1.a Two-Generator Example  
Considering a one period example with the data provided in Table 2-5, the optimal dispatch 
is Generator A = 40 MW and Generator B = 90 MW with an LMP of $60/MWh. Generator A 
will profit while Generator B will operate at a $500 loss, shown in Table 2-7.  The DPA 
determines the modified LMP to be 𝜆𝐷𝑃𝐴 = $65.56/MWh, which recovers Generator B’s startup 
costs by charging an additional $5.56/MWh to both buyers. Since the new LMP is above the bid 
of Buyer 2, Buyer 1 pays an additional $1.37/MWh (𝜇1
pd
) making Buyer 2 break even by receiving 
a payment of $4.56/MWh (𝜇2
cd). The 𝜆𝐷𝑃𝐴 reflects the incremental cost of serving load and the 
resulting settlement leaves Generator B and Buyer 2 at a break-even point, Generator A with 
increased profits, and Buyer 1 with decreased additional value.  
These prices and profits can be compared with the ELMP model. As shown in Table 2-7, 
ELMP produces a price of $62.50, which is the marginal cost plus the startup cost amortized 
over the total capacity. Generator A receives more profit than under LMP pricing, but less 
compared to DPA pricing. Generator B requires a make-whole payment, although it is smaller 




Table 2-5 Generator Costs 
Gen Marginal cost ($/MWh) Startup cost ($) Pmin (MW) Pmax (MW) 
A 40 500 0 40 
B 60 500 10 200 
Table 2-6 Demand Function 
Buyer Value ($) Max demand (MW) 
1 100 100 
2 61 30 
Table 2-7 Total Profit and Value 
 
Traditional LMP DPA ELMP 
Price $60/MWh $65.56/MWh $62.50/MWh 
Generator A Profit +$300 +$522.22 +$400 
Generator B Profit –$500 $0 –$275 
Buyer 1 Value +$4,000 +$3367 +$3750 
Buyer 2 Value +$30 $0 +$45 
Uplift $500 $76.67 $275 
 
2.7.1.b MISO Four Generator Example  
Using data from a MISO sample problem in [83], we can look at a range of demand levels 
for a single period problem. The generator costs are in Table 2-8, and the single demand has a 
value of $100/MWh. Figure 2-1 shows the clearing price for three different pricing methods for 
demand from 0 MW – 350 MW. The dispatch LMP (𝜆∗) spikes when moving from the cheaper 
generators to the more expensive (A to C), since it must turn on the generator with the lowest 
minimum and highest marginal cost (D) to match demand. The ELMP is monotonically non-
decreasing with demand, forming steps when the expensive generator is needed. Similar to the 
dispatch LMP, the DPA price also spikes when the expensive generator is dispatched. The prices 
then decrease, showing quantity discounts as the generator reaches it maximum. There are no 
uplift payments needed with the DPA, while there are payments required from the LMP and 
ELMP. The prices without condition would range from the lower-bound in Figure 2-1 to 
$100/MWh, the demand offer. Since 𝜆𝐷𝑃𝐴 has no coefficient in the objective, the prices output 
can vary within that range in every simulation; the GAMS solver returned a value of $100/MWh 
without conditioning, although other solvers might return the lower-bound value.  
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Table 2-8 Generator Costs 
Gen Marginal cost ($/MWh) Startup cost ($) Pmin (MW) Pmax (MW) 
A 50 500 20 100 
B 52 500 20 100 
C 55 500 20 100 
D 65 40 5 50 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Snapshots of different demand levels with three different pricing methods 
 
2.7.1.c Scarf  Example 
We simulated other small test examples with similar results. A benchmark example created 
by Scarf in [85] has been used to demonstrate the versatility of pricing methods. The DPA is 
compared with a traditional LMP and uplift in Figure 2-2. The figure shows the changes in price 
as demand quantity increases. The prices and resulting uplift payments are shown with blue solid 
and dashed lines, while the DPA prices and uplift are shown in black and orange. There are no 
uplift payments made at any demand level, and prices oscillate between $6/MWh and $7/MWh 
under DPA pricing, the latter being the price of the generator with a high marginal cost and no 



























Figure 2-2 Prices resulting from the modified Scarf example compared with the traditional method of 
determining prices and uplift payments 
2.7.2 Multi-Period Examples 
The single period examples demonstrate the prices across varying demand levels, while the 
following multi-period examples focus on the prices and payments across time.  
2.7.2.a Multi-Period, Multi-Generator Example with Conditioning  
The generator characteristics for this set of examples are found in Table 2-9 and the demand 
value and quantity, and reserve data are found in Table 2-10.  




Startup cost ($) No Load cost ($/h) Pmin (MW) Pmax (MW) 
A 30 900 100 200 1200 
B 50 600 100 50 80 
C 60 360 100 25 50 
 
Table 2-10 Hourly Data 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Demand 1,  
Value $200/MWh 
510 528 546 573 582 588 594 564 
Demand 2,  
Value $80/MWh 
340 352 364 382 388 392 396 376 
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The resulting prices are in Table 2-11, showing the difference between the two types of DPA 
conditioning and the traditional LMP, 𝜆𝑡
∗. In the first conditioned DPA price, 𝜆𝑡
DPA, the penalties 
are imposed in every period (constraint (2-45)), while 𝜆𝑡
DPA′ imposes a single penalty on all 
periods (constraint (2-40)). The impact is uniform prices for all periods compared to a higher 
price in a single period. Another notable impact is on uplift payments. The dispatch LMP 
imposes a $1700 uplift payment on the system, while both conditioned DPA prices incur no 
uplift. This is an example where the DPA produces a single market clearing price, and there is no 
need to follow uplift allocation guidelines.  
Table 2-11 Prices & Payments 
 




∗ 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 1700 
𝜆𝑡
DPA 30.23 30.23 30.23 30.23 30.23 30.23 30.23 30.23 0 
𝜆𝑡
DPA′ 30 30 30 30 30 30 31.72 30 0 
  
2.7.2.b RTS Test Case 
We examine the generation from a modified single zone RTS96 test case [86]. The generator 
characteristics and load data are found in Table 2-12 and Figure 2-3. All generators were located 
at a single node with 24 hourly simulations. The resulting generator profits and demand value are 
in Table 2-13, and prices in Figure 2-4. As expected, the total social welfare remains the same 
between the two simulations. In order to reduce uplift and provide proper incentives for 
investment, there is a transfer of surplus between consumers and producers. With zero uplift, the 
price provides a transparent indicator for investment; it allows investors to evaluate if their unit 
could enter the dispatch. While the only guaranteed method of analysis for market entry would 
involve rerunning the dispatch with the potential unit, the transparency of the DPA price sends 

















Oil/CT 4 20 15.8 76 163 1139 
Coal/Steam 4 76 15.2 1061 19.64 131 
Oil/Steam 3 100 25 4754 75.64 840 
Oil/Steam 3 197 68.95 6510 74.75 1160 
Oil/Steam 5 12 2.4 571 94.74 73 
Coal/Steam 2 155 54.25 1696 15.46 253 
Nuclear 2 400 100 2400 5.46 215 
 
 
Figure 2-3 Hourly demand for the modified RTS example  
 
 
Table 2-13 Surplus & Payments 
 
Traditional LMP DPA 
Generator Profits $2,244,014 $4,765,784 
Consumer Value $5,233,475 $2,711,704 
Uplift $10,768 $0 
 
  




































2.7.2.c Multi-Period Comparison with Uplift 
This 8-period example compares prices that result from four different pricing models: LMP, 
ELMP, DPA, and average incremental cost or locational incremental price (LIP). The generator 
characteristics can be found in Table 2-8 and demand data in Table 2-14. The dispatch can be 
found in Table 2-15, where the underlined values represent generators dispatched to their 
minimum operating levels. The resulting energy prices in Figure 2-5 show several trends. Both 
LMP and DPA remain the same for the first four periods, while ELMP and LIP increase for 
periods 3 and 4. In these periods, Gen B is at its minimum capacity, making Gen A the marginal 
unit.  The same occurs when Gen C is at its minimum in period 6; both the ELMP and LIP 
increase, while the LMP and DPA remain the same. The DPA behaves this way due to its tuning 
to the LMP. In this case, the conditioning constraint in (2-40) is modified so that the surplus and 
slack variables are the same in every period, i.e., (𝜆𝑡
𝐷𝑃𝐴 − 𝜆𝑡
∗∗ )/𝜆𝑡
∗∗ − 𝜆𝑢𝑝 + 𝜆𝑑𝑛 = 0. The DPA is 
slightly higher than the LMP in each period, with a small allocated uplift. The DPA allocates the 
uplift payment of $8.89/MWh to Gen C and charges Demand 2 $0.49/MWh. Demand 2 has a 
higher value bid compared to Demand 1, and receives the full uplift charge. The uplift for the 
other methods can be calculated as a single lump-sum charge to demand; the LMP uplift 
payment is $3110, ELMP payment is $197.20, and LIP payment is $0. 
Table 2-14 Hourly Data 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Demand 1,  
Value $80/MWh 
510 550 620 597 600 636 640 520 
Demand 2,  
Value $200/MWh 
600 608 626 653 662 668 674 644 
 
Table 2-15 Hourly Generation in MWh where Underlined Values are at Minimum Capacity 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Gen A 1110 1136 1196 1200 1200 1200 1200 1164 
Gen B 0 0 50 50 62 79 80 0 
Gen C 0 0 0 0 0 25 34 0 




Figure 2-5 Prices from 8-period comparison example  
2.8 DISCUSSION 
The examples in the previous section show the prices and costs that can result from the 
DPA. While not guaranteed to always occur, there are several common trends in the examples. 
DPA prices tend to be higher than the traditional LMP and the ELMP. This is not surprising due 
to the incorporation of fixed costs, and low or no uplift payments. While ELMP minimizes uplift 
payments, they are often nonzero. With zero uplift, the additional cost is incorporated into the 
prices, causing them to be generally higher than LMP prices. Higher prices should not be 
perceived as positive or negative; however, when there are no private side payments, there is 
increased transparency in the market. Additionally, compared to pricing mechanisms that are 
non-decreasing (like convex hull), prices are more volatile. Due to fixed costs, DPA prices are 
closer to the average incremental cost of delivering power, which is a decreasing function with 
respect to demand for each generator. As discussed in Section 2.2, volatility should not be 


























Pricing mechanisms should produce efficient prices, ones that support the optimal schedule. 
In combination with deviation penalties, the DPA prices support the optimal schedule and 
recover all parts of both generation bids and demand offers. The prices also signal points of 
entry into the market. With low or no uplift payments, new entrants can better evaluate if their 
incremental costs are below the clearing price. While this is not a guaranteed point of entry, it 
provides more market information than the traditional LMP. When side payments are needed, 
the algorithm allocates them to both supply and demand in particular periods. The endogenous 
allocation ensures that demand does not pay more than its offer and supply is made whole. In a 
one-sided market (where demand in inelastic), demand will pay any price and revenue adequacy 
is guaranteed. Even in markets today there are elastic bids, a trend that is likely to increase as 
markets change in response to the shifting resource mix. 
The DPA method and resulting prices share similarities with existing methods discussed in 
Section 2.3. Similar to all methods but [62], the DPA maintains the optimal market surplus. It 
fixes the optimal schedule, like the formulation in [43] and also fixes the dispatch level. The 
revenue neutrality characteristic is shared by the single price methods in [44], [61], [62], and the 
additional uplift revenue neutrality condition is shared by [59], [60]. Uplift calculations are done 
endogenously in the DPA and [59], [60], while other methods either have zero uplift or calculate 
the payment ex-post. Both [44] and the DPA may result in prices that are the marginal 
generator’s average incremental cost. The DPA method strives to support basic economic 
market principles and formulating a pricing method around these principles will cause overlap 
with existing methods. However, the DPA upholds all principles simultaneously while 
incorporating demand side participation and multiple periods. The extension to multiple periods 
helps allocate costs to the periods that cause them. Some methods might have direct extensions 
to multiple periods, but most cases are not well-defined. 
Unlike other pricing methods which produce prices with a consistent relationship to the cost 
function of the marginal cost generator, the DPA prices uphold the economic principles from 
 
 60 
2.2 without a strict relationship to the marginal generator’s cost function. The prices often result 
in the average incremental cost. This price has the benefit of eliminating uplift payments, 
therefore ensuring bid cost recovery. As mentioned in 2.5.6, the high prices that can occur must 
be supported by strong market rules to dissuade price chasing and support the efficient dispatch. 
While the prices will be higher than the LMP, the average incremental cost is an incremental 
price signal for non-convex entry, whereas the LMP is a weak signal. 
The DPA introduces both supply-side and demand-side payments in order to recover costs 
due to prices that are above or below a resource’s costs. At present, the demand-side does not 
pay uplift based on elasticity, and introducing such payments might adjust demand behavior. In 
theory, it might act like a pay-as-bid scheme: demand with low elasticity pays demand with high 
elasticity, both recovering only their bid-in value. A pay-as-bid scheme for generation can 
increases prices, causing generation to bid strategically at the estimated price rather than their 
true marginal cost [87]. Demand might act in the same way, meaning, they would lower their bid 
to pay less for electricity. Since there is very little demand-side bidding in markets today, it is 
difficult to evaluate this theory on actual customer behavior. In order to actively bid at low 
values, the demand must be willing to stop consumption if not selected in the optimal dispatch 
(due to low bids). This is a risky endeavor, and would depend on the type of consumer. It is 
unlikely that all consumers will be able to stop consuming; however, it also places a burden on 
inelastic demand to pay a greater amount of uplift. If the penetration of price responsive demand 
increases, further analysis must be done to assess their ability to strategically bid. In this case, 
additional rules or regulations might be created.  
2.9 CONCLUSION 
Spot prices should provide proper incentives for both operations and investment. Electricity 
is unlike other commodities due to the fixed costs necessarily incurred during operation and the 
need to physically balance supply and demand. Due to these non-convexities, it is difficult to 
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determine the ‘right’ price for electricity. Methods suggested in the literature often consider only 
one aspect of pricing or are contingent on inelastic demand. This project proposes the Dual 
Pricing Algorithm, which brings together many principles surrounding pricing mechanisms: 
maximizing market surplus, revenue neutrality, non-confiscation, transparency, signals for market 
entry, and side payment allocation. The DPA is an ex-post pricing scheme that upholds these 
principles and can be adapted to particular system operator needs. It is a linear program, making 
it computationally efficient, and can be incorporated into current ISO software. The approach is 
applied to multiple time horizons and can easily include additional operational constraints, e.g., 
reserve requirements.  Further work can be done to incorporate these constraints and evaluate 







CHAPTER 3  
EFFICIENT ACQUISITION OF 
GENERATION RESERVES TO BACK-
UP WIND IN DUTCH ELECTRICITY 
MARKETS   
Reserve  capacity is  needed in an e lec tr i c syst em in case  of  a cont ingency.  With the 
increased penetrat ion o f  renewable  energy in the  Nether lands , it s var iable  output  
can require  additional  reserve  on the  syste m. The Netherlands currently  procures 
reserve  months in advance through long t ime contrac ts  with l it t l e  coordinat ion with 
i ts  ne ighbors.  I f  addit ional r eserve  is  needed,  i t  should be  procured at  least  cos t to 
the  system. This  pro jec t  sugges ts  improvements  that can be  made to  the  process  o f 
procur ing ,  al locating ,  and act ivating  reserve .  The s imulat ions use  a mult iple  t ime 
s cales  and mode ling  across many regions .  A mode l  o f Europe call ed COMPETES 
is used to  analyze the  improvements , employing  a future  s cenar i o with a high 
penetration of  wind across  countr ies .  Comparison o f dif ferent  improvements wil l 
e lucidate  which have  the  most  bene f its  to  the  sys tem as a whole ,  and the  methodology 




As discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, electricity is a unique commodity. 
Supply must meet demand instantaneously, with no economic opportunities for large-scale 
storage in most parts of the world. Due to this instantaneous need, grid operators have 
traditionally held backup power capacity at the ready in case of emergencies or contingencies. 
Theses can range from load and renewable energy forecast errors to outages of large generators 
or transmission lines. If there is more than expected load on the grid, power plants have 
automatic detection that increases or decreases output depending on the frequency or regulation 
signal. A large change to forecasted load or the loss of a generator would require more power 
than an automatic response can produce. In that case, operators call online generators to increase 
output. The additional capacity that is held at the ready in case of a contingency or forecast error 
is broadly called operating reserves [88], the technical aspects of which will be discussed in the 
following section. Operating reserves are primarily procured from generators online or those that 
can come online quickly (fast start generators). Procurement and use between the U.S. and 
Europe varies greatly, where U.S. uses a market to procure reserve and Europe uses long term 
contracts [89]. 
As variable resources have come online, the need for additional capacity has expanded 
beyond generator outages and load forecast error. Renewable forecast error is present in both the 
day-ahead and balancing (real-time) markets, forcing operators and policymakers to consider 
how to handle the additional variability and uncertainty. Reserve requirements can be inflated to 
reflect the added difficulty of renewable forecast error, but this change alone is likely not enough 
to manage the quality and quantity of renewable power coming online [88]. The magnitude of 
power can be large in some areas, causing strain on other plants to ramp up to support large 
renewable generation swings. In other regions, the reserve needed might necessitate a different 
type of resource, such as a change in reactive power output. While there are many hypothetical 
examples, the issue remains that operators must evaluate how to change reserve products in light 
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of increased renewable energy penetration. This chapter evaluates alternative improvements that 
could be made to reserve procurement in order to increase efficiency in the network. The 
improvements look holistically at reserve, from sizing to allocation to activation, to determine 
what changes will decrease costs and impact renewable curtailment.16 The Netherlands case study 
will demonstrate which improvements make the largest impact, enabling policy makers to focus 
on the most cost-effective strategies. The analysis is holistic, combining multiple aspects of 
reserve through different markets (day-ahead and balancing) and across regions.  
Reserves can be used in many stages of power system operation. The loss of a generator 
during operations is a short-term problem. The need for reserve also arises in long-term 
planning; if an operator builds a future system to meet demand exactly, there might be periods of 
shortfall. Instead, planning reserve determines the amount of extra capacity needed for 
investment decisions, which can impact the reliability of the grid [90]. Although it can have an 
impact on future reliability [91], the focus of this chapter is on operational reserve for short-term 
operations.  
Obtaining operational reserve can generally be divided into three steps: sizing, allocation, 
and activation [92]. The sizing of reserve determines how much is needed to be procured, called 
a reserve requirement; for instance, three percent of load forecast is needed in every hour or a 
fixed amount of MW, as seen in Figure 3-1. The required reserve is then allocated to particular 
generators either through long term contracts or through a mechanism in an energy market. In 
the real-time or balancing time-frame, the reserves are activated or consumed as needed.  This 
activation might be the result of operator action, or through market mechanisms (for instance, in 
the way the flexible ramping is deployed through normal energy dispatch in MISO and CAISO).  
This phase assesses whether there were enough reserves procured and if they were deliverable 
                                                     
16 An alternative approach would be use of stochastic programming, which determines reserves 
endogenously rather than ex ante. Although it has not been implemented in an actual market 
setting, research is ongoing, with seminal papers [232]–[234]. With increased uncertainty from 
renewable generation, stochastic modeling can become increasingly important.  
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when needed. While there is great focus on the first stage, sizing, the next two are equally 
important for the reliability of the system. An abundance of reserve procured in a congested area 
that cannot deliver during a contingency will cause an outage, just as under procurement would.17 
 
Figure 3-1 Examples two types of reserve: fixed percentage of load and fixed MW 
 
These issues are all important to assess, and it is not often that a system operator can 
implement many changes at once. This study evaluates specific improvements to reserve 
procurement, comparing which have the greatest impact on market efficiency. The 
improvements directly or indirectly involve each of the three stages of operating reserves 
procurement, and compare an existing method with a proposed method. In the Netherlands, the 
reserve requirement is presently based on a seasonal average, and capacity is acquired by the TSO 
months in advance through long-term contracts with generators within the Netherlands alone 
[89].  
In the alternative reserve schemes proposed in this chapter, three enhancements are 
considered. The first improvement changes the quantity of reserve procured from a seasonal 
fixed amount to a value that changes day-by-day. In the summer months, the seasonal quantity 
of reserve procured might be high due to expected high temperature during peak summer weeks. 
                                                     
17 Deliverability of a flexible ramping product is currently an issue in California in the Energy 
























However, temperatures in early weeks might be lower than expected, causing over-procurement 
of reserve. The suggested improvement would procure reserve based on the following day’s 
expected load; this should provide a tighter bound compared to a seasonal average. The second 
improvement is changing the allocation of reserve from long-term contracts to a market 
mechanism. The suggestion creates a system similar to the U.S., which co-optimizes energy and 
reserve together. The allocation of reserve can follow the least cost dispatch and take advantage 
of online generation, rather than contracting with one particular generator. The final 
improvement coordinates the allocation and activation of reserve. Each country allocates and 
activates reserve independently, with minimal real-time balancing. This improvement would 
combine the reserve needs of neighboring countries to take advantage of less expensive 
generation. The three enhancements are tested in an hourly market model simulation for Europe 
for a year of wind data given the expected penetration for the year 2030. Background on reserve 
products and European markets can be found in Section 3.2, followed by a detailed description 
of the three improvements and mathematical formulation used in Section 3.3. The simulation 
data and results can be found in Section 3.4 with a discussion of the implications and limitations 
in Section 3.5. 
3.2 BACKGROUND 
There are many types of operating reserve depending on their use, and many conflicting 
terms across system operators. Reserve types can be distinguished by the response time, physical 
characteristics, and the type of event to which it is responding [93]. Most European markets have 
primary, secondary, and tertiary reserve [94]. Primary reserve, also called governor response and 
regulating reserve, responds within seconds or less and provide frequency support. After an 
event occurs, there is usually slow tertiary reserve which replaces reserve that was used for a 
contingency. Between these types is secondary reserve, a type of reserve that responds within 
seconds to minutes to ease forecast uncertainty and in some cases, follow load. These types of 
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reserve also fall into categories of spinning and non-spinning reserve, where spinning reserve is 
provided by an online generator and non-spin by a resource that can come online quickly. Most 
U.S. markets have further distinctions between types of reserve. Contingency reserve is only used 
in an emergency setting and load following reserve is used in ‘non-event’ situations, generally for 
balancing due to forecast errors. Generally, all regulation reserve or primary reserve must be 
spinning, while contingency reserve might be spinning or non-spinning. The distinctions 
between countries and markets is wide ranging; several comparison tables can be found in [88], 
[93], [95]. In the Netherlands, secondary reserve is called automatic or manual frequency 
response (aFRR or mFRR) [96],[97], the latter of which is the focus of reserve procurement in 
this chapter. This section will first detail broad literature on reserve modeling, particularly the 
choice of reserve requirement. Next, specific literature on European institutions, markets, and 
procedures will be explained, including studies in the literature and from collaborators most 
similar to the work in this chapter.  
Reserve modeling has received increased attention in the literature due to the uncertainty 
from wind and solar generation. There has been a great deal of literature discussing alternative 
reserve models that directly consider uncertainty. A review of reserve markets including a focus 
on both modeling issues and technical constraints can be found in [94]. Literature on modeling 
extends from competitive market models to theoretical equilibrium models. More recently, a 
complementary review of flexibility was published including flexibility metrics, market design, 
and the possibility of distribution system operator (DSO) interactions [98]. Finally, a 
comprehensive review of different types of reserves in a high wind system can be found in [93], 
with country-specific practices and policies and an evaluation of reserve in wind integration 
studies.  
Much of the literature on reserve proposes new methodologies for determining the reserve 
requirement needed [99]–[103]. The authors of [99] propose a new reserve requirement based on 
the loss of load costs associated with each period, with only slightly increased computational 
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time. The method is generalized in [100], where demand is represented as a probability 
distribution and Monte Carlo analysis is used to compare the proposal against traditional reserve 
formulations. Another proposed method in [101] for reserve requirement uses a probabilistic 
approach that produces an hourly requirement that reduces the risk of load shedding over the 
year. While also incorporating the cost of lost load, the authors in [102] explicitly consider 
probabilities with a stochastic two stage model, acknowledging the computation burden is high 
and proposing methods to decrease the difficulty. In [103], probabilistic sizing is used to 
determine reserves that directly considers the cost of activation. Finally, rather than a new 
proposal, [104] compares two common requirements, N-1 or loss of a single generator or 
network device, and 3σ or three times the standard deviation for demand and renewables. With a 
common test system, the authors find the amount of reserve schedule depends on the 
penetration of wind, with levels decreasing as penetration increase until they reach a minimum 
and finally increase with penetration. They point to the utilization of a large nuclear plant, which 
can impact total reserve need in a small system. The majority of these methods use a benchmark 
system, one of the IEEE Reliability Test Systems, to analyze proposed reserve procurement 
systems [99], [100], [102]. This chapter distinguishes itself by utilizing a real-world system and 
historical data instead of a well-known test case, focusing on European markets. Each paper 
cited proposes a new method for determining the requirement that improves economic 
efficiency or increases wind penetration. The focus of this chapter is comparing improvements 
beyond a single requirement (endogenous to the day-ahead market model). These methods can 
be used as future comparisons to the simple requirement used in this chapter, which is one of 
the three suggested improvements.  
The literature on European reserve or ancillary services markets is extensive. For those more 
familiar with U.S. markets, [105] offers a comparison between U.S. and European markets, with 
a summary figure of European markets and the role of the TSO. An overview of the European 
ancillary services market can be found in [106], details of generator decision making in the 
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Nordic market detailing reserve processes in [107], an overview of Dutch markets can be found 
in [108] and [109], and a Dutch a wind integration study in [110]. In [108], they show there has 
been more over-procurement than under-purchasing of reserve in a twelve year period,18 
suggesting a tighter bound could lead to efficiency improvements. This claim helps motivate the 
reserve requirement improvement, showing that rather than use a broad requirement, a tighter 
requirement might benefit the system (described in Section 3.3.2.c). 
In analyzing the future European electricity system, [111] promotes the change from bilateral 
contracts for reserve to a market-based system, one of the improvement suggested in this 
chapter (Section 3.3.2.b).19 The authors in [112] suggest design options for such a market, 
distinguishing between longer-term reserve capacity and reserve needed for balancing; similar to 
how this chapter refers to the different phases of reserve: allocation and activation. They delve 
further into the details of implementing a reserve market, where the Common Merit Order 
method is most similar to the proposal in Section 3.3.2.b. The basis for [113] also assumes the 
existence of a simultaneous energy and reserve market, and additionally examines coordination, 
similar to Section 3.3.2.d.  
Several papers emphasize the need for cross-border integration and interconnection as an 
essential tenant of renewable integration in Europe [111], [113], [114]. Those authors’ assertion 
complements the last improvement suggested in this chapter, the coordination of reserve across 
countries (Section 3.3.2.d). The framework used in [113] is most similar to the improvements 
suggested in this chapter, coordinating reserve across Northern Europe and modeling a common 
marketplace. With both system-wide reserve allocation and activation across the region in 
balancing markets, reserves from the Nordic region are highly utilized in the remainder of 
northern Europe, where 30% of the requirement is traded across the border between the Nordic 
and UCTE systems which are not synchronized and so are connected with DC lines. In a follow-
                                                     
18 Under-procurement might also lead to loss of load, suggesting proper penalties and incentives 
are needed to ensure the system is long rather than short on reserve. 
19 Co-optimization of energy and reserve is current practice in all U.S. markets. 
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up study, [114] shows that allocating transmission capacity is a vital aspect of cross-border 
reserve trading.  
The topic is also explored through my collaborative work with a visiting student to Johns 
Hopkins, where the resulting paper, [92], examined the coordination of reserves for four 
countries. The simulations found that the coordinated allocation of reserve in the day-ahead 
market did not necessarily correspond to lower system costs in the balancing market. Without 
reserving capacity on transmission lines, the reserved power was not always deliverable when 
needed. This result leads to the addition of extra simulations to confirm the outcome using a 
European-wide model.  
There are similarities between this chapter and the papers in the previous paragraphs, as all 
examine coordination between regions in Europe and use of a market setting to procure reserve. 
The modeling frameworks in [79], [100], and [101] are most similar to the methodology in this 
chapter. All use a unit commitment model to simulate the day-ahead market, followed by an 
activation of reserve in a balancing market. The input data and networks that are utilized differ, 
but the basic framework is the same. This work is distinguished by analyzing the combination of 
these proposals in addition to alternate reserve requirements or coordination alone. By 
comparing three modes of improvements, this chapter can assess which improvement makes the 
biggest impact for maximizing market surplus and integrating wind power. While there is 
literature on specific improvements to one aspect of reserve modeling, no paper compares 
improvements to different steps of the reserve process in addition to contract versus market-
based reserved. This project offers a comparison of reserve improvements in procurement 
allocation, and activation focusing on the Dutch and European markets. While the case study is 




In order to deal with the uncertainty that rises from wind generation, a model is needed that 
represents the multi-stage nature of operational decisions and the uncertainty and variability at 
each stage. The Netherlands does not exist in isolation, and therefore the model must be able to 
interact with its neighbors and reflect current market conditions. For these reasons, we chose to 
run simulations for this project with the Comprehensive Market Power in Electricity 
Transmission and Energy Simulator (COMPETES) expanded to include a day-ahead unit 
commitment stage [115], [116]. COMPETES is a network-constrained pan-European market 
model with one node per country. As seen in Figure 3-2, the nodes consist of 26 European 
Union member states and 7 non-EU countries. The full list of countries and the abbreviations 
used in the results section can be found in Table 3-1. The model was originally created as a 
game-theoretic model of generation dispatch on a power network by researchers from Johns 
Hopkins and Energy Research Center of the Netherlands (ECN) [117], [118]. COMPETES 
includes a combination of mixed-integer and relaxed unit commitment formulations for day-
ahead unit commitment, along with operating reserve requirements, transmission constraints, 
and rules for thermal generation in both day-ahead and balancing (real-time) markets.  
Section 3.3.1 describes the modeling framework for the three improvements. The 
formulation for the unit commitment model is presented in detail in Section 3.3.2, with 
subsections for each type of improvement. Section 3.3.3 explains the sensitivity performed 




Figure 3-2 Network in COMPETES model 
 
Table 3-1 Countries in COMPETES and their abbreviations 
BEL Belgium POR Portugal 
CZE Czech Republic  SKO Slovakia 
DEN Denmark East SPA Spain 
DEW Denmark West SWE Sweden 
FIN Finland UKI United Kington 
FRA France SWI Switzerland 
GER Germany NOR Norway 
IRE Ireland BLK Balkans 
ITA Italy BLT Baltics 
NED Netherlands AUS Austria  
POL Poland   
3.3.1 Modeling Framework 
There are three improvements to reserve procurement that will be tested. Each 
improvement roughly captures a different step in the reserve process and contrasts current 
practice with what we hypothesize to be an improvement. The first proposes to update the 
allocation phase from using bilateral contracts to a market system (referred to as ‘type’). The 
second is an improvement to the sizing or procurement of reserve (referred to as ‘reserve 
requirement’). The third improvement coordinates reserve allocation and activation among 
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countries in northwest Europe (referred to as ‘coordination’). This framework is unique among 
the literature. There have been papers that compared one or two of these improvements, but to 
my knowledge, this combination and extensive simulation has not been performed previously.  
Figure 2 shows a comparison of different simulations with increasing complexity moving 
away from the origin. The costliest point is hypothesized to be the black dot, representing a 
limited set of generators provided by contract for a seasonal requirement. The least costly 
simulation is hypothesized be the market-based daily reserve requirement including all 
generators, represented by a star. Moving away from the origin, the complexity increases. 
Determining reserve on a daily basis takes more computational effort than a seasonal 
requirement. Similarly, operating a market is more intensive than bilateral contracts. While 
complexity increases, I also hypothesize efficiency increases. The improvements should increase 
market surplus through the different simulations.  
 
 
Figure 3-3 Conceptual diagram of reserve improvements, where complexity and efficiency increase moving 
away from the origin. The type improvement is described in 3.3.2.a, the reserve requirement is in 3.3.2.b, 












The day-ahead and balancing models run sequentially to mimic actual operations. The day-
ahead model fixes the generation commitment schedule, then the real-time model runs hour by 
hour with that schedule. Generators that are able to start up quickly will be able to commit in the 
balancing market, while slow generation commitment will either be fixed based on the day-ahead 
schedule or out of the market. The day-ahead market uses wind forecasts scaled based on 
historical data and the real-time market uses actual data where available and similarly distributed 
data where not available. A further description of the data used for wind can be found in 3.3.3.   
Although there are twelve possible simulation combinations from Figure 3-3, all are not 
practical. Reserve is currently contracted on a seasonal basis; it is highly unlikely that contracts 
will change daily to accommodate a new daily reserve requirement. Therefore, the daily contract-
based simulations (with and without coordination) were not simulated. Additionally, the seasonal 
coordinated day-ahead simulation was eliminated as it would require companies across countries 
to coordinate contracts. Although possible, it would require many assumptions about cross-
country cooperation. In total, the eight simulations done can be found in Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2  Eight simulations performed using COMPETES 
  No Coordination Balancing Only DA and Balancing 
Contract 
Seasonal X X  
Daily    
Market 
Seasonal X X X 
Daily X X X 
 
3.3.2 Model Formulation for Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets 
Each of the eight scenarios is simulated for both a day-ahead and balancing market. The 
formulation for the day-ahead market is described below, followed by a description of the 
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differences between the day-ahead and balancing constraints. The specific differences between 
the scenarios are described in subsections 3.3.2.a, b, and c. The definitions of sets, variables, and 
parameters can be found in the Nomenclature section at the beginning of the dissertation and 
details about the input parameters can be found in Section 3.4.  
Equations (3-1)-(3-21) are considered the basic day-ahead unit commitment model for this 
project and will be used as the base model for all scenarios. Among the simulation types, the 
formulation shows a co-optimized energy and reserve market; differentiated constraints for 
additional simulations are shown after the formulation. The objective of the model is to 
minimize operating costs, which consist of fixed costs for start-up and minimum-load operation, 
as well as the marginal cost for the power dispatched. The objective in (3-1) is straightforward; 
minimize operating costs, which include the cost of generation, storage and lost load. The value 
of lost load (VOLL) is €3000/MWh, which is the market cap for most European markets [119] 
and the cost of storage is based on the investment costs [118]. Constraints (3-2) and (3-3) limit 
the power capacity of each generator. Due to the large problem size, the unit commitment 
formulation is based on [120] for the resources in the Netherlands. This formulation for unit 
commitment produces the same result as other unit commitment formulations, but is shown to 
be tighter and more compact. The generation dispatch variable is constrained between 0 and the 
maximum less the minimum capacity. Many other unit commitment formulations limit the 
dispatch between minimum and maximum (𝑃𝑔
min𝑢𝑔,𝑡 ≤ 𝑝𝑔,𝑡 ≤ 𝑢𝑔,𝑡𝑃𝑔
max). 
For resources outside the Netherlands, the generation is aggregated by year and fuel type, 
meaning there are not individual generators. Committing the aggregated resources using a strict 
binary variable would imply that the all generators of a particular type would be committed, 
where this is not the case in reality. It would also be a significant computational burden. 
Therefore, for all generators outside the Netherlands, the same formulation is used except the 
unit commitment variables are relaxed between 0 and 1. This allows generators that would 
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otherwise be operating at their minimums to set price, a characteristic that provides further 
insight into pricing and echoes the ELMP pricing model from Section 2.6.1.  
The imports and exports between countries are described in constraints (3-4)–(3-6), with 
Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) limits on lines and export/import limits between countries. A 
transshipment (“pipes-and-bubbles”) formulation is used. Constraint (3-7) defines the startup 
and commitment status of the generator, where the variables u, v, and w can either be 1 
(startup/commitment occurs in that interval/shutdown) or 0 (otherwise).20 The ramping 
capability of the generators is defined in (3-8) and (3-9), where (3-8) limits ramping up and (3-9) 
limits ramping down. The reserves are found in the ramp up but not ramp down constraint. 
While it can be added in both directions, the characteristics of the system do not need additional 
ramp down from reserve, since ramp up is the greater concern. Constraints (3-10) and (3-11) 
define the minimum up and down times for the generators during the 24-hour commitment 
period. Similar to the dispatch model, the wind injection can be curtailed in the node balance 
constraint (3-12), and is limited by the day-ahead forecast in (3-13). Demand can also be shed at 
a high cost, and the slack variable’s upper bound is shown in (3-14).  
The constraints describing energy storage in the network are in (3-15)–(3-18). The charging 
and discharging is limited by the maximum power output of the storage resource in (3-15) and 
(3-16).  The state of charge variable for storage has an upper bound of the maximum capacity in 
(3-17). The storage balance constraint, which determines the state of charge between periods 
relative to the charging and discharging, is found in (3-18). Reserve for storage is similar to the 
formulation in [121], with the reserve variable limited by the amount discharged and the 
production capacity in (3-16), and by the state of charge in (3-19). There are other formulations 
for storage reserve [122], many of which are related to electric vehicle charging [123], [124]. 
Some formulations assume reserve must be utilized to a certain degree in each period [122]; 
                                                     
20 The shutdown variable w does not have a cost in the objective, and both v and w could be 
continuous between 0 and 1. However, the formulation in [120] proves that if both are binary 
the formulation is tight and compact.  
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however, the formulation presented below might overestimate the contribution of storage to 
reserves. Future work in this area would simulate several formulations to determine how much 
storage is overestimated and how that would impact operating costs.  
Constraint (3-20) defines the requirement for operating reserves, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑞 . The requirement is 
dependent on which of the two scenarios is being simulated. The definition of 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑞 is found in 
Section 3.3.2.c. The value of requirement is based on the NREL 3+5 rule [88], where 3% of 
demand and 5% of variable generation is required. The rule was originally intended for 
contingency reserve, with half available as spinning reserve. Since this model only considers 
spinning reserve and has a high renewable penetration, the entire 3% and 5% are the 
requirement utilized. A report from IEA determined that 4% of installed wind would be 
necessary for additional reserves with penetrations under 10% [9]. Since the penetration in most 
countries exceeds 10%, a requirement of 5% is not unreasonable. Finally, the commitment 
variable defining the status of a generator is restricted to be a binary variable in (3-21) for Dutch 
generators and relaxed for remaining generators in (3-22). The variables that are nonnegative are 
designated in (3-23). All notation definitions can be found in the Notation section at the 
beginning of the dissertation. For any one simulation, the time horizon is twenty four hours, with 
the last hour of the previous day used as input for the next.   
Day-Ahead Unit Commitment in COMPETES 
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up







max, ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡  (3-6) 
𝑣𝑔,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑔,𝑡 = 𝑢𝑔,𝑡 − 𝑢𝑔,𝑡−1, ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡  (3-7) 
𝑝𝑔,𝑡 + 𝑟𝑔,𝑡
SP − 𝑝𝑔,𝑡−1 ≤ 𝑅𝑔, ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 > 1  (3-8) 





≤ 𝑢𝑔,𝑡 , ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 ≥ 𝜏𝑔




𝑟=𝑡+1 ≤ 1 − 𝑢𝑔,𝑡 , ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 ≤ |𝑇| − 𝜏𝑔





















≤ 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 , ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡  (3-13) 
0 ≤ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
max ≤ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
max, ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡  (3-14) 
𝑠𝑣,𝑡
ch ≤ 𝐶𝑣,𝑡
max, ∀ 𝑣, 𝑡  (3-15) 
𝑠𝑣,𝑡
dc + 𝑟𝑣,𝑡 ≤ 𝐶𝑣,𝑡
max, ∀ 𝑣, 𝑡  (3-16) 
0 ≤ 𝑙𝑣,𝑡 ≤ 𝑆𝑣,𝑡
max, ∀ 𝑣, 𝑡  (3-17) 





= 0, ∀ 𝑣, 𝑡 (3-18) 
𝑟𝑣,𝑡
𝜂𝑣








,   ∀𝑖, 𝑡 (3-20) 
𝑢𝑔,𝑡 , 𝑣𝑔,𝑡 , 𝑤𝑔,𝑡 ∈ {0,1}, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺
𝑁𝐿 , 𝑡  (3-21) 
0 ≤ 𝑢𝑔,𝑡 , 𝑣𝑔,𝑡 , 𝑤𝑔,𝑡 ≤ 1, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺






dc , 𝑟𝑣,𝑡, 𝑙𝑣,𝑡 ≥ 0, ∀𝑣, 𝑘, 𝑡 (3-23) 
 
The Europe-wide balancing market model is based on the day-ahead formulation with 
adjustments for reserve and fast generators. This chapter uses an hourly balancing market model, 
mimicking the last intra-day market, which is typically operated one-hour before delivery [117]. 
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In this simulation, reserves are released, meaning all reserve variables and constraints (3-19) and 
(3-20) are not included. The formulation for the day-ahead market is used for fast-start 
resources, or those generators that have a minimum run time of one hour and can ramp to their 
minimum capacity within an hour. In actual market operations, these resources may be required 
to start up within a shorter time period, however this balancing market is modeled hourly. The 
slow generation resources have fixed commitment status, meaning the 𝑢𝑔,𝑡 , 𝑣𝑔,𝑡 , and 𝑤𝑔,𝑡 variables 
are held at their day-ahead status. The dispatch level for the units can change, still limited by their 
ramping capability. In some of the simulations, cross border flows are fixed, while in others the 
set of resources that were formerly contracted for reserve are available for dispatch. These 
distinctions can be found in the following three subsections, one for each improvement. Figure 
3-3 shows an experimental design in which each of three changes are considered and varied 
between two options (one the base case, and the other an improvement). In the next three 
subsections I explain each of these characteristics. 
 
3.3.2.b Reserve Characteristic 1: Contract- vs. Market-Based Procurement 
The first of three proposed improvements considered in this chapter is the method by which 
reserves are allocated, where current practice allocates based on long-term contracts with 
particular generators. The improvement to current practice is allocation of reserve through an 
auction, where energy and reserve are co-optimized in the day-ahead market (as is done in U.S. 
markets). The hypothesis is the market-based case will provide a lower cost solution, since it will 
allocate reserve closer to delivery (with more information on the state of the system) and based 
on cost rather than contracts.   
 Reserve contracts are usually between the TSO and a company or generation owner. As the 
details of contracts are private information, the modeling assumes generators engaged in a 
contract will be paid a fixed price per MWh for the duration of the contract [89], [108]. The 
quantity of reserves contracted is the same as the reserve requirement in the market-based 
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model. Before any simulation is done, a simple algorithm determines which generators will be 
contracted for reserve based on their installation date and fuel type. For the simulations, only 
fossil fuel generators were contracted. The naïve algorithm first contracted the oldest oil, coal, 
gas, and lignite, followed by newer units until the requirement was met. A unit was contracted 
for its full capacity; if the requirement was exceeded due to the last unit added, it could not be 
larger than 110% of the requirement. For example, if the requirement was 1000 MW and 950 
MW had been allocated, a generator larger than 150 MW would be skipped for a newer resource 
less than 150 MW. All countries procured resources in this manner except Switzerland, which 
had not fossil fuels. In that case their hydro resources were partially contracted to provide 
reserve.  
The generators in each country that are contracted for reserve would be excluded from 
participation in the day-ahead market, since their capacity could not be scheduled for energy 
generation. In the balancing market, the reserves are released, and can be used for balancing the 
wind forecast error. Other than fixing the off status of the contracted generators, no other 
modeling is altered from the formulation above. The contracted generators would be paid a price 
for their capacity as reserve, and the balancing price for any energy provided in that market. 
Since information on contract prices is not publicly available and would greatly impact cost 
calculations for comparison, no reserve costs were included in the results. A further discussion 
can be found in Section 3.4.5. 
3.3.2.c Reserve Characteristic 2: Seasonal vs. Daily Reserve Requirement 
The second improvement analyzed is changing the quantity of reserve requirement itself. 
Current practice sets a seasonal reserve quantity, and the proposed improvement would set a 
daily requirement. The hypothesis is the daily requirement would produce a lower cost solution 
compared to the seasonal requirement, since the amount would be tailored to the next day’s 
needs rather than a seasonal estimation. In both the seasonal and daily case, the requirement 
utilized is simple in order to compare the importance of relative size of the requirement and 
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ensure ease of implementation. As mentioned in the formulation section, the NREL 3+5 rule for 
load and renewable energy is used for both seasonal and daily requirements [88]. The 
requirement was written for use in a U.S. market, where contingency reserve is procured using 
both spinning and non-spinning reserve. In this modeling framework, only spinning reserve 
(reserve that is online) is procured. The rule is adapted to set 3% of average load and 5% of 
average renewable forecast is the minimum requirement. These values can be updated in future 
simulations to reflect wider or narrower ranges. A rule using 1% of load and 3% of renewables 
was tested, and the resulting load shed in the simulation was greater than using 3% and 5%.  
The seasonal simulation is based on the average load and renewable forecast for winter, 
spring, summer, and fall, leaving 4 different requirements for the year. The daily requirement is 
based on the average load and wind forecast for the following day, leaving 365 different 
requirements for the year. The reserve requirement is determined exogenously from the model, 











, ∀𝑖, 𝑠 ∈ {𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟, 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟, 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙} 
where 𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛  is the number of hours in either winter, spring, summer or fall, and 𝑡𝑠 is the set of 












, ∀𝑖, 𝑑 ∈ {1,2, … ,365} 
where 𝑇𝑑𝑎𝑦  is the number of hours in in the day (24), and 𝑡𝑠 is the set of hours in each day d.  
 
3.3.2.d Reserve Characteristic 3: Independent Allocation vs. Coordination 
among European Countries 
The third improvement deals with the coordination of reserve procurement between the 
Netherlands and its neighbors. In current practice, each country procures reserve from resources 
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within its boundaries [89]. With some coordination between neighbors, the reserve can be 
procured from the least cost resource, possibly leading to higher overall system efficiency. The 
hypothesis is the coordinated scenarios will produce a lower cost result and integrate more wind 
energy. The overall system should be at least the same or better off with coordination in the 
balancing market, since the solution without coordination is part of the set of solutions in the 
coordinated case. This type of coordination is also explored in Chapter 5 for energy markets. 
However, coordination across both day-ahead and balancing markets leads to more complex 
interactions.  
For the market-based simulations, all reserves will be allocated to specific generators in the 
day-ahead market and released in the balancing market, being allowed to freely provide energy 
according to its energy cost. Actual markets would hold reserve in the balancing market for use 
in real-time delivery; however, this chapter treats the balancing market as activation in real-time. 
The first reason for this modeling assumption is availability of data. Simulation of real-time 
delivery would require additional wind and load data based on an hour-ahead forecast. This data 
was not available for countries in this study. Second, real-time simulations would best be served 
using an ac model so voltage and reactive power deviations could be captured. The model used 
for this chapter is meant to analyze market mechanisms and not real-time operations. For this 
reason, reserves meant to manage second-by-second frequency variations (primary reserves) are 
also not modeled.21  
The no coordination simulation will allocate country by country, while the improvement will 
combine Northwest Europe, expanding the reserve zone to the countries surrounding the 
Netherlands. The balancing market will then incorporate those countries, while fixing any 
imports and exports. The countries coordinating in the simulation are sometimes referred to as 
Central Western Europe, and were the focus of previous work [92];  they include the 
                                                     
21 Unlike the U.S., there are no contingency or ramping reserve products in ENSTO-E. The 
response to a contingency is provided by primary, secondary and tertiary reserves, which will 
respond at different speeds [88].  
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Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Germany. Due to increased trade,22 the simulations also 
include the United Kingdom; future studies can analyze different combinations of these 
countries to evaluate if any supersede the five used in simulations.  
Previous research in [92] identified an important discrepancy between expected benefits 
from coordination in the day-ahead and balancing markets, to coordination in the balancing 
market alone. In [92], the simulations where coordination occurred in both allocation phases 
(day-ahead market) and the activation phase (balancing market) resulted in higher costs 
compared to coordination in the activation phase alone. To investigate this discrepancy in 
COMPETES, an additional set of scenarios is created to account for coordination in the 
balancing market alone. This improvement was updated to have three levels of coordination: (1) 
no coordination, where each country allocates and activates reserve independently, (2) 
coordination in the balancing market, where allocation of reserves in the day-ahead market 
occurs independently by country, and (3) coordination in day-ahead allocation and balancing 
market activation.  
For the case with no coordination, each country procures reserve independently and 
balances forecast error independently. Constraint (3-20) is modeled for each country i and the 
balancing market fixes the total imports and exports between countries. When only the balancing 
market is coordinated, the day-ahead market remains independent, as in the no coordination 
scenario. Then in the balancing market, Northwestern European countries can trade between 
each other, while remaining countries balance independently and their imports and exports are 
fixed. For full coordination, the day-ahead market is also coordinated; any generator in 
Northwestern Europe can contribute to the reserve requirement following NTC limitations. The 
remaining countries have separate reserve requirements that must be fulfilled with in-country 
resources. The balancing market allows trade among Northwest Europe, again fixing the imports 
                                                     
22 Trade between the UK and the Netherlands increased due to the BritNed line, an underwater 
high voltage dc transmission line that began operation in 2011 [236]. 
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and exports of all other countries. The modifications are shown below, where 𝑁𝑁𝑊𝐸 , 𝐾𝑁𝑊𝐸 is the 
combined set of countries or the set of lines connected the countries in Northwest Europe: the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. The set −𝑁𝑁𝑊𝐸, −𝐾𝑁𝑊𝐸 
contains all other countries and the inter-tie lines connecting them, see Table 3-1 for a complete 
list. 
 
No Coordination  
 Day-Ahead: reserve constraint for each country, same as (3-20) 




+ ∑ 𝑟𝑣,𝑡𝑣𝑉𝑖 ≥ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑞
,   ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑡 




 All countries balance independently 
Balancing-Only Coordination 
 Day-Ahead: reserve constraint for each country, same as (3-20) 




+ ∑ 𝑟𝑣,𝑡𝑣𝑉𝑖 ≥ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑞
,   ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑡 
 Balancing: modifies constraints (3-4)–(3-6), fixes inter-tie flow, 𝑓𝑘,𝑡
up
, 𝑓𝑘,𝑡
dn ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾−𝑁𝑊𝐸 
Counties outside of Northwest Europe balance independently, countries in Northwest 






max, ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑁𝑊𝐸 , 𝑡    
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖
max ≤ ∑ 𝐼𝑖,𝑘(−𝑓𝑘,𝑡
dn + 𝑓𝑘,𝑡
up
)∀𝑘∈𝐾𝑁𝑊𝐸 , ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁





max , ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑊𝐸 , 𝑡  
Day-Ahead and Balancing Coordination 
 Day-Ahead: single reserve constraint for Northwest European region and independent 
constraints for all remaining countries, modifies (3-20) 
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Counties outside of Northwest Europe schedule reserves independently, countries in 




+ ∑ 𝑟𝑣,𝑡𝑣𝑉𝑖 ≥ ∑ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑞
𝑖=𝑁𝑁𝑊𝐸 ,   ∀𝑖 = 𝑁




+ ∑ 𝑟𝑣,𝑡𝑣𝑉𝑖 ≥ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑞
,   ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁−𝑁𝑊𝐸 , 𝑡 
 Balancing: modifies constraints (3-4)–(3-6) 
Counties outside of Northwest Europe balance independently, countries in Northwest 






max, ∀ 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝑁𝑊𝐸 , 𝑡    
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖
max ≤ ∑ 𝐼𝑖,𝑘(−𝑓𝑘,𝑡
dn + 𝑓𝑘,𝑡
up
)∀𝑘∈𝐾𝑁𝑊𝐸 , ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁





max , ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑊𝐸 , 𝑡  
 
3.3.3 Role of  Forecast Error between Day-Ahead and Balancing 
In addition to the three improvements described in the previous three subsections, scenarios 
for the actual realization of wind for real-time markets are developed to ensure a comprehensive 
set of results. There is uncertainty between the day-ahead and balancing markets. The midday 
forecasts are between 12 and 36 hours from delivery considering the auction runs for the 
following day (midnight to midnight) [125]. Due to the error from forecasts, simulation of a 
single actualization might not capture the full uncertainty of wind. The simulation of multiple 
actualizations ensures the results reflect more than a single realized uncertainty. The amount of 
reserve procured in the day-ahead market might be enough for one actualization but might fail in 
other cases. Analyzing the average of five real-time actualizations helps capture that uncertainty.    
As discussed earlier, only wind input data changes between the day-ahead and balancing 
markets, load data remains constant. This study focuses on the impacts of wind, and the 
simulations highlight the change of wind forecast error compared to realizations, meaning one 
uncertainty is simulated to isolate the impact. The data available is also limited for load, and 
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synthesizing data for actualizations would require many assumptions. If further data becomes 
available, future studies can investigate the effect of interactions between wind and load forecast 
and actualizations [126], [127].  
The balancing wind data is based on historical data with additional scenarios created using an 
autoregressive (AR) model [128]. The production data for actual realizations is provided by the 
Wind Unit at ECN from public and private wind data, and the AR model was developed by a 
colleague at ECN, Özge Özdemir. The available historical data is used for the first of five 
balancing market wind realizations. The wind forecasts and actualizations are then used to create 
four additional synthetic annual wind time series for use as scenarios in the balancing market. 
The forecast less the wind actualization calculates basic forecast error, which is used in an 
autoregressive model. The first autocorrelation, 𝜌, is calculated in (3-24), where 𝑥𝑡 is the forecast 
error, or the forecast less the actual realization, 𝜇 is the mean forecast error, 𝜎 is the standard 
deviation, and 𝑇 is the total number of time periods, or 8760 hours. The noise, 𝜖, is calculated 
using a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation 𝜎√1 − 𝜌2, shown in (3-25). 
Finally, the scenarios are calculated using an AR(1) model in (3-26), where the parameters are the 
series autocorrelation and mean. For countries without available data, the average mean and 








𝜖𝑡 = 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚 (0, 𝜎√1 − 𝜌
2) (3-25) 
𝑥𝑡
𝑆 = 𝜇 + 𝜌(𝑥𝑡−1 − 𝜇) + 𝜖𝑡 (3-26) 
As shown in Figure 3-4, one wind forecast is used for the day-ahead market. The simulation 
results for scheduling and inter-tie line flow are fed into five separate annual wind actualizations, 
each 365 days, for the balancing market. Five different yearly simulations run one after the other, 
each using the same day-ahead input, meaning for each of the 8 combinations listed in Table 3-2, 
5 balancing market simulations are run. The first of five wind actualizations is the historical 
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forecast. The results shown in the next section analyze the average and the minimum and 
maximum resulting simulation.  
 
 
Figure 3-4 Simulations between day-ahead and real-time 
3.4 SIMULATION DATA AND RESULTS  
Each of the eight market design scenarios described in Table 3-2 are simulated for the day-
ahead and balancing market with the goal of determining which improvement or set of 
improvements has the greatest benefit. The day-ahead market is simulated daily in one-hour 
increments for one year (365 days) using scaled historical wind and load data for each country 
using COMPETES. One day is optimized at a time, first for the day-ahead time-frame using the 
formulation in 3.3.2 and then for the balancing time-frame in which the realized wind value is 
different from the forecast. The schedule and commitment from the last hour of each day is used 
as a starting point for the following day in a rolling fashion. The balancing market takes the 
schedule from the day-ahead market and fixes the slow generators, allowing the fast-start 
generations to be committed. The balancing market is simulated using multiple real-time wind 
scenarios.  
Between the day-ahead and real-time models, the wind forecast is updated but the load 
remains the same. This is due to several characteristics of wind forecast error compared to load 
error. First, load forecast error is usually much smaller than wind forecast error [9]. There are 









horizon. Second, wind forecast errors are usually larger in range compared to load forecast 
errors, when expressed as a fraction of the forecasted amount [126]. Finally, the focus on this 
project is on wind uncertainty and integration, and this simulation allows me to focus on the 
impact of wind error without confounding it with load errors. There can be impacts of wind and 
load forecast error together, and indeed operating reserves should be acquired considering both, 
but data on both types of errors were not readily available for all countries.  
The model is coded using AIMMS version 4.6 software using CPLEX 12.6.1 solver. The 
Europe-wide 24 hour model has approximately 145,000 constraints and 178,000 variables with 
3672 integer variables for the day-ahead market. The Europe-wide balancing market has 
approximately 138,000 constraints and 130,000 variables with 3168 integer variables. Integer 
variables are only for units in the Netherlands, where there are many gas plants, which can be 
turned on during the balancing market due to their short minimum run times. Every day solves 
in 6-9 seconds, and including time to write output files, the yearlong simulation takes 
approximately 2 hours to run.  
3.4.1 Characteristics of  Generators, Wind, and Load 
The characteristics of the generation in COMPETES can be found in the figures below, in 
addition to descriptions in [117], [118]. The generation mix used in the simulations is projected 
forward for the year 2030, which is the year considered in the simulations, and includes the 
current generation mix less planned retirements and any generation capacity already planned to 
open in future years. There is no additional capacity expansion modeled. Figure 3-5 shows the 
capacity for each country by fuel type. The gas generation includes gas turbines, combined cycle 
gas turbines, combined heat and power, and derived gas internal combustion plants [129]. 
Generators with a long minimum run time are considered slow-start generators and cannot be 
dispatched in the balancing market. In this study, all coal, lignite, nuclear, and biomass generators 
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are slow generators, with the remaining being fast start generators able to turn on in the 
balancing market.  
The wind capacity is a combination of onshore and offshore projected future capacity based 
on estimates for future penetration with data acquired by our collaborator, ECN’s Wind Energy 
Unit. Capacity factors for wind are shown in Figure 3-6, for both onshore and offshore capacity. 
Histograms of forecast errors between day-ahead and balancing are shown in Figure 3-7 for the 
Netherlands and in Figure 3-8 for Germany. The errors shown in the figures are simple 
differences between the two data series, as was done in [126]. The root mean squared error for 
each of the five balancing wind simulations is shown in Figure 3-9 for each country as a fraction 
of the forecast output. An hourly average of the five wind series is shown in Figure 3-10 for 
Germany and the Netherlands. The amount of load in each country is shown in TWh in Figure 
3-11, and load factors are shown in Figure 3-12.  
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Figure 3-6 Capacity factor of wind for onshore and offshore  
 
Figure 3-7 Histogram of onshore wind forecast error for the Netherlands as a fraction of the forecast 
output 
 






































































Figure 3-9 Root mean squared error for wind power between the day-ahead forecast and balancing 
actualization for each country, where each bar is a different balancing market annual scenario 
 
 
Figure 3-10 Five wind scenarios averaged by hour for one day in the Netherlands and Germany 
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Figure 3-12 Annual load factor for each country 
3.4.2 Operating Costs 
The first assessment of market efficiency is examining total operating costs.23 The operating 
costs from the eight simulations are shown in Table 3-3 and Table 3-4 as percent deviations 
from the hypothesized best-case simulation result; the same results are shown on the conceptual 
diagram in Figure 3-13. The value in the lower right corner of each table shows the ‘ideal’ result, 
i.e., the result with all three improvements simulated. Because the focus of the simulations is 
relative improvements between the improvements, the costs are shown as relative deviations 
from the ideal result. For example, the simulation using market-based, seasonal requirement with 
coordination in balancing only (MSCBal) is calculated using total operating costs as follows. The 
values shown are the output total operating costs for all of Europe for the yearlong simulation in 







All remaining values are calculated using this same relationship, with the ‘ideal’ case always as the 
comparison. The values in parentheses below the percentage are the minimum and maximum 
                                                     
23 Since demand is inelastic, market surplus can be represented as a minimization of operating 
costs. If demand were elastic, the market surplus would be composed of both consumer surplus 




























deviations for total operating costs for each of the five annual simulations, also using the same 
calculation above. A non-parametric statistical comparison of results is shown later in the 
section.  
Table 3-3 Total system cost (Europe-wide) without load shedding 
(Left columns show allocation type and requirement type and top columns show the amount of 
coordination. Minimum and maximum are shown in parenthesis below each mean value.) 
 
























Figure 3-13 Conceptual diagram showing total system costs (Europe-wide) without load shedding 
Table 3-4 The Netherlands system cost without load shedding (average percentage across five scenarios, 
with range across five scenarios of 365-day averages in parentheses) 



















Coordination No Coordination 















Table 3-5 Total system cost (Europe-wide) with load shedding (average percentage across five scenarios, 
with range across five scenarios of 365-day averages in parentheses) 























There are several distinct trends resulting from both Table 3-3 and Table 3-4. First, the ideal 
case is the lowest cost solution, i.e., all other percentages are positive. This confirms the 
hypothesis that the combination of all improvements produces the lowest cost solution. While 
this is true for the averages, the minimum and maximum costs for the scenarios overlap; 
meaning, the highest cost simulation from the balancing only coordination scenario for a market-
based seasonal average is higher than the lowest cost simulation for the coordination in day-
ahead and balancing scenario. This overlap hints that the operating cost results for certain 
scenarios might not be significantly different from each other.  
Previous work of mine in collaboration with KU Leuven investigators [92] shows that a case 
with coordination in balancing alone has lower costs compared to a simulation with coordination 
in both day-ahead and balancing. The reason for the discrepancy is due to the availability of 
transmission capacity; the reserves allocated in one country in the day-ahead market could not be 
delivered in real-time because of lack of transmission capacity between the countries. The 
simulations in [92] have four countries with four transmission lines, whereas this set of 
simulations models all European countries with many interconnections. The results between the 
two coordination scenarios are much closer in this project, likely due to increased system size 
and availability of transmission capacity.  
The overlap among ranges of scenarios leads to the second trend, which is evident from 
comparing the means of the no coordination cases with the two coordinated cases. The 
coordinated cases have much lower operating costs compared to the cases without coordination; 
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there is a minimum of 30% difference between the simulations. However, the difference 
between the two coordinated simulations is small, insignificant when considering the overlapping 
minimum and maximum scenarios. For example, the market simulation based on the seasonal 
requirement/coordination in balancing only assumptions has a minimum simulation that results 
in lower total costs (-0.21%) compared to the mean ideal case (but not lower than the minimum 
ideal case, -0.33%). This trend demonstrates that there is a great benefit in coordinating, either in 
activating reserves in the balancing market or both in the day-ahead and balancing markets.  
The third trend can be seen in the difference between the seasonal and daily requirement 
results. There is a similarly small difference between the requirements for the coordinated cases: 
0.12% compared to 0.05% and 0.11% compared to 0%. This difference is evident in the no 
coordination case when total system costs include load shedding. While the requirement was 
significantly different in these cases, it did not make a large difference in total system costs.  
The five annual simulations performed for the balancing market do not provide enough 
yearly data for traditional parametric tests; therefore, a nonparametric test is used to analyze the 
yearly results. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test is used to test if two samples are from 
the same population [130], [131]. The test ranks results from two populations, with the null 
hypothesis being the populations are the same and the alternate being that they are different 
[132]. Using the WMW test, the results can be analyzed using a z-score. The results for total 
European operating costs are shown in Table 3-6 as a comparison between the ideal case; the 
values are z-scores determined using the WMW test, where a score higher than 1.65 is outside 
the 95% confidence interval. For those scenarios with values greater than 1.65, the alternate 
hypothesis holds with 95% confidence, meaning, the samples come from different populations. 
For the simulations with a value less than 1.65, the null hypothesis holds with 95% confidence 
and the populations are indistinguishable.  
The market-based simulations with some type of coordination are significantly likely to be 
from the same population. This indicates that doing coordination in balancing only or in both 
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day-ahead and balancing could result in similar results. Simulations with no coordination are 
significantly different, and likely would not result in the low costs of the ideal simulation. The 
results for the total operating costs without load shedding in Table 3-7 show the same 
significance, where the seasonal simulations have a slightly higher z-score (still below 1.65). 
Comparing the two market-based simulations with no coordination against each other, the 
WMW test results in a score of 0.80, indicating they are likely from the same population. 
Comparing the market-based and contract-based no coordination simulations, the resulting score 
is 1.60; this indicates there is 94% chance they are from different populations.  
Table 3-6 Z-scores using WMW test of Europe-wide system costs with load shedding; a score higher than 
1.65 shows the annual costs are statistically significantly higher than the ideal solution (Daily market/DA 
and Balancing) with 95% confidence 
  No Coordination Balancing Only DA and Balancing 
Contract Seasonal 2.61 2.61 N/A 
Market 
Seasonal 2.61 0.94 1.15 
Daily 2.61 0.52 Base Comparison 
Table 3-7 Z-scores using WMW test of Europe-wide system costs without load shedding 
  No Coordination Balancing Only DA and Balancing 
Contract Seasonal 2.61 2.61 N/A 
Market 
Seasonal 2.61 1.36 1.36 
Daily 2.61 0.52 Base Comparison 
 
Although the overall lowest cost solution was the ideal case, each country’s lowest cost 
solution was not in that scenario. Table 3-8 shows where each country had the lowest cost 
solution. Due to the similarities between the seasonal and daily simulations, these distinctions are 
likely not significant; meaning although the Netherlands is in the seasonal requirement, fully 
coordinated scenario box, it can be grouped with the daily requirement countries. The biggest 
distinction is the countries which are better off without coordination in both the day-ahead 
allocation and balancing activation phases. These countries generally see increased costs due to 
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coordination because their generation is being ramped up for reserve or they are used for 
wheeling purposes. For the former case, a less expensive generator in Belgium might be used for 
balancing in surrounding countries. This would mean that surrounding countries reduce costs, 
but Belgium’s costs increase since it is reserving more power in day-ahead. In a theoretical 
coordinated setting, the system will be at least the same or better off with coordination, but 
individual players in each country can be worse off. Generators might make more profit, but 
consumers might pay more for power. This can be seen in the statistical test for the Belgian 
system costs in Table 3-9. The seasonal balancing only simulation and the seasonal day-ahead 
and balancing coordination simulation are significantly different than the daily day-ahead and 
balancing simulation.  
Table 3-8 Lowest cost solution by country  
  No Coordination Balancing Only DA and Balancing 
Market 
Seasonal BEL, FIN, IRE - NED, BLT 
Daily 
DEN, POL, UKI 
 
- 
CZE, DEW, FRA, 
GER, ITA, POR, SKO, 
SPA, SWE, SWI, NOR, 
BLK 
Table 3-9 Z-scores using WMW test for the Belgian system cost without load shedding; a score higher 
than 1.65 shows the results are statistically different with 95% confidence  
(Percentage)  No Coordination Balancing Only DA and Balancing 
Contract Seasonal 2.61 2.61 N/A 
Market 
Seasonal 2.61 2.61 1.57 
Daily 1.77 0.94 Base Comparison 
 
3.4.3 Trade 
The biggest impact seen from comparing operating costs is the simulations comparing 
coordination of reserve between countries. Figure 3-14 shows the percent change between the 
ideal case and the seasonal/ market-based/ no coordination case, or the hypothetical ‘worst’ case 
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of the market-based simulations (herein referred to as the worst case, which is at the origin of 
Figure 3-3). The total amount of energy from the balancing market is summed throughout the 
year and then compared against the other simulation. For instance, if the Netherlands exported 5 
MW in hours two and four and imported 3 MW in hours one, three, and five, the total exports 
would be 10 MWh and imports would be 9 MWh. A positive value in the figure indicates that 
the ideal case has more trade, while a negative value indicates the worst market-based case has 
increased trade. For instance, Belgium both imports and exports more energy in the worst case 
compared to the ideal case, which is not unexpected when considering its lowest cost solution is 
also for this scenario (although the same is not the case for the other two countries that are 
better off in this scenario).  Some countries, like Sweden and Denmark East, import significantly 
more when coordinating reserves, while Ireland exports more. Overall, the gross imports and 
exports in GWh increase by 0.16% in the ideal case compared to the worst. 
 
Figure 3-14 Percent change of total imports and exports between the ideal case and the seasonal 
requirement/ market-based/ no coordination case (worst market-based case) 
3.4.4 Wind Energy  
The wind and solar resources used in COMPETES are based on historical data for 
forecasted and realized wind, and modeled as free to the system operator. The historical data is 
























Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) Vision 4 for renewable penetration 
[133]. The input wind penetration to the day-ahead model is shown in Figure 3-15, with the 
Netherlands at 30% penetration.  Although the wind data is fed as a time series of input, the 
model allows for curtailment. Although the wind data is fed as a time series of input, the model 
allows for curtailment. As partial motivation for improving reserve procurement is lowering the 
cost of integrating wind power and improving its utilization, assessing wind curtailment is an 
important scenario evaluation tool. Curtailment percentages are Table 3-10 and Table 3-12.  
 
 
Figure 3-15 Wind penetration in GWh as a percentage of demand by country for a year  
 
Table 3-10 Wind Curtailment in Europe   

















Noticeably, the ideal case does not have the lowest curtailment of all scenarios. The daily 
requirement/ coordination in balancing only/ market-based scenario has the lowest overall 

























scenarios, each country allocates its own reserves in the day-ahead market, meaning they might 
be more dispersed across the region compared to the ideal case, where reserve allocation is 
shared between countries. Then in the balancing market, reserve is spread throughout the 
countries, so more is available for balancing wind variability. The daily or seasonal fully 
coordinated cases might concentrate reserves in one region day-ahead, so that in balancing 
deliverability becomes difficult as lines are already delivering energy from day-ahead. As others 
have noted, reserving transmission line capacity can be critical to deliverability; Section 3.5 
discusses how this might be done for COMPETES. 
  While the relative position of the simulations has changed, minimum and maximum 
curtailment overlaps between all scenarios. As seen in Table 3-11, the outcome of the WMW test 
show mixed results compared to the clear significance with operating costs. The two closest 
scenarios to the ideal case are likely from the same population, but the remaining simulations 
have over a 90% chance of being from a different population. The inconsistency in the 
curtailment results is partially due to low wind curtailment in the simulations; the total MWh of 
curtailment for the Netherlands is shown in Table 3-12, where there was no curtailment in four 
of the scenarios. Some countries saw no curtailment in many scenarios, making differentiation 
between simulations difficult. 
Table 3-11 Z-scores using WMW test of Europe-wide wind curtailment  
(Percentage)  No Coordination Balancing Only DA and Balancing 
Contract Seasonal 2.61 0.94 N/A 
Market 
Seasonal 1.78 1.57 0.52 
Daily 1.78 1.15 - 
Table 3-12 The Netherlands wind curtailment (in MWh) 













3.4.5 Operating Reserves 
All thermal generation is available to provide reserve in the simulations. While pumped 
hydro storage is available to provide reserve, conventional hydro could not provide reserve. 
There are two types of reserve requirement examined in the simulations, a daily requirement and 
a seasonal requirement. Both requirements are based on the NREL 3+5 rule, meaning the 
average of 3% of demand and 5% of renewable forecast was reserved as backup power. The 
daily requirement used the average of the following day’s load and renewable forecast, while the 
seasonal used the average of the entire season. The amount of reserve summed for each country 
in Europe for the daily requirement is shown by season in Figure 3-16 – Figure 3-19 as 
histograms. The seasonal average is described in the figure title. The daily requirements tend to 
have higher concentrations around the seasonal average, but show more variability, with 
secondary peaks in summer and fall.  
 
Figure 3-16 Dispersion of daily winter reserve requirements, winter seasonal average is 8675 MW 
 




































Figure 3-18 Dispersion of daily summer reserve requirements, summer seasonal average is 7625 MW 
 
Figure 3-19 Dispersion of daily fall reserve requirements, fall seasonal average is 7870 MW 
 
The hypothesis was that the daily average would be able to more closely approximate the 
needed amount of reserves, rather than consistently over- or under-estimating as a seasonal 
average would be. Yet, as Table 3-3, the choice of average time period in the reserve requirement 
had relatively little impact on operating costs. The cause of lessened impact is due to the amount 
of reserve available in the network. There reserve requirement constraint was rarely binding with 
a positive price, meaning there was usually more than enough reserve to support the 
requirement. Any extra headroom in a generator would be allocated towards the requirement, 
and there were enough generators throughout the network below their maximum capacity that it 
was not difficult to reach the requirement in most periods. This is partially due to the modeling 
of generation outside of the Netherlands; units are aggregations of several plants by fuel type and 
year installed. Therefore, the maximum capacity of the plants is overestimated, meaning this 
impact is likely underestimated. A comparison between the daily/market-based no coordination 
and complete coordination scenarios is shown in Table 3-13. The prices shown are averages of 


































across the eight periods. There are generally fewer binding periods in the coordinated case 
compared to the case without coordination. For the Netherlands, Denmark West, and the 
United Kingdom, there are significantly more binding periods leading to increased costs. Reserve 
costs are largest in Sweden, being about €12/MWh on average; however, most countries have 
costs below €1/MWh. 
Table 3-13 Comparison of average reserve price and binding periods between the daily requirement, 
market-based coordination scenarios 
 





Count of Binding 
Periods 
Price (€/MWh) 
Count of Binding 
Periods 
BEL 0.003 2 0.023 28 
CZE 0.002 1 0.004 2 
DEN 8.017 4684 8.038 4701 
DEW 0.003 2 9.218 5154 
FIN 8.236 5064 8.25 5055 
FRA 0.003 2 0.031 42 
GER 0.003 2 0.004 2 
IRE 0.388 215 0.481 278 
ITA 0.006 8 0.006 8 
NED 0.003 2 8.87 3046 
POL 1.992 24 1.992 25 
POR 0.074 61 0.079 72 
SKO 0 0 0 0 
SPA 0.074 61 0.079 72 
SWE 12.153 7227 12.165 7215 
UKI 0.003 2 0.476 275 
SWI 0.002 1 0.002 1 
NOR 0 0 0 0 
BLK 0 0 0 0 
BLT 0.046 53 0.047 54 
AUS 0.003 2 0.002 1 
 
The amount of reserve procured by generation type in the day-ahead market did not differ 
greatly between simulations and is shown in a single graph, Figure 3-20. Over half of the reserve 
was procured from storage, which is majority potential pumped hydro in the model. As 
mentioned in Section 3.3.2, the formulation used for storage reserves likely overestimates the 
quantity of reserves storage would provide. There is no clear consensus in the literature on the 
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best way to model reserves provided from storage; future work would entail running the 
simulation with different reserve formulations to assess the overestimation. After storage, the 
next largest category is gas, which accounts for 37% of reserved allocation in the day-ahead 
market. Renewable resources were not chosen for reserve, since it was less expensive for 
renewables to be used for energy rather than reserve and existing thermal plants had enough 
headroom to account for the majority of reserve. The thermal plants used for reserve also 
included coal, lignite and a small amount of biofuels.   
 
Figure 3-20 Reserve allocation by fuel source for year 
 
3.5 DISCUSSION 
With the challenges of uncertainty and variability, it is important for power operators to 
evaluate the operational flexibility of their system in order to cope with increased renewable 
generation. As the penetration of renewable energy increases, the system might require additional 
buffer capacity in order to accommodate the renewable sources. The extra capacity, operating 























who must commit reserve capacity well in advance of decisions about energy production. This 
reduces the efficiency of production and of reserve capacity provision. Allowing for 
simultaneous decisions about energy production and reserve allocation and deciding closer to 
real time reduces overall system costs. This chapter compares three categories of potential 
improvements to current practice of procuring, allocating and activating reserve in Dutch 
markets. Using a sophisticated pan-European energy market model, changes to reserve sizing, 
procurement methods, and coordination of reserve allocation are compared. If given the option 
to update the market using only one of the improvements, the results from this chapter can assist 
decision makers in choosing where to invest time and money. No other study has compared all 
three improvements simultaneously. As discussed in 3.2, studies have shown benefits of degrees 
of coordination, but none have also compared market- and contract-based allocation and 
different requirements.  
3.5.1 Key Results 
As hypothesized, combining all three improvements to operating reserve in a single model 
results in the lowest cost solution for Europe. Of the three improvements, coordination of 
reserve among countries in Northwest Europe24 provides the single greatest improvement of the 
options. Both the market-based scenarios and the contract-based scenarios show greatest 
improvement when reserves were coordinated. Complementing the result of [92], coordination 
in the balancing market alone provides almost all of the benefit that coordination in the 
allocation (day-ahead) phase provides. By performing a small sensitivity analysis, the resulting 
simulation total costs are shown not to be significantly different from one another.  The WMW 
test demonstrates that balancing market coordination lowers costs as much as coordination in 
both markets. 
                                                     
24 The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom 
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The results for coordination can be compared to previous studies of European markets. As 
mentioned previously, the comparison between different coordination schemes is also the central 
framework in [92]. Their results found that coordinating the allocation of reserves in the day-
ahead market procured reserve that could not be delivered in real-time, resulting in higher costs. 
The balancing coordination alone was the lowest cost simulation. The results in this chapter 
show that the two cases are indistinguishable using the WMW test; one is not higher than the 
other, but both share the same benefits. This is likely due to the larger system and network size, 
since the network model used in this chapter connects the Northwest Europe to the Nordic 
region and southern European countries. Limitations of both models are discussed in the next 
subsection.  
The difference in results between seasonal and daily reserve requirements is minor, with 
results not being significantly different in total costs between the five simulations. Although the 
daily requirement should have been a tighter bound, there was enough additional capacity in the 
system to provide sufficient reserve. This ‘improvement’ is likely not necessary to implement 
given the expected generation fleet. If the future fleet changes significantly, changes in the 
requirement might be necessary and further simulations can be performed.  
Integration of wind is a major concern in the Netherlands and much of Europe looking 
forward. The results for wind curtailment point initially to the simulations with balancing 
coordination alone as having the least curtailed hours. However, the sensitivity analysis showed 
results varied widely across the scenarios, making it difficult to confidently suggest any one will 
dominate the others. Complementary research in the literature points to reservation of 
transmission line capacity as an important aspect of reserve delivery [92], [114]; future 
simulations can assess whether allocation of capacity could improvement wind integration.  
The Dutch market regulators have been interested in improving aspects of reserve 
procurement. The results of the eight simulations suggest that the single improvement with the 
greatest impact is coordination of reserve in the balancing market. Rather than each country 
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solely using its own resources in the balancing market, sharing resources across regions has the 
potential for significant cost savings. Coordination between countries is no small feat, as all 
European regulators would need to agree on trade rules and regulations. The advantage of this 
result is adjustments would only be required in the balancing market, rather than in both the day-
ahead and balancing markets. As wind penetration increases across the Netherlands, higher levels 
of coordination can likely provide the Netherlands with both lower costs and greater levels of 
wind integration.  
3.5.2 Limitations  
Studying multiple time-frames using three improvements to current practice to simulate 
eight pairs of models can lead to limitations and suggestions for future work. The first 
improvement suggested, adjusting the reserve requirement from seasonal to daily, found little 
change in total system costs. Due to the type of reserve procured, the ramping headroom on the 
system was great enough to leave this improvement ineffectual. A future study should compare 
probabilistic requirements [103] or use of a response set [134].  
Limitations might also be due to the type of reserved modeled. There are many products 
available in Europe and the U.S. and the need for each product can vary depending on 
generation mix. Future studies can compare contingency reserve, regulation reserve, and even 
ramping products25 to determine which will most benefit the system. The modeling of storage 
might also be limited, since the framework used in this chapter will overestimate the resource’s’ 
ability to provide reserve. Other modeling constraints can be compared to identify the extent to 
which reserves have been overestimated.  
The benefits seen in this chapter are also likely limited by the availability of transmission. 
Other studies have advised that deliverability of reserve might lower overall coordination 
benefits [112], [135]. Future simulations with this framework should analyze the impact of 
                                                     
25 For instance, the California ISO has implemented a flexible ramping product [237], [238]. 
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reserving transmission capacity for any cross-national trade. Finally, limitations of data 
availability for wind and load might skew results. This chapter also did not include load forecast 
errors, which might interact both with available of balancing reserve and wind forecast errors. 
Future studies should analyze the sensitivity of the results to correlations between wind and load 
and correlations between future wind plants in the region.  
Generally, the results show large changes in operating costs between the different cases. 
These changes would be unlikely to materialize in the magnitude reported throughout the 
chapter (e.g., a 40% increase in operating costs). With the use of increased transmissions 
capacity, additional generation investment, correlated wind and load scenarios, and alternative 
reserve requirements, the magnitude is likely to decrease. Although the study has many 
limitations and suggestions for future enhancements, many insights are gained from comparing 
three improvements. This study can provide the building blocks for future analysis of reserve in 







CHAPTER 4  
PRICING  ENVIRONMENTAL 
EXTERNALITIES  IN  REGIONS  WITH 
ASYMMETRICAL  POLICIES   
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Managing the flow of electricity between adjacent electric grids is a challenging task for any 
system operator. Difficulties can arise when determining rules for trade, ensuring each side sees 
benefits, and coalescing contradicting policies. These difficulties are inflated when renewable 
energy and environmental concerns are involved. Wind and solar energy are prevalent in 
different parts of the country, and not necessarily co-located with load centers [136]. Trading that 
power across regional boundaries can create problems for system operators, who aim to 
maximize market surplus given local policies and rules on emissions reductions.  
This chapter focuses on balancing area coordination considering the complicating factor of 
externalities, particularly, cases when neighboring balancing areas value an externality 
asymmetrically. An externality is a cost or consequence that is incurred outside of the market 
setting. There are both positive and negative definitions of externalities, which arise when the 
activities of one firm or person are dependent on another outside firm or person [137],[15]. 
Environmental externalities can be challenging to price [138]. If they are local, such as particulate 
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matter pollution, the surrounding community is harmed. However, externalities like acid rain or 
carbon emissions from power plants do not stay local and are not necessarily created locally; they 
impact the region and even global communities [139]. If one balancing area aims to effectively 
reduce its carbon footprint, it must consider the effect of its decisions on net imports and 
exports and their carbon consequences; it is not enough to solely examine the power plants in 
the target region. A full accounting of a carbon footprint considers impacts of consumption in 
one region on emissions outside the region.  There is rich literature on how carbon policies 
impact the electric system [140]–[144], which is discussed in detail in Section 4.2. The challenge 
becomes preventing leakage and contract shuffling [145]–[147], i.e., ensuring that a region’s 
environmental rules do not take too much credit for reducing emissions because of unaccounted 
emissions increases outside the region. Even further, the challenge is to design policies that 
attempt to incent reduction of emissions in regions that are sources of imports.26  
The Western U.S. is an ideal case study for examining the effect of power trading among 
regions that value emissions differently. California has implemented a cap-and-trade system for 
carbon emissions under AB 32 [26] while also completely consolidating its real-time market with 
several surrounding balancing areas through its Energy Imbalance Market [148]. Although 
several states have proposed legislation on carbon emissions, no other Western states have 
implemented a carbon reduction scheme. However, resources in those states still profit from 
selling power to California customers. Several proposals for coordinating trade have been 
proposed while attempting to maintain the integrity of California’s AB 32 system (i.e., count the 
carbon emissions due to California imports while incenting carbon reductions outside California) 
[27], [149], [150].  This chapter evaluates each of the proposals for its ability to reduce carbon 
emissions, maximize market surplus, and price energy consistent with economic incentives. The 
                                                     
26 While this chapter focuses on importing regions, exporting regions can also have similar 
concerns. A region may want to count emissions reductions that occur outside its region because 
of its exports. In the 1990s, Seattle City Light considered carbon reductions from exported 
power to California and found some planning scenarios had negative net carbon emissions due 
to exported power [239].  
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proposals are compared against a first-best (social cost minimizing) model and a do-nothing (no 
carbon regulation) model.  
Broadly, this chapter delves into issues that can arise when some systems value a particular 
product but neighboring systems do not. Particularly, this chapter addresses the situation in 
which adjacent regions within a single market treat externalities in an asymmetric manner. The 
goals of economic efficiently and environmental regulation differ between regions, and improper 
pricing of the externality (the carbon reduction policy) might weaken environmental gains. The 
section answers the questions:  
In an integrated  marke t ,  can one reg ion pr i c e  an env ironmental  external i ty  that  i s  no t  
valued by  al l  r eg ions ,  and what  ine f f i c i enc i e s  might  r esul t?   
What method for  c l ear ing  the  shor t - run ener gy  market  fo r  mult iple  r eg ions can account  
fo r  carbon emiss ions that  are  due to  demand in  one reg ion w ithout  caus ing  cos t -
ine f f e c t iv e  d ispatch and d i s tor t ed pr i c e s  in another?   
In particular, this chapter considers California’s efforts to lower carbon emissions under AB 
32 [26] while still encouraging power trade with states elsewhere in the West that do not limit 
emissions. This chapter contributes to current literature through modeling and analytical 
comparison of different greenhouse gas emission schemes. The market model simulations 
evaluate proposals for incorporating carbon emissions, finding no one method dominates the 
others in both reduction of costs and emissions. Section 4.2 reviews literature on carbon policies, 
such as cap-and-trade, incorporation into markets, and the broader institutional context for 
greenhouse gas modeling. Model descriptions can be found in Section 4.3, along with detailed 
mathematical formulations. The do-nothing and social cost of carbon models are in Section 
4.3.1, followed by the single-pass method in Section 4.3.2, the two-pass method in Section 4.3.3, 
and the tax-at-the-border method in Section 4.3.4. The results are shown in Section 4.4, 
including explicit definitions of carbon leakage in Section 4.4.2.e, followed by a discussion in 
Section 4.5. In the discussion, I consider the broad set of criteria that are relevant to choice of a 
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policy to limit leakage of carbon emissions from a regulated region to a neighboring unregulated 
region that has no carbon regulation, and describe how the results of this chapter shed light on 
some but not all of those criteria. 
4.2 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Coordination of energy and environmental markets in regions that exchange electricity is 
difficult. There can be differences in policies and procedures, in addition to distinct political 
motivation. Inevitably, any two regions might have different policies when it comes to operation 
of the electric grid. Since there is no federal policy for greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S., 
individual states have implemented their own emissions reduction policies. Although this section 
focuses on the carbon policy in California, it is applicable to many regions that are considering an 
emission reduction scheme. The sub-section describes the cap-and-trade system, with 
background literature on the strengths and weaknesses of different implementation options. The 
second sub-section defines of carbon leakage and options for a second-best carbon modeling. 
Finally, the third sub-section includes further details on the history of cap-and-trade in California 
and current practices.  
4.2.1 Options for Valuing Emissions under Cap-and-Trade Regulation 
Coordination when regions employ different policies is a complex issue, one that might not 
have a clear solution. One issue that has become especially prominent due to climate change is 
policies around greenhouse gas emissions. Different states in the U.S. have enforced policies 
around the amount of greenhouse gas emissions that can come from the power sector. In the 
Northeast, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) mandates resources within its 
member states buy allowances for greenhouse gas emissions, with a total cap on emissions 
updated over time [151]. In California, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) has put in 
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place a similar allowance system, requiring all resources selling to the California market purchase 
allowances under Assembly Bill 32 [26].  
These systems are called cap-and-trade and have been used in the U.S. and Europe to curb 
emissions. Cap-and-trade limits the total emissions in a region by giving generators allowance 
credits that can then be traded in a given time period [152]. By allowing trade, individual 
generators can decide how much they can emit depending on the price of the allowance. While 
the focus of this chapter is not on the efficacy of cap-and-trade or other renewable incentive 
programs, literature on the efficacy is extensive for the U.S. [143], [153], [154], Europe [141], 
[142], [155], between-countries [156], and compared to other renewable incentive programs 
[12],[157]. Some major issues that are addressed are the ways in which allowances are allocated to 
participants, its impact when competing with other renewable incentive programs (such as 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS)), and leakage (discussed later in this section). From a policy 
standpoint, the focus of this chapter is on the impact of an existing cap-and-trade scheme within 
one region on multi-region electricity markets, rather than the scheme itself.  
Assuming a region is implementing a cap-and-trade system, there are several decisions that 
must be made to account for emissions; broadly, these have been divided into load-based, 
source-based, and first seller approaches [11], [146], [152], [158]. A load-based system forces the 
demand-side to account for emissions from the power it consumes. If the load exclusively uses 
bilateral contracts to buy power, the load-based system would be easy to track. However, in the 
current electricity market framework, identifying the exact source of emissions is extremely 
difficult [159] or not feasible [158]. Additionally, since inter-state sales can occur, further 
complications arise from tracking emissions from these sales. Through simulation, [160] shows 
load-based systems could raise costs and inhibit competitiveness. Further showing the 
shortcomings of the mechanism, [161] shows load-based systems have increased transactions 
costs, being at best equivalent to source-based systems. 
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The source-based system focuses on accounting for emissions from the supply-side. As was 
described above in reference to RGGI, allowances are allocated to individual sources of 
emissions; these can then be bought or sold depending on need. This method is the most 
popular and can work well in regions where all participants are subject to the cap-and-trade 
scheme. The resource with the allowance will add any extra costs into their energy bid. In this 
way, they can recover the cost and the supply stack will be reordered to account for resources 
with new higher costs. However, this method becomes difficult when multiple regions are 
involved; for instance, California buys power from participants outside the state who are not 
subject to AB32. To deal with this issue, [11] designate “pure” and “modified” methods, where 
the pure source-based approach would exclude imports and the modified version includes power 
sold to California (or the target region).  
Lastly, cap-and-trade can be implemented using a hybrid method called the first-seller 
approach. Like the source-based approach, the first-seller scheme assigns emissions to the supply 
side for generators within California. For imports, the entity importing the electricity is assigned 
the emissions responsibility. Since the first-seller approach can account for emissions due to in-
state generation and imports, it is preferred by many including explicit endorsements from the 
authors of [146] and [160]. Formal analysis of the method, called first-deliverer in the paper, is 
simulated in [162], where the authors find that it is not likely to be more effective than the 
source-based approach, and only slightly reduces emissions when certain rules are in place.  
These three major methods address the source of emissions accounting under a cap-and-
trade regime. If utilized in a market context, each method will have distinct implications for 
prices and schedules output from the market. To analyze the impacts of both emission trading 
and market interactions of the different accounting methods, two papers distinguish themselves 
by considering an endogenous allowance price [163], [164]. The first focuses on the method and 
equity of allowance allocation [163]. By modeling two allocation methods, the authors assess 
how each will impact leakage and profitability. They show that an allocation method providing 
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high emission rate plants with more allowances to prevent cost shocks (“fuel-based” updating) 
might instead increase costs and emissions in the long run relative to allocating allowances based 
on production output (“output-based” updating). The second paper focuses on the strategic 
behavior of generators under a carbon trading scheme [164]. They find generators with high 
emissions rates are incentivized to take a long position in forward markets, driving up prices, and 
allocation of allowances to generators with low emissions rates would decrease prices. The 
results are complementary; both find that allocating more allowances to high emission rate plants 
would not necessarily reduce emissions or prices. Both papers’ authors also acknowledge their 
modeling departs from realistic markets, as they use a modified version of source-based 
allowances. Even with this assumption, each draws important implications for markets.  
Both simulation and regression can be used to analyze the impact of cap-and-trade on 
electricity prices. Simulation has been used more extensively used for analysis of European cap-
and-trade system, called the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) [165]–[167], whereas 
cap-and-trade in U.S. affects fewer markets [168]. Engineering economic simulations anticipate, 
consistent with economic theory, that at least some of the cost of carbon allowances would be 
passed through to consumers, with the exact amount depending on price elasticities of supply 
and demand, and the exact generation mix [11]. Regression analysis for the European ETS 
examined whether futures electricity prices would respond faster to increases or decreases of 
CO2 allowances and fuel prices, finding that there was no evidence of asymmetric responses 
[169].27  Although earlier work found no impact on electricity prices in California [170], the same 
authors in [171] found the price of carbon in California significantly impacted several 
surrounding regions. They advocate for expanding the cap-and-trade region, as the prices are 
already being impacted by the program. This analysis underscores the difficulty of the California 
                                                     
27 The authors specifically analyzed the asymmetric response of prices to increases and decreases 
in input prices (such as fuel), called “rockets and feathers.”  
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cap-and-trade efforts. Assigning allocations and creating energy market rules for recovery of the 
allocation price is exceedingly difficult when regions have asymmetric policies.  
Much of the literature on cap-and-trade has focused on implementation of the cap-and-trade 
auction and allocation methodology. Similar to [169]–[171], the research of this chapter begins 
with the assumption the auction has occurred, and a price for emissions has been determined. 
Instead of analyzing if carbon prices will influence electricity prices through regression, this work 
simulates different methods for integrating carbon prices into generator bids. It focuses on the 
issues that arise when neighboring regions participate in the electricity market, but are under no 
legal obligation to reduce carbon output locally. This complication, as is present in California, 
creates opportunities for divergent incentives and price manipulation. Through simulating 
multiple bidding methodologies, this chapter compares costs, prices, total emissions, and leakage 
to determine if one method dominates the rest. The next section will describe existing research 
and definitions of leakage, followed by a discussion of the institutional context for this chapter.  
4.2.2 Emissions Leakage and the Second-Best Response 
Leakage can occur when neighboring grids have asymmetrical policies28 [25], [162], and is 
defined as increased emissions outside of the target area due to imports [172]. Meaning, even if 
emissions decreased in the target region (e.g., California), they might have increased elsewhere in 
the network (e.g., Southwest or Northeast). Leakage can be calculated simply by comparing the 
emissions in nonregulated region under a carbon reduction scheme to baseline emissions from a 
market with no carbon regulation. Leakage can be expressed as a fraction:  
(Increase in nonregulated region emissions)/(Decrease in regulated region emissions).  
                                                     
28 Leakage can occur on both the supply and demand side [162]. Demand-side leakage occurs 
when consumption of a good decreases in the target region and increases elsewhere. Long term 




Literature on emissions trading schemes commonly uses this definition of emissions leakage 
[28]–[31], [172]. It is most relevant to cap-and-trade systems that only apply to the regulated 
region and do not attempt to attribute emissions to imports or regulate them (e.g., RGGI, Clean 
Air Act SO2 Trading Program, and European ETS). Leakage using this definition can occur if 
energy imports from the non-regulated area to the regulated area increase and if the regulations 
provide no incentive or ineffective incentives to limit measures in the non-regulated area. 
There are variants on this definition; one proposed in this chapter suggest that if a region’s 
policy accounts for estimated emissions associated with imports from another region, then 
leakage can be defined as a discrepancy between the emissions accounted for in imports, and 
actual changes in emissions outside the region due to imports. Since carbon emissions are not 
localized, policies that aim to reduce carbon emissions should consider regional impacts rather 
than local areas alone.  
A related issue that arises is contract shuffling [173], in which power importers change the 
designated source of power from dirty to clean sources without actually changing the operations 
of facilities [146]. As a hypothetical example, California places value on reducing carbon 
emissions by use of allowances, while Idaho, Nevada and Utah do not value limiting carbon 
emissions. Say that a California utility presently has a power purchase contract with a Utah coal 
plant. If the California policy penalizes imports that are associated with high emitting sources, 
then the utility could switch its contract to existing hydropower plants in Idaho and Nevada. The 
utilities in Idaho and Nevada that formerly bought hydropower could then obtain replacement 
power from the coal plant in Utah. Utah can sell any kind of power to those utilities, including 
power that has high carbon emissions. Although California is buying nominally clean power 
from Nevada, Utah is still producing power from the high carbon emitting plant, meaning the 
emissions are still taking place, just not directly being sold to California. Dispatch and physical 
power flows are unchanged by the policy, but the emissions accounting system inaccurately 
reports that emissions are reduced. This is an example of contract shuffling.   
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The first-best response to capturing carbon leakage and contract shuffling would be a tax on 
all externalities in the region. In the case of California, it would mean taxing all power being 
dispatched by the ISO within California as well as other states. This would be the best method 
for implementation since all generators would both bid their allowances and the prices would 
reflect the cost. However, the surrounding states have not implemented a cap-and-trade 
program, meaning they do not value greenhouse gases in this way. The first best solution would 
therefore unduly tax their customers, and it is unlikely any state would support such a policy. 
This chapter analyzes what method might be second-best [174], in that it can achieve carbon 
reductions cost-effectively subject to the constraint that California cannot impose a tax or 
shadow price on all carbon emissions by power plants in other states. Any method that is 
second-best cannot capture the full extent of carbon emissions, but comes close given the policy 
and regulatory backdrop of the region [144].  
While the modeling in this section can be applied to any externality that is subjected to 
differential regulation in neighboring jurisdictions, the language and descriptions in the section 
focus on California’s challenge of attaining an emissions goal while integrating with neighbors. 
From an economic standpoint, there is an environmental externality that must be internalized 
into prices in one region and not affect prices in another.  
4.2.3 Institutional Context  
California and its neighbors have begun full coordination (integration) due to the great 
benefits both sides are expected to achieve [148]. This market, called the Energy Imbalance 
Market (EIM) [175], is a voluntary real-time market in the Western U.S. that co-optimizes all 
participating resources as if they were one balancing area. Utilities and companies in surrounding 
states have opted to bid their resources into the California market and abide by CAISO market 
rules, but the market does not extend to include their residents in California state policies. These 
different regions have diverging priorities, where California alone has a policy goal of reducing 
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greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Even if large economic benefits are achieved from complete 
coordination among real-time markets, there is a concern that emissions targets will not be met 
[176].  
Concern over greenhouse gas emissions arose as the CAISO was attempting to determine a 
new governance structure for a West-Wide ISO [177]. The original proposal had a specific 
principle related to GHG emissions; however, it was removed in the final proposal and noted it 
was not directly related to governance [178]. It was later developed as an issue paper [179]. This 
is not a new concern for California, but the models used to address the issue have changed over 
time. One of the methods examined in this chapter (the single-pass method) and current practice 
for California can result in carbon leakage, a concern for environmental groups and the 
California Air Resources Board [31], [180].  
If plants bid their allowances into the real-time market, the lowest cost resources will be 
dispatched for each load, likely dispatching high cost resources last. However, in a single 
optimization, here called the single-pass method, leakage and contract shuffling are still issues. In 
this chapter I compare the results of the single-pass method with other real-time market clearing 
procedures that have been proposed to lessen the amount of leakage and/or contract shuffling.  
One such procedure was proposed by the CAISO [148], [149], essentially establishing a counter-
factual that allows California to attribute emissions to imports it buys from other states, and 
more accurately characterize the emissions that can be attributed by its own load. Due to 
criticism, such as [27], the proposal was recently amended, which is one optimization model 
(rather than two passes)29. Although the model has changed and likely will continue to change, a 
comparison can still provide insight into the relative differences of these methods. The results of 
a two-pass system can be compared against other approaches to avoid leakage, particularly a tax-
                                                     




at-the-border method, which places a hurdle rate on trades, limiting emissions but not capturing 
all leakage.  
The question of bidding allowances into energy markets is relevant to several ISOs at 
present. California went through an extensive stakeholder process to develop the two-pass 
methodology (described in Section 4.3.3) [148]. Due to the rapid developments in the politics of 
regional coordination and the emergence of new approaches, especially in the California context, 
academic literature is just beginning to address the topic.30 The author in [27] points to several 
disadvantages of the two-pass proposal and briefly lays out an alternative. As stated in the paper, 
the core shortcomings of the two-pass proposal are its deviation from efficient dispatch, creating 
perverse bidding incentives, increasing the demand for carbon permits. As an alternative, the 
paper suggests imposing an exogenous fee and using a separate settlement structure that would 
maintain efficient dispatch and charge each party according to regional policy.  
Outside of [27], several reports have been published that discuss the incentives and 
implications carbon pricing on markets. In response to New York’s carbon goals, NYISO 
commissioned a report to analyze carbon pricing for the state [23]. The extensive report 
addresses alternative carbon pricing options, market design issues such as leakage and allocating 
carbon payments back to customers, and the overall benefits to markets. They identify two main 
ways to create carbon prices for New York: add a carbon price for each MW generated or create 
a secondary (and tighter) cap-and-trade system. While each has its benefits, neither can fully 
apply to the case in California, since California dispatches generators in states not under the cap-
and-trade system. Although the New York market is separate than its neighbors, it is part of 
RGGI, where there is an embedded carbon cap.  
                                                     
30 The effort to reform integration of greenhouse emissions into the California market began in 
September 2016 with CAISO’s announcement of a new initiative, “Regional Integration 
California Greenhouse Gas Compliance” [179]. After a straw proposal was published in 
November, a draft final proposal was issued in June 2017, followed within the month by a 
revised version [149]. The second revision was published in February 2018 [240].  
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Unlike New York ISO, the PJM system operator is composed of states with differing carbon 
policies. PJM is evaluating options to manage carbon in the region, and have published a report 
most similar in scope to Section 4.2.1 [25]. They analyze both the two-pass method proposed by 
CAISO and a single pass method (described in Sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.2 respectively); while 
neither method is strictly preferred, they simulate an example where the two-pass method 
reduces emission further than the single-pass.  
The simulations in this chapter similarly analyze both the two-pass and single-pass options. 
However, the work in this chapter extends the comparison to a tax-at-the-border alternative and 
rigorously evaluates the resulting prices, dispatch, payments, and costs. No report or paper to 
date has analyzed the variety of carbon pricing methods for wholesale markets given asymmetric 
carbon polices, as is the case in California. The simulations offer a framework for assessment of 
existing and proposed mechanisms, and provide further guidance on how carbon costs 
incorporated into market algorithms can impact cots and emissions in a region. 
Each of these models will be described in the next subsections, followed by examples. The 
models refer to California in the formulation, because it is the target case study and to ease 
understanding. It is also consistent with the cited formulations for the CAISO’s proposed two-
pass model. This methodology, however, can be generalized for any two or more sets of regions. 
However, further complications might arise if any other surrounding state implements a carbon 
tax or cap-and-trade system, such as the one Washington put on the ballot in 2017. This issue 
will continue to arise in regions with adjacent balancing areas, such as PJM [25], New York [23], 
and the European Union. 
4.3 GHG TRADING MODELS  
In order to examine the impacts of different carbon pricing schemes, five approaches are 
modeled and analyzed. Two approaches represent the extreme cases: no greenhouse gas pricing 
and a socialized price for all. These two models will bookend the three cases that incorporate 
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carbon pricing and attempt to account for carbon embodied in imports using different types of 
models: a single-pass, a two-pass, and a tax-at-the-border method. Mathematical models for each 
of the five methods are explained in the subsections below. Two methods are modified from 
California ISO’s modeling efforts to integrate greenhouse gas trading into their market [148]: 
single-pass and two-pass methods. The CAISO has changed the model formulation over the last 
few years and very recently decided to adjust the method to a single pass, different from the one 
shown in this section. The stakeholder process is ongoing and negotiations with the California 
Air Resources Board are still to come. While the method discussed will not be implemented, it 
still provides a counterpoint for the remaining models.  
The five models will be compared based on region specific and total emissions, costs, 
surpluses, and prices. The focal outputs, emissions and costs, are compared in a two-dimensional 
plot to see how the five simulations compare. A sensitivity analysis will then be presented to 
determine the sensitivity of the results to different the chosen carbon prices.  
4.3.1  Upper and Lower Limits: No Greenhouse Gas Model & Social Cost 
of  Carbon 
At the upper and lower limits of the model types are the no greenhouse gas (No-GHG) case 
and the model which includes a social cost of carbon. The No-GHG model should have high 
emissions, as cost is the only factor in considering dispatch; it should be the upper limit for 
emissions and the lower limit for cost. The bookend to a No-GHG model would be a ‘full’ 
GHG model, or one where each and every generator considers the social cost of carbon. It 
would be the lower bound for emissions, and near the upper bound for cost. Although this is not 
the only method to determine a lower emissions solution, out of the methods proposed below, it 
is the first-best solution to lowering emissions because all generators face the same price of 
carbon, and carbon has the same impact no matter where and when it is emitted. The method is 
only a theoretical possibility, unless all regions and generators are mandated (or agree) to 
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dispatch considering the same cost of carbon. However, it is a useful benchmark against which 
the emissions reductions and costs of other solutions can be compared. 
There are several constraints that are the same for all five models, and are common to most 
economic dispatch models. The common constraints, together with an objective that involves 
only fuel and other variable operations & maintenance costs and excludes carbon penalties, 
create the ‘No-GHG’ case, where plants are dispatched solely based on their characteristics and 
marginal costs. The objective in (4-1) is simply minimizing the cost of operations, or marginal 
costs multiplied by quantity dispatched. Lower and upper bounds on generation and line flow are 
in (4-2) and (4-3). Flow on a line is calculated using the Power Transfer Distribution Function 
method (4-4), and (4-5) is the node balance constraint. For simplicity, and to be consistent with 
previous chapters, 𝐷𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 represents the total inelastic (fixed) demand for the period, rather than a 
variable for demand dispatched.  
No Greenhouse Gas Model Formulation 





0 ≤ 𝑝𝑔,𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
max ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (4-2) 
𝐹𝑘
min ≤ 𝑓𝑘,𝑡 ≤ 𝐹𝑘
max ∀𝑘, 𝑡 (4-3) 











= 0  (4-5) 
 
Mathematically, a model with no carbon price and one with a socialized price are similar. 
They differ only in the bid in cost of the generating facilities. The Social Cost of Carbon method 
would change the objective to include the GHG cost bid along with the marginal cost bid, as in 
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(4-6). Otherwise, the model remains the same. This formulation is used as a first-best 
comparison, showing possible outcome if all regions valued carbon the same way. 
Social Cost of  Carbon Formulation 






                        (4-2) – (4-5)   
4.3.2 Single-Pass Method 
In order to capture the power flow due to power plants emitting greenhouse gases, 
constraints and variables must be added to record or tag plants that emit greenhouse gases. The 
single-pass method allows the system operator to limit the imports of power into California to 
those plants who bid a greenhouse gas cost and quantity into the market. The greenhouse gas 
costs are accounted for separately from other costs for generators outside California and 
included in a single energy bid for generators within California. Within California, they are one 
and the same, as the costs will be paid by California residents. Generators outside of California 
also have the option of only serving their local load by submitting a quantity bid of zero to the 
California market (i.e., their power can’t be used to support exports to the CAISO); CAISO will 
then dispatch them in merit order without any sale to California load. With a non-zero capacity 
bid, the resource can provide up to that amount of power to California customers. By using 
greenhouse gas cost bids in addition to energy bids, prices in California will reflect combined 
energy and greenhouse gas costs. Outside of California, prices are calculated without a 
greenhouse gas adder, so residents of other states do not pay for California state regulations.  
The single-pass method suffers from the contract shuffling problem described in the 
literature review and introduction to Section 4.2.1, in which greenhouse gas emitting plants in 
Utah might displace renewable energy in Nevada thereby maintaining rather than reducing 
emissions. This issue is often referred to as contract shuffling [145]. In a single pass method, the 
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power being sold to California will have lower emissions, but does not impact sales among the 
surrounding regions selling.  
The model formulation from CAISO’s June 23, 2017 model [149] is used as the basis for the 
single-pass method, and the two-pass method in the next section. In the single pass method, the 
objective has two sets of terms. Like the economic dispatch model above, the marginal costs of 
production are minimized. In addition, we must assign a cost to GHG emissions. As discussed in 
Section 4.2, generators are required to purchase allowances to offset the emission of CO2 from 
an emission auction, and this value will determine the GHG price bid that is offered into the 
real-time auction. In addition to the price bid, a new quantity for production from a plant whose 
GHG emissions are attributed to California consumption must be introduced. The variable 
captures the net flow of power to California from greenhouse gas emitting plants, 𝑝𝑔,𝑡
𝐺𝐻𝐺 . The new 
bid is multiplied by the new quantity and minimized in the objective in (4-8), below.  
The remainder of the additional constraints defines the bounds on the GHG quantity 
variable. The lower bound of the sum is defined in (4-9) by the total power generated outside 
California less demand, i.e., anything imported into California. The upper bound for each 
generator is defined in (4-10)-(4-12) as the minimum of the power dispatch of the generator, its 
capacity, or the GHG quantity bid into the market. In actual operations, these models would be 
the final auction before power delivery. Before this model runs, there would be a fifteen minute, 
an hour-ahead, and day-ahead market auction. The results of those auctions would be part of the 
input to this model. Since this comparison is only considering a single market framework, 
additional inter-auction constraints are omitted.  
For both the single-pass and the two-pass models, prices (LMPs) outside of California 
include an adder for greenhouse gas emissions. If the dual variable on the node balance 
constraint (4-3) is 𝜆𝑡 , the transmission constraint (4-5) is 𝜇𝑘,𝑡 (+ for upper bound and – for lower 
bound), and the greenhouse gas lower bound (4-9) is 𝜂𝑡, then prices at each node are defined as 
in (4-7). The system energy price () can reflect additional costs of greenhouse gas emissions. By 
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adding the greenhouse gas lower bound dual, 𝜂𝑡, the prices outside of California will only reflect 
the marginal energy price and the additional costs of greenhouse gas allowances. This ensures 
that load only pays the marginal cost of energy and not the additional greenhouse gas bid.   






+ 𝜂𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (4-7) 
Single-Pass Formulation  















 ∀𝑡 (4-9) 
𝑝𝑔,𝑡
𝐺𝐻𝐺 ≤ 𝑝𝑔,𝑡 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (4-10) 
𝑝𝑔,𝑡
𝐺𝐻𝐺 ≤ 𝐺𝑔,𝑡
𝐺𝐻𝐺  ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (4-11) 
𝑝𝑔,𝑡
𝐺𝐻𝐺 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (4-12) 
and (4-2) – (4-5)   
4.3.3 Two-Pass Counterfactual  
The two-pass system was designed in an attempt to address the leakage problem that can 
occur with emissions trading in the single-pass method. As described earlier in Section 4.2.1, a 
single pass method might apparently reduce emissions directly sold to the interested party (in this 
case California), but maintain or even increase emissions elsewhere in the network. In an attempt 
to limit the substitution of external polluting generation for within-California generation (i.e., 
leakage), so that total emissions are reduced, a two-pass method was proposed by the CAISO. In 
order to limit the substitution, the first pass must establish the baseline emissions that would 
occur without California. This is done by limiting the first pass to trade outside of California. 
The schedules from the first pass are used as input for the second pass, but prices from the first 
pass are not used for settlements. The second pass then uses the baseline to limit emissions; the 
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upper bound for generation capacity becomes the difference between total capacity and the 
optimal baseline from the first pass. The two passes of the two-pass system are described below. 
First Pass  
The first pass limits imports by California to be non-positive in total, so that California must 
supply all of its demand, and the remaining nodes can trade amongst each other or buy 
California exports. This is enforced through (4-14), where the sum of the flow on lines going 
into California is non-positive, allowing exports from California to the remaining nodes. 
Although nodes outside California will not directly pay for greenhouse gas emissions, the 
greenhouse gas dispatch variable is included in the first pass to set a baseline for the second pass. 
This enables the model to distinguish between emissions caused by California and those that 
would be emitted otherwise. 
As in the single-pass, the GHG dispatch variable is included in the objective only for the 
generation outside of California, seen in (4-13). The lower and upper bound for 𝑝𝑔,𝑡
𝐺𝐻𝐺 is defined 
as it was in the single-pass method and the trade is limited GHG capacity submitted to the 
market, shown in (4-15) and (4-17)-(4-19). The only time 𝑝𝑔,𝑡
𝐺𝐻𝐺 will be positive is if the previous 
markets pass on generation from one region. In the model this value is shown as 𝑇15, which 
represents the fifteen-minute market. In all simulations, this value is zero.  
Two-Pass Counterfactual: First-Pass Formulation 






  (4-13) 
∑ 𝑎𝑘𝑓𝑘,𝑡
∀𝑘∈𝐶𝐴

















𝐺𝐻𝐺 ≤ 𝑝𝑔,𝑡 ∀𝑔 ∉ 𝐶𝐴, 𝑡 (4-17) 
𝑝𝑔,𝑡
𝐺𝐻𝐺 ≤ 𝐺𝑔,𝑡
𝐺𝐻𝐺  ∀𝑔 ∉ 𝐶𝐴, 𝑡 (4-18) 
𝑝𝑔,𝑡
𝐺𝐻𝐺 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀𝑔 ∉ 𝐶𝐴, 𝑡 (4-19) 
and (4-2) – (4-5)   
Second Pass 
Using the first pass GHG dispatch as a baseline, the second pass can redispatch generation 
throughout the region considering cost and limited by the baseline emissions. There are two 
modeling differences in the second pass. The limit imports to California is eliminated, and the 
limits on 𝑝𝑔,𝑡
𝐺𝐻𝐺 are now tighter. The difference between the maximum capacity, and energy and 
GHG dispatch from the first pass now creates an upper bound for the GHG dispatch variable. 
This limits the dispatch so that any change from the first pass can be attributed to demand from 
California. In this way, the ‘leaked’ power will now be influence the price and final energy 
dispatch.  
A brief example can illustrate how the two-pass method works. A generator outside of 
California has a maximum capacity of 100 MW and submits a greenhouse gas quantity bid of 90 
MW due to previous local contracts of 10 MW. The first pass dispatches the generator to 60 
MW. The GHG dispatch variable is the lesser of the capacity (100 MW), the GHG quantity bid 
(90 MW), and the energy dispatch (60 MW); it happens that the optimal solution is 55 MW in the 
first pass. In the second pass, the GHG variable will be the limited again by the dispatch, GHG 
quantity bid, and the last term of (4-21), which is 100 MW – (60 MW – 55 MW) = 95 MW. Since 
the GHG quantity bid is lower than the last term, the variable would be limited to 90 MW.  
Two-Pass Counterfactual: Second-Pass Formulation 






  (4-20) 
𝑝𝑔,𝑡










𝐺𝐻𝐺∗(1)) ∀𝑔 ∉ 𝐶𝐴, 𝑡 (4-23) 
and (4-2) – (4-5), (4-15), (4-16)    
4.3.4  Hurdle Rate or Tax-at-the-Border 
The last method takes a simplistic approach: limit the amount of GHG emissions coming 
into California by putting a hurdle rate or tax at the border on all imports. Similar to the hurdle 
rate used in Section 5.5.3, this rate puts economic friction on any power flowing into California. 
The power will not be imported unless its value is above the tax [158]. Unlike the former hurdle 
rate, this value is asymmetric. Since only California values emissions, the import tax is much 
higher than the export, or the export tax is zero or negative. Unlike the previous methods, the 
tax-at-the-border method overlooks the individual emission rates of power plants. Any power 
coming across the border must ‘hurdle’ the tax, which can include plants for a variety of 
emission rates.  
The formulation adds a term in the objective, (4-25), to tax the flow into California. Two 
new variables are introduced for these flows, 𝑠𝑡
𝑖𝐶𝐴 and 𝑠𝑡
𝑒𝐶𝐴 , respectively.  The variables are 
defined in (4-26), and only apply to the intertie lines into and out of California. The input values 
chosen for the GHG import tax (𝑇𝑡
𝐺𝐻𝐺) can have a significant impact on the outcome of this 
model. The export fee (𝑇𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡) can be negative, maximizing the power leaving California; if the 
power is primarily from plants with higher emissions, total emissions might not decline overall. 
This simulation set the export fee to zero and varied the level of the import tax. The results show 
how different import taxes impact the results, and future simulations can examine how varying 
the export fee might impact outcomes. The prices that result from the hurdle rate formulation 
include the dual variable of the import/export (𝜑𝑡) constraint in (4-26). The calculation for 
prices at each node is in (4-24). 
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+ 𝜑𝑡  ∀𝑔, 𝑡 (4-24) 
 
Tax (Hurdle Rate) Formulation 







𝑒𝐶𝐴  (4-25) 
𝑠𝑡
𝑖𝐶𝐴 − 𝑠𝑡
𝑒𝐶𝐴 = ∑ 𝑓𝑘,𝑡
∀𝑘∈𝐾IT
 ∀𝑡 (4-26) 
and (4-2) – (4-5)   
4.4 WESTERN U.S. EXAMPLE 
4.4.1 Network Description 
The three methods for GHG trade and carbon accounting for imports are compared in an 
example using the network and generation modified from [11]. The three-bus ten-generator 
example is a rough approximation for the Western U.S., where California includes GHG costs in 
their prices while the remaining two nodes, the Northwest and Southwest, exclude GHG costs 
from prices. The generator and load data can be found in Table 4-1 and Table 4-2, and the 
network configuration in Figure 4-1. 
A single hour is modeled. The generators from [11] represent aggregated units, broadly 
mimicking the generation in each region. The Northwest has a great deal of hydro, which is 
represented by Gen 6 with zero GHG emissions and zero marginal cost. The remaining 
generation is not specific to a technology, but has representative characteristics; the Southwest 
has some lower cost resources with higher emissions compared to the lower emissions and 
higher costs of California. Compared to [11] the marginal cost, capacity, emissions rate, and 
network characteristics have not been modified. Since the GHG bid and cost are specific to this 
problem, they were calculated based on the provided emissions rate. The calculations multiplied 
the emission rate by the prevailing price for CO2 allowances. The November 2017 allowance 
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auction produced a rate of $15.06/metric ton CO2 [181]. To reflect the increasing trend of 
allowances, this project used a rate of $17/metric ton CO2, which is in line with other cap-and-
trade schemes like RGGI [23] and in the same range as those used in simulations of California 
[170]. The GHG costs that result are in Table 4-1. This value can greatly influence the outcome 
of the different methods; a sensitivity analysis is done with results in Section 4.4.4. Additionally, 
the flow on the line between the Southwest and California is modified to increase available 
capacity to allow for further trade among all three regions.  
 













Gen 1 CA 28.14 250 580 - 9.86* 
Gen 2 CA 26.46 200 545 - 9.27* 
Gen 3 CA 26.6 450 600 - 10.2* 
Gen 4 NW 15.52 150 500 150 8.5 
Gen 5 NW 16.2 200 500 200 8.5 
Gen 6 NW 0 200 0 180 0 
Gen 7 SW 17.6 400 1216 400 20.67 
Gen 8 SW 16.64 400 1249 400 21.23 
Gen 9 SW 19.4 450 1171 450 19.91 
Gen 10 SW 18.6 200 924 200 15.71 
*These values are not used as GHG cost bids in simulations, rather are added to the marginal costs and 
bid as energy costs. The resulting California marginal cost bids total 38, 35.72, 36.80 $/MWh respectively. 
Only the No-GHG case uses the marginal cost values from the table.  
 
 
Table 4-2 Network characteristics  
Line/Node   CA NW SW 
 Max Capacity 
Load 890 MW 303 MW 684 MW 
Line 1 255 MW PTDF  +0.3333 –0.3333 0 
Line 2 120 MW Values +0.3333 +0.6667 0 





Figure 4-1 Three-bus network diagram 
 
4.4.2 Simulation Results  
Each of the five methods was modeled in AIMMS and solved using CPLEX. The GHG 
models have approximately 53 constraints and 23 primal variables, and the hurdle rate model has 
23 constraints and 15 variables. The results are shown Sections 4.4.2.a-4.4.2.e, which describe 
market outcomes, including: dispatch, operating costs, emissions, prices and profits, and carbon 
leakage. In the results section, the term ‘GHG models’ refers to the simulations that include 
GHG costs in some form, including the single-pass, two-pass, tax, and social cost of carbon 
models (excluding the No-GHG case). The first pass of the two-pass system is shown in the 
results for reference, as the proposed two-pass method does not include a pricing run for the 
first pass.  
The tax-at-the-border method also shows two results: below and above the effective break 
point. Properly selecting a tax or hurdle rate is one difficulty with this method, and examining 
many hurdle rates enables evaluation of both successful and unsuccessful rates. In this simple 
example, there is a break point above which the tax limits all trade to California and acts like the 
first pass of the two-pass method, thus making it ineffective. In this case, “ineffective” does not 
mean carbon emissions are reduced. It means the regional market is ineffective in terms of 
promoting trade (it discourages trade). Below this point, the tax takes effect and allows some 
















$20.40/MWh would allow trade at that price while anything above it would limit trade to 
nothing. One additional point lies with a tax of $0/MWh, where the results would be equivalent 
to the No-GHG case. Different problems will have different break points and determining that 
point remains a difficulty with the tax method. The break point for this problem is found by 
looping through incremental tax rates to find changing solutions. A summary of each model type 
can be found in Table 4-3. 
Table 4-3 Summary of model types 
Name Description 
No-GHG 
No greenhouse gas costs in the objective for any generator (in 
California or the rest of the West (ROW), no additional constraints  
GHG only in CA 
Greenhouse gas costs in the objective only for California generator but 
not for ROW, no additional constraints 
Single-Pass 
Greenhouse gas costs part of CA generator’s energy bid (“GHG in CA 
MC”), separate variables and constraints to account for and penalize 
greenhouse gas costs for ROW generators deemed to export to CA 
Two-Pass 
First Pass 
No imports or exports to CA, sets a baseline for greenhouse gas 
accounting, GHG in CA MC 
Second 
Pass 
Allows imports and exports, identifies and penalizes the greenhouse 
gas imports using baseline from first pass and same constraints as the 
single-pass, GHG in CA MC 
Tax 
Effective 
Net flows into CA must pay a tax (or buy allowances) based on an 
assumed ROW-wide marginal emissions rate and tax rate/allowance 
price, equivalent to 20 $/MWh; GHG in CA MC 
Ineffective Same as above except the tax (> 20 $/MWh for this case) 
Social Cost of Carbon 
Greenhouse gas costs included in all CA and ROW generators’ energy 
bids, no additional constraints  
 
4.4.2.a Dispatch 
The total dispatch level is shown in Table 4-4. Both the No-GHG and the ‘GHG only in 
CA’ models result in the same dispatch, and are shown in the same column. The difference 
between these models is the carbon price on generators in California; in the latter model, 
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generator offers in California are composed of the marginal and GHG costs added together. 
Given the input data in this chapter, the imports between the Northwest and Southwest region 
and California are particularly limited. The transmission capacity between the Southwest and 
California is small, preventing additional imports between the regions. The marginal (fuel) costs 
are also high in California, much higher than the rest of the West. When the GHG costs are 
added to the marginal costs, merit order does not change, meaning the supply stack stays the 
same.  




















Gen 1 CA 26.7 30 240 105.6 90 240 77 
Gen 2 CA 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Gen 3 CA 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 
Gen 4 NW 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
Gen 5 NW 200 200 132.9 200 200 132.9 200 
Gen 6 NW 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Gen 7 SW 250.3 247 104.1 171.4 187 104.1 0 
Gen 8 SW 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
Gen 9 SW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gen 10 SW 0 0 0 0 0 0 200 
CA net export -213.3 -210 0 -134.4 -150 0 -163 
NW net export 247 247 180 247 247 180 247 
SW net export -33.7 -37 -180 -112.6 -97 -180 -84 
 
With No-GHG limits and no effective tax, California imports the greatest amount of power, 
followed by the single pass method and the effective tax. If California is required to supply its 
own power, in the first pass of the two-pass method or the ineffective hurdle rate, the high cost 
Gen 1 is used almost at capacity. In the remaining cases, Gen 7 increases output to supply 
California and Gen 1 is operated a lower level. Including the cost of emissions, Gen 7 cost 
slightly more compared to Gen 1 ($38.27 compared to $38). The single pass model backs down 
the units in ‘clean’ order rather than merit order, meaning it backs down the highest marginal and 
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carbon cost unit rather than the highest marginal cost unit. The two-pass and effective tax 
models also back down Gen 7, but significantly more than the single pass method. Seeing only 
the marginal and carbon cost of Gen 7, the social cost of carbon model does not turn it on, and 
instead turns on Gen 10, which has a lower marginal and carbon cost.  
The last three rows of Table 4-4 show the net exports, or generation less load, for each 
region. The imports into California are highest for the No-GHG case and the social cost of 
carbon case. The first pass of the two-pass model and the ineffective tax do not import or export 
power to California.  
4.4.2.b Operating Costs 
Next, we examine the total variable operating costs of each node.  These are costs of fuel 
and non-fuel variable operations & maintenance and, as indicated below, either include or omit 
the expense of AB32 emissions allowances. The total costs are separated into three tables, Table 
4-5 through Table 4-7: the first shows costs including GHG costs for California based on AB32 
allowances and the taxed imports (for the tax model), the second includes all additional GHG 
costs due to AB32 allowances for all regions, and the third excludes GHG costs altogether. Note 
that Table 4-6 shows the true social cost, including all non GHG operating costs plus the social 
cost of carbon emissions. It can be obtained by multiplying each generator’s emissions rate by 
the social cost, assumed to be $17/ton.  
Note that the actual operating costs of any system can include or exclude GHG costs 
depending if the allowances procured by generators are given for free or auctioned. If allowances 
are free, then the costs in Table 4-7 would reflect operating costs.31 If they are auctioned, and all 
generators outside of California are able to recover the costs or are allocated allowances for free, 
Table 4-5 shows the total costs per region. The tax columns in Table 4-5 show the tax rate in the 
                                                     
31 This assumes that the generators who emit GHG and therefore must hold allowances are 
given them for free; if however allowances are allocated freely but to generators who do not 
need them and therefore sell them to generators, then the distribution of costs will differ, 
although the total in Table 4-7 would be correct. 
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costs for the Northwest and Southwest, adding a tax of $20.40/MWh to the imports from each 
region into California (imports totaling 150 MWh). The ineffective tax does not import into 
California, which is why the costs are higher in the Northwest and Southwest for the effective 
tax compared to the ineffective tax. If all regions require generators to purchase allowances, then 
Table 4-6 would reflect the generator’s cost of operating under GHG pricing.  
Unsurprisingly, the lowest cost solution in Table 4-5 and Table 4-7 (both of which do not 
include any GHG costs in that particular solution) is No-GHG, the case in which no plant pays 
for AB32 allowances. Its cost is shown as the same in both tables, because there are no carbon 
costs charged to any plant in that regulatory model. The second lowest cost solution is the single 
pass method, which trades the most power among the GHG methods, thereby operating the 
least cost generators. Next is the two-pass method followed by the effective and ineffective tax 
models. The tax payment is excluded from the totals in Table 4-7, since it would depend on the 
exact amount. As noted earlier, the ineffective tax has the same solution as the first pass of the 
two-pass system, allowing no trade and operating at the highest cost.  
California’s operating cost follow the same trend as total system costs, with the No-GHG 
solution as the lowest cost, followed by the single pass. The Northwest operating costs only 
differ when no trade is allowed to California; the remaining solutions are the same. Because their 
plants are operating at capacity, their dispatch is only impacted when all trade is blocked.  Finally, 
costs in the Southwest increase under the GHG schemes, and become lower when trade is 
blocked. Because Southwest plants operate at higher output, total costs grow when allowed to 
trade with California. However, their revenues will also increase when they sell more. Since the 
marginal unit sets the price in the Southwest, profits happen to be the same for all simulations; 
further results are shown in Section 4.4.2.d. 
The operating costs including the cost of carbon in all regions (as charged by each respective 
regulatory scheme) are shown in Table 4-6; for consistency with the remaining models, carbon 
costs are shown in Table 4-6 for the No-GHG case. As might be expected, the costs of the No-
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GHG method including carbon costs are higher than the GHG models. The social cost of 
carbon model has, by construction, the lowest cost, since the carbon costs are considered during 
dispatch. The second-pass and the effective tax have similar solutions, and are second-best only 
to the social cost of carbon solution. Both models do not turn on Gen 10, which has a lower 
combined marginal and carbon cost, but are able to use more power from Gen 1 ($38/MWh 
combined) than Gen 7 ($38.27/MWh combined). The highest cost solution is the ineffective tax 
and the single pass, since both require the use of high cost resources in California.  




















CA 18,013 24,720 24,844 32,824 27,718 27,124 32,824 26,630 
NW 5,568 5,568 5,568 4,481 5,568 8,264 4,481 5,568 
SW 11,061 11,061 11,003 8,488 9,672 10,310 8,488 10,376 
Total 34,642 41,348 41,415 45,793 42,958 45,699 45,793 42,574 
 
Table 4-6 Total operating costs ($/hr, including GHG costs for all regions assuming social cost of $17/ton 














CA 24,720 24,844 32,824 27,718 27,124 32,824 26,630 
NW 8,543 8,543 6,886 8,543 8,543 6,886 8,543 
SW 24,728 24,602 19,133 21,708 22,306 19,133 22,011 
Total 57,990 57,989 58,843 57,969 57,973 58,843 57,184 
 













CA 18,013 18,106 24,016 20,234 19,795 24,016 19,429 
NW 5,568 5,568 4,481 5,568 5,568 4,481 5,568 
SW 11,061 11,003 8,488 9,672 9,947 8,488 10,376 




The model with the highest emissions solution is the case without any GHG constraints, 
seen in Table 4-8. The single pass, effective tax and two pass methods follow respectively, each 
with lower total emissions. As anticipated, the lowest emissions solution is the social cost of 
carbon method. The second lowest total emissions come from the ineffective tax or first pass of 
the two-pass method, showing that no trade with California actually lowers emissions more than 
any method. This is due to the high-cost low-carbon resources in California. The highest cost 
method (social cost of carbon) produces the lowest emissions, while the lowest cost solution 
(No-GHG) produces the highest emissions. These set up the ranges of possible cost and 
emissions outcomes, and allow us to examine the solutions in-between. The single pass method 
has low operating costs (excluding GHG costs), but much higher emissions compared to the 
two-pass method.  














CA 394.50 396.40 518.20 440.26 431.20 518.20 423.66 
NW 175.00 175.00 141.46 175.00 175.00 141.46 175.00 
SW 803.93   799.95   626.17   708.00   726.99  626.17 684.40 




0 -2.1 -87.6 -50.2 -40.2 -87.6 -90.4 
 
A regional fuel cost per unit of emissions reduction can be determined by comparing the 
change between each model and the No-GHG case (difference in total cost, in Table 4-7, 
divided by total emissions), seen in Table 4-9. Operating costs for the comparison include the 
marginal fuel cost, excluding any GHG costs. This cost per ton is the incremental cost of 
removing carbon, or the social cost of removing CO2. While the magnitude of the average cost 
in each case is different, the relative changes for California generators are the same, $48.52/ton.  
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This value is the sum of the marginal cost of Gen 1 (increases its output) and GHG allocation 
dual variable, which is difference between the GHG cost and marginal cost of Gen 1 and the 
marginal cost of Gen 7 ($38-$17.6). When California reduces its emissions, it is only because of 
moving Gen 1 up and Gen 7 down in every case, which is why the California marginal cost of 
emissions reduction is constant. 
Since the Northwest costs and emissions are the same as the No-GHG case for all cases 
except when no trade occurs, this means that no average cost can be calculated. Similar to 
California, the Southwest has the same cost per unit for all cases except the social cost of carbon 
case. The totals show a similar incremental cost for the solutions, a higher cost for the cases 
without trade (first pass and ineffective tax), and the lowest cost for the social cost of carbon 
case. Since both costs and emissions decrease for the Northwest and Southwest, the values are 
negative.  












CA 48.52 48.52 48.52 48.52 48.52 48.52 
NW no change -32.40 no change no change -32.40 no change 
SW -14.47 -14.47 -14.47 -14.47 -14.47 -5.73 
Total 17.50 26.75 16.61 16.62 26.75 8.10 
  
Even though the single pass costs less than the other methods, the social cost of removing 
CO2 is around $17/ton for all second-best32 methods, about double the cost of the social cost of 
carbon case. This is also the slope of a line connecting the second-best points on Figure 4-2, 
discussed next, with the no-GHG solution. The social cost minimization case removes more 
                                                     
32 Second-best methods are methods which cannot impose a direct tax on all carbon emissions, 
but given the regulatory constraints of the system, can achieve carbon reductions cost-effectively.  
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CO2 at a much lower per unit cost, which highlights the inefficiency of partial geographic 
coverage of carbon laws.  
Emissions and non-GHG operating costs are compared side-by-side for each model in 
Figure 4-2. As might be expected, the No-GHG model is in the upper left corner, with low costs 
and high emissions. In the lower right corner is the first pass of the two-pass model and the 
ineffective tax, both with no imports into California. These models have the highest costs, but 
also consequently have low emissions. Lower emissions for no import cases might not be a trend 
for systems with different characteristics, especially, if the regulated system has higher emissions 
rates than surrounding regions (shown briefly in Section 4.4.3). Falling between these cases is the 
effective tax and the second pass of the two-pass system. Neither system has the lowest 
emissions or the highest costs.  
 
Figure 4-2 Comparison of total opportunity costs (without carbon costs, $) versus total system emissions 
(tons) 
 
Meanwhile, the social cost of carbon model deviates from the downward sloping line 
connecting the other four, with the lowest emissions and relatively low costs. The social cost 
system dominates all the solutions except No-GHG and single-pass by having both lower costs 








































regulations. Otherwise, no method dominates the other methods. Assuming that the social cost 
solution is not politically feasible, implementation of another method involves spending more 
money for more emissions reduction, which is a value judgment. Thus, using the economist’s 
definition of second-best,33 all the other solutions are efficient ways of achieving the given level 
of reduction, given the political constraint, and are second-best. This conclusion for second-best 
methods may be highly dependent on the system in question, and I anticipate that the shape of a 
graph like Figure 4-2 can change significantly system to system. However, the social cost of 
carbon method will always dominate the second-best methods, because it directly incorporates 
the cost of GHG emissions into the dispatch decisions. Future research should attempt to obtain 
analytical results to assess the generality of these conclusions or investigate other assumptions 
and systems. 
As another analysis of system emissions, the methods can be compared against the No-
GHG case. Table 4-10 shows the percent increase of each simulation’s emissions compared to 
the No-GHG method by region and in total. A positive value represents an increase, while a 
negative value shows a decrease. The single pass is only slightly lower in total emissions, while 
the social cost of carbon method shows a 7% decrease. The region-by-region percentages show 
that while some areas reduce emissions, in all cases, California increases emissions compared to 
the No-GHG case. This demonstrates the value of the EIM; although California plants might 
output more, the region will benefit from any carbon pricing method.  This is also atypical as to 
what might be expected in general with emissions caps, in which emissions in the regulated 
region would be expected to decrease, with leakage increasing emissions outside (as, e.g., in 
RGGI, see [31]).  The reason is that, first, imports into California are already at their upper 
bound. Second, California is much cleaner than one of its neighboring regions (the Southwest), 
so a regulatory system that motivates reductions in emissions in imported power might shift 
                                                     
33 The theory of second best states that if the optimal solution cannot be attained due to a 
constraint, then the next-best optimal solution can only be gained by deviating from that solution 
(all Paretian conditions) [241]. 
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production from a dirty region (the Southwest) to a clean region (California). The capped 
imports can be seen in Table 4-4, where the imports (or net exports) from the No-GHG case are 
higher than all other method’s net exports. 













CA - 0.48% 23.87% 10.39% 8.51% 23.87% 6.88% 
NW - 0% -23.71% 0% 0% -23.71% 0% 
SW  -  -0.50% -28.39% -13.55% -10.58% -28.39% -17.46% 
Total - -0.15% -6.81% -3.79% -3.02% -6.81% -7.04% 
 
4.4.2.d Prices and Profits 
Energy prices for each model are shown in Table 4-11, as are CO2 prices. In general, the 
energy price at a location is the increase in the objective function (total cost), resulting from a 1 
MW increase in demand at that location. Without congestion, all prices would be the same 
throughout the network. The single-pass, effective tax, and social cost of carbon models do not 
have any congestion, whereas all others have one line at its maximum capacity. The prices for 
uncongested models shown in Table 4-11 are the same for regions outside of California, but 
prices in California reflect GHG costs.  





















CA 33.35 38.00 38.00 16.90 38.00 38.00 38.00 38.00 
NW 25.47 27.80 17.60 16.20 17.06 17.60 16.20 38.00 
SW 17.60 17.60 17.60 17.60 17.60 17.60 17.60 38.00 
CO2 
Price 
N/A N/A 20.4 0 20.67 20.4 21.10 N/A 
 
 The energy price calculation for the GHG models is different from the No-GHG and social 
cost of carbon methods, since it includes the cost of greenhouse gas emissions inside California 
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but not outside. The calculation for each price is shown in Section 4.3, under each model’s 
respective sub-section. To summarize, the second-best methods use the dual variable of either 
the GHG allocation constraint or the tax constraint as an adder to determine prices in California. 
Prices outside of California are calculated without the GHG adder. Similar to the price 
calculation method described by CAISO [148], incorporating the GHG price adder incorporates 
the GHG cost into California prices and excludes it from prices in the rest of the West. 
California residents will pay for the GHG costs, while residents in the unregulated states will not. 
For the single- and two-pass models, the CO2 price is the dual variable of the GHG allocation 
constraint in (4-9) and (4-15). For the tax model, it is the dual variable of the California flow 
constraint in (4-26). 
The results can be summarized as follows. The energy price for the social cost of carbon is 
reflective of Gen 1’s fuel and GHG cost, which is marginal throughout the uncongested 
network. The single-pass is also uncongested, but the price outside California is lower because it 
does not include the GHG dual variable, which is 20.4 $/MWh. This variable, the CO2 price for 
both the single-pass and tax, is the difference between the marginal and GHG cost of Gen 1 
($38/MWh) and the marginal cost of Gen 7 ($17.60). Compared to the No-GHG model, these 
two generators increase and decrease output respectively. The two-pass method produces some 
congestion, but still shows similar pricing compared to the single-pass method. The first pass of 
the two-pass method is not used for settlements, but is shown as a reference without the GHG 
constraint dual adder.  
The prices resulting from the effective tax method are the same as the single-pass method, 
and almost the same as the two-pass method. The dual variable on the import/export constraint 
in the tax method (constraint (4-26)) has the same value as the GHG export constraint in the 
single pass method (constraint (4-9)), 20.4 $/MWh. This is also the value at which the tax 
changes from effective to ineffective. This value must be included in pricing for the tax method, 
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else the prices will not be supporting, meaning the price will be too low to incentive the 
generator to produce (the generator would operate at a loss).  
Profits for each generator based on the prices in Table 4-11 are shown in Table 4-12 and 
Table 4-13. The profits in Table 4-12 are calculated assuming that allowances are allocated for 
free to the generators, i.e., the costs exclude the GHG costs. On the other hand, if California 
generators are required to purchase allowances, the profits would be those found in Table 4-13, 
where GHG costs are included. If all generators in the West are required to purchase allowances, 
profits would be negative in the Northwest and Southwest. Prices outside California do not 
include the GHG adder, which would mean prices are not supporting outside California. 
Generators in the Northwest and Southwest would require another means of cost recovery if 
required to purchase allowances, or pricing would need to be adjusted.  
For this example, profits are highest in the social cost of carbon model, since the price of 
power on average goes up by more than the average emissions rate times the social cost. Other 
systems might have different results, for instance if the marginal generators are clean generators 
and the dirty generators are at capacity, so that the average emissions rate is greater than the 
marginal emissions rate. Taxing emissions might increase or decrease profits, depending on the 
average emissions rate and the marginal emissions rate [182], [183].  The GHG only in CA and 
No-GHG models have the next highest profits under both purchased and free allowances, due 
to congestion in the network leading to higher profits in the Northwest. Because all generators in 
the Northwest are at maximum capacity, delivering an additional MW to the Northwest requires 
increased 0.5 MW increased output from generators in both California and the Southwest.  
The single-pass and effective tax methods produce the same prices in all locations because 
there is no congestion. If allowances are purchased (Table 4-13), the total profits are the same. 
Gen 1 and Gen 7 are dispatched to different quantities in the simulation, but both are marginal 
generators and do not make a profit (the price is equal to their marginal costs). However, if 
allowances are allocated for free (Table 4-12), the change of dispatch level between the two 
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methods returns higher profits for the effective tax case compared to the single-pass. Without 
the ability to sell power to California, the ineffective tax produces the lowest profits when 
allowances are purchased. In that case, Gen 5 is marginal in the Northwest, where in the other 
methods it is producing at full capacity.  
Profits are understandably impacted by whether or not the allowances are allocated to each 
generator for free or are purchased. If the generators are purchased, profits are reduced 
significantly in this example. The last row of Table 4-13 shows the decrease in profits for 
California generators when they are required to pay for allowances. The marginal generator 
breaks even in this case, and because the other generators are at maximum capacity, they 
produce the same profits for each model. If the allowances are allocated for free, and prices still 
include the GHG adder, all generators will make additional profits. Rather than pay the 
generators the additional cost of allowances, a system operator might choose to return the 
surplus to California consumers who are paying a higher price for electricity. Alternatively, the 
state can choose to use this surplus for carbon reduction activities. The means of income 
distribution is necessary area for further research.  
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Gen 1 CA 139 264 296 N/A 1041 887 2,366 759 
Gen 2 CA 1,378 2,308 2,308 N/A 2308 2,308 2,308 2,308 
Gen 3 CA 3,038 5,130 5,130 N/A 5130 5,130 5,130 5,130 
Gen 4 NW 1,493 1,842 312 N/A 230 312 102 3,372 
Gen 5 NW 1,855 2,320 280 N/A 171 280 0 4,360 
Gen 6 NW 5,095 5,560 3,520 N/A 3,411 3,520 3,240 7,600 
Gen 7 SW 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 - 
Gen 8 SW 384 384 384 N/A 384 384 384 8,544 
Gen 9 SW - - - N/A - - - - 
Gen 10 SW - - - N/A - - - 3,880 




Table 4-13 Profits per generator in California assuming allowances are purchased ($) 















Gen 1 CA 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 
Gen 2 CA 456 456 N/A 456 456 456 456 
Gen 3 CA 540 540 N/A 540 540 540 540 
Total including 
profits from NW 
and SW 
9,821 5,492  5,195 5,492 4,722 28,752 
Decrease in CA 
Profits from 
 Table 4-12 
6,706 6,738 8,808 7,483 7,329 8,808 7,201 
 
4.4.2.e Carbon Leakage and Contract Shuffling 
Other than the No-GHG method, each model changes the dispatch in an attempt to lower 
emissions in the overall system, based on the incentives embodied in each model. The goal of 
these methods is to reduce overall emissions, including the impact of leakage and contract 
shuffling, meaning that low cost imports into California should not also increase emissions 
elsewhere in the network. I consider two definitions of leakage here: 
1) The traditional definition is the increase in emissions outside of the regulated region. This calculated 
simply by comparing the rest of the West (ROW, the sum of Northwest and Southwest) 
emissions under the regulated regime with a no-regulation (No-GHG) baseline. Leakage 
can then be expressed as a fraction: (increase in nonregulated region 
emissions)/(decrease in regulated region emissions). In much of the literature, this is the 
common definition of carbon leakage [28]–[31], [172]. It is most relevant to cap-and-
trade systems that only apply to the regulated region and do not attempt to attribute 
emissions to imports or regulate them (e.g., RGGI, Clean Air Act SO2 Trading Program, 
and European ETS). Leakage using this definition can occur if energy imports from the 
non-regulated area to the regulated area increase and if the regulations provide no 
incentive or ineffective incentives to limit measures in the non-regulated area.  
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2) The alternative definition proposed in this chapter is most applicable when a regulatory system attempts 
to quantify and regulate emissions associated with imports from non-regulated systems (as California 
does). The alterative definition of leakage calculates the difference between (a) the 
accounted for reduction of emissions (including emissions within the regulated region, 
and emissions associated with imported power from the nonregulated region that are 
subject to the regulatory system) relative to a baseline, and (b) the actual total reduction 
of emissions in both the regulated region and the nonregulated region relative to the 
actual reduction. If this difference is divided by (a), this is a percentage measure of 
leakage. Definition (2) will be the same as (1) if the accounted for emissions in imports 
into the regulated region equals the actual difference between emissions outside the 
regulated region under the model in question, and those emissions if instead imports are 
restricted to be zero. This is a measure of how accurate the accounted for reductions 
under the regulatory scheme (including any that are associated with imports) are relative 
to the actual reductions totaled across the regions. It is of interest when a regulatory 
system, such as California’s, attempts to limit leakage and/or contract shuffling by 
counting emissions associated with imports and assigning carbon costs to them (through 
taxes or required purchases of emissions allowances). 
Calculations based on the first definition of leakage, i.e., increase in emissions outside the 
regulated region compared to decrease in emissions in the regulate region, are shown in Table 
4-14. Given this definition, the example presented in this chapter has no leakage, or has reverse 
leakage. Emissions in the Northwest and Southwest are highest in the No-GHG case, and lower 
in all models that consider emissions. This is a surprising result, one that results from the specific 
assumptions and input data used for the example. In particular, there is a constrained 
transmission line between the Southwest and California, which does not allow additional imports 
into California. While overall emissions decrease due to redispatch of existing resources, 
emissions inside California increase. This type of result would not be typical in real-world 
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systems, since there are more interconnections between two regions than shown here. Table 4-14 
shows the emissions in the rest of the West decrease compared to the No-GHG case, and 
California emissions increase. Thus, examining leakage using this definition does not produce a 
meaningful result. Since the change in the rest of the West emissions is negative and it is divided 
by a large increase of emissions in California, this definition of leakage yields a misleadingly 
positive and large result. 

















Emissions in ROW 978.93 974.95 767.63 883.00 901.99 767.63 859.40 
Change in ROW 
emissions (ROW) 
N/A -3.9 -211.3 -95.9 -76.9 -211.3 -119.4 
Emissions in CA 394.50 396.40 518.20 440.26 431.20 518.20 423.66 
Change in CA 
emissions (CA) 
N/A 1.9 123.7 45.8 36.7 123.7 29.2 
Leakage Definition (1) 
(-ROW/CA) 
N/A 205% 171% 209% 210% 171% 409% 
 
By using additional data from the simulation outcomes, we can calculate leakage using the 
second definition. This calculation incorporates the regulation’s errors in accounting for 
emissions in imports in cases where the cap-and-trade systems attempts to quantify and penalize 
emissions associated with imports, as California attempts to do. The second method to calculate 
leakage compares two elements, labeled (a) and (b) above.  
Part (a) compares the accounted for reduction in emissions relative to an adjusted No-GHG 
baseline. The baseline uses California emissions from the No-GHG case, and the difference 
between the rest of the West emissions in the No-GHG case and the first pass. The baseline 
examines the difference between the total emissions from the No-GHG case and emissions in 
the rest of the West only due to their own needs (which is the definition of results from the first 
pass). The baseline is then compared to each model’s specific emissions in California and the 
emissions due to regulated import. The import is calculated differently depending on the model. 
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For the single- and two-pass method, the imports are calculated with the greenhouse gas variable 
introduced in Section 4.3.2, 𝑝𝑔𝑡
𝐺𝐻𝐺 , multiplied by the plant’s emissions rate. For the tax cases, a 
similar value can be calculated. Using the lower bound of 𝑝𝑔𝑡
𝐺𝐻𝐺 , shown in constraint (4-9), 
imports can be calculated by taking the total imports (total supply less demand in the Northwest 
and Southwest), and choosing 𝑝𝑔𝑡
𝐺𝐻𝐺 from the lowest cost greenhouse gas bids. The simple 
method to calculate this value for the tax and social cost of carbon case is shown in (4-27)-(4-29). 
The calculated results are shown in Table 4-15 as “GHG Emissions Imports as Accounted for 
by Regulation (RegI),” and the total values for part (a) are shown as RegI. 













 ∀𝑔 ∉ 𝐶𝐴, 𝑡 (4-28) 
𝑝𝑔,𝑡
𝐺𝐻𝐺 ≤ 𝐺𝑔,𝑡
𝐺𝐻𝐺  ∀𝑔 ∉ 𝐶𝐴, 𝑡 (4-29) 
 
Part (b) is compares the change in total emissions from the No-GHG case to the model 
specific emissions, called Tot. This value is the actual reduction in total emissions, whereas Part 
(a) shows the reduction due to accounted for emissions. The values for each part are shown in 
Table 4-15, based on the relationships below.  
o RegI = (Baseline) – (Accounted for Emissions) 
 = [(No-GHG CA)+((No-GHG CA)–(First Pass ROW))]–[(Model CA)+(Model GHG imports)] 
o Tot = (No-GHG Total) – (Model Total) 
o Leakage = 1 – Tot/RegI 
Leakage using the second definition is shown in gray in Table 4-15. This definition of 
leakage extends beyond most found in the literature to include the impacts accounting for 
regulated emissions. As was evident from the leakage in Table 4-14, this case might not 
demonstrate the traditional definition of leakage, but still shows the impact of shifting imports 
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between generators inside and outside California. Leakage is zero when there are no imports into 
California, seen in the first pass and the ineffective tax. The single pass has 98.5% leakage; there 
is only 2.1 tons of actual emissions reduction (Tot), but almost 140 tons accounted for due to 
regulation. Plants that would have been used to serve local demand are now being counted for 
California demand, and other dirtier plans are filling the difference. A similar phenomenon 
happens with the effective tax. Supply in California is being fulfilled by Southwest supply, but to 
a lesser degree, resulting in 70.1% leakage. In comparison, the two-pass method increases low 
emitting supply in California and reduces imports. The total emissions reduce more than the 
accounted for emissions from regulation and the net result is a negative percentage for leakage.  

















CA Emissions (CA) 394.50 396.40 518.20 440.26 431.20 518.20 423.66 
ROW Emissions (ROW) 978.93 974.95 767.63 883.00 901.99 767.63 859.40 
Total Emissions  1373.4 1371.4 1285.8 1323.3 1333.2 1285.8 1283.1 
Actual Reduction in Total  
(Tot) 
N/A 2.1 87.6 50.2 40.2 87.6 90.4 
GHG Emissions Imports as 
Accounted for by Regulation 
(RegI) 
1258 70.0 0.0 134.8 40.0 0.0 46.5 
 GHG as Accounted for 
Regulation (RegI) 
[Baseline* – (CA+RegI)] 
N/A 139.40 87.60 30.78 134.60 87.60 135.64 
Leakage Definition (2) 
[1-Tot/RegI] 
N/A 98.5% 0.0% -63.0% 70.1% 0.0% 33.4% 
Change in imported emissions 
compared to No-GHG 
(Import) 
N/A 1188 1258 1123 1218 1258 1212 
Contract Shuffling  
[1-ROW/Import] 
N/A 100% 117% 109% 106% 117% 110% 
*Baseline  
= California Emissions from No-GHG+(ROW Emissions from No-GHG – First Pass ROW Emissions) 
=1373.4-767.63 = 605.8 
 
Similar to the calculations from [11], the total contract shuffling can be calculated using the 
change in the rest of the West emissions and the apparent change in import emissions into 
California. The change in ROW emissions is shown in Table 4-14, and the change in imports is 
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shown in Table 4-15 as (Import). The amount of contract shuffling is over 100% in all GHG 
models. Since no additional power can be imported into California, all regulated emissions 
decreases are due to shifting contracts among sources of imports from the rest of the West. In 
this case, contract shuffling was utilized to reduce emissions. However, unlike the results in this 
example, contract shuffling might not always work to the advantage of the regulated region, 
especially if the contracts are outside the market. For instance, if a generator not dispatched by 
the ISO is able to sell to an unregulated state.  
Leakage and contract shuffling are both complicated concepts, each with different 
definitions in literature and few papers which attempt to quantify their impact. One or both can 
result when neighboring regions have asymmetrical policies in place, both for carbon emissions 
and other greenhouse gases. The effect of leakage will vary depending on the accounting method 
used for imports. Neither leakage nor contract shuffling have necessarily negative impacts; if 
overall emissions decrease, then shifting emitting plants from one regions to another has a net 
benefit for the system. However, this does not account for local emissions or effects on 
communities. While outside the scope of this chapter, it can be a criterion for method evaluation, 
discussed briefly in Section 4.5.2. 
4.4.3 Modified Network 
Although emissions reduced using the GHG models in the previous example, emissions in 
the rest of the West also decreased. This is an unusual result in the sense that trade is limited in 
the No-GHG case, making results with and without GHG costs in California identical. This is 
due to the restricted line flow between the Southwest and California. The total amount of 
imports could not extend beyond the No-GHG case, which is why it did not change total 
dispatch when including GHG costs for California plants. That case shows the impact of a 
congested network and the benefits of an alternative definition of leakage. By modifying the 
network and generator costs in California, a network can be examined in which leakage can 
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occur through increases in imports, which is the more typical concern from environmental 
groups (for instance, as articulated by the Sierra Club [184]). The original generator and network 
information in Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 is modified with shaded text in Table 4-16 and Table 
4-17. Here, generators in California have comparable marginal fuel costs to the rest of the West, 
and higher emissions rates compared the previous example (now comparable to the Southwest).  
This example simulates a situation in which a capped markets; units have emissions rates similar 
to neighboring uncapped regions.  
The same five models are simulated, and notably, there are now two distinct No-GHG 
cases. Without any carbon price, the emissions in the entire region are high. With GHG prices 
only in California, emissions decrease overall, but increase in the rest of the West, resulting in 
leakage by the first definition in the previous section.  













Gen 1 CA 15.2 250 1429 - 24.3* 
Gen 2 CA 15.9 200 1342 - 22.82* 
Gen 3 CA 16.0 450 929.4 - 15.8* 
Gen 4 NW 15.52 150 500 150 8.5 
Gen 5 NW 16.2 200 500 200 8.5 
Gen 6 NW 0 200 0 180 0 
Gen 7 SW 17.6 400 1216 400 20.67 
Gen 8 SW 16.64 400 1249 400 21.23 
Gen 9 SW 19.4 450 1171 450 19.91 
Gen 10 SW 18.6 200 924 200 15.71 
*These values are not used as GHG cost bids in simulations, rather are added to the marginal costs and 
bid as energy costs. The resulting California marginal cost bids total 39.5, 38.72, 31.80 $/MWh 
respectively. Only the No-GHG case uses the marginal cost values from the table.  
 
Table 4-17 Network characteristics  
Line/Node   CA NW SW 
 Max Capacity 
Load 890 MW 303 MW 684 MW 
Line 1 255 MW PTDF  +0.3333 –0.3333 0 
Line 2 120 MW Values +0.3333 +0.6667 0 




Using the same two definitions of leakage from Section 4.4.2.e, Table 4-18 compares the 
amount of leakage in a system with larger transmission capacity, allowing increased imports into 
California. The first definition of leakage is the change in emissions from the unregulated region 
(ROW), which can be expressed as a ratio to the change of emissions within the regulated region 
(CA). The comparisons are between the No-GHG case and all remaining models, including the 
case with GHG prices in California alone. Calculations using the second leakage definition 
(described in Section 4.4.2.e) are shown in the last row of Table 4-18. As a reminder, leakage 
using definition (2) is the difference between the actual reduction in the West’s emissions and the 
reduction as accounted for by the regulation (including imports). Both leakage results are 
highlighted in gray. 




















Emissions in CA 1043.7 264.8 592.5 1029.4 686.5 264.8 1029.4 418.1 
Change in CA 
emissions (CA) 
N/A -778.9 -451.2 -14.3 -357.2 -778.9 -14.3 -625.6 
Emissions in ROW 759 1452.8 1096.6 767.6 1006.9 1452.8 767.6 1196.2 
Change in ROW 
emissions (ROW) 
N/A 693.8 337.6 8.6 247.9 693.8 8.6 437.2 
Total Emissions 1802.7 1717.6 1689.1 1797 1693.4 1717.6 1797 1614.3 
Change in Total  
Emissions (Tot) 
N/A -85.1 -113.6 -5.7 -109.3 -85.1 -5.7 -188.4 
Leakage Definition (1) 
(-ROW/CA) 
N/A 89% 75% 60% 69% 89% 60% 70% 
GHG Emissions 
Imports as Accounted 
for by Regulation 
(RegI) 
0 552.3 191.6 0 258.7 552.3 0 345.2 
 GHG as Accounted 
for Regulation (Reg) 
[Baseline*–(CA+RegI)] 
N/A 218 251 5.7 89.9 218 5.7 271.8 
Leakage Definition (2) 
[1-Tot/Reg] 
N/A 61% 55% 0% -22% 61% 0% 31% 
*Baseline  
= California Emissions from No-GHG + (ROW Emissions from No-GHG – First Pass ROW 




This example shows a case where leakage occurs in the nonregulated region (ROW) due to 
shifting emissions from California to the West. The new values for emissions in California create 
more leakage that might occur in actual system operations. However, other regions in the 
Eastern U.S. have higher emitting resources in-state and lower emitting resources out of state. In 
this case, leakage might be a significant issue. Further analysis of this and other similar cases are 
necessary to evaluate the impact of leakage between the different second-best or GHG models. 
4.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis for the Carbon Price 
In order to test the sensitivity of single-pass, two-pass, and social cost of carbon models, 
different carbon prices were tested for all the models. The following tables show the results of 
the models with carbon prices of $10/ton, $15/ton, and $20/ton. The base case, which resulted 
in the previous section’s results, is $17/ton. The results for a price of $10/ton or $15/ton are the 
same, and therefore only shown once. A $25/ton price was also tested, with the only change 
being to the social cost of carbon model, therefore it is shown in the emissions tables as a 
separate column. A positive value indicates an increase in costs and an increase in emissions. 
Likewise, a negative value indicates a decrease in costs and decrease in emissions. 
With a lower carbon price, total costs decrease for all models, although costs increase for the 
Southwest. Even though costs are lower, the total emissions increase. This outcome follows 
common logic, if carbon is not valued as highly, emissions will increase. The reverse is true when 
the carbon price increases. With a price of $20/ton, prices increase and emissions decrease. At an 
even higher price, $25/ton, only the social cost of carbon model shows a change dispatch. The 
costs increase even higher, but the emissions decrease by just over 58 metric tons compared to 
the $17/ton price.  
The social cost of carbon method is the only model that changed when faced with a higher 
carbon price, which confirms the dominance of the social cost of carbon method over the 
second-best models. The single- and two-pass methods both respond to a lower cost per ton of 
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carbon, but only the two-pass method reduces emissions when the cost increases. For this 
example, this would suggest the two-pass method is better able to respond to a changing carbon 
price, dominating the single-pass.  
Table 4-19 Change in operating costs per node in $/hr, (CO2 = 10 or 15 $/ton) – (Base Case) 
 
Single Pass 
Two-Pass Social Cost of 
Carbon  First Pass Second Pass 
CA  (124)   -     (2,998)   (1,910) 
NW  -     -     -     -    
SW  58  -     1,520  885 
Total  (67)   -     (1,477)   (1,026)  
 
Table 4-20 Change in operating costs per node in $/hr, (CO2 = 20 $/ton) – (Base Case) 
 
Single Pass 
Two-Pass Social Cost of 
Carbon 
Social Cost of 
Carbon 
(25 $/ton)  First Pass Second Pass 
CA  -     -     3,586   1,088   6,201 
NW  -     -     (763)  -     (1,088)  
SW  -     -     (832)  (476)  (1,597)  
Total  -     -     1,991   611   3,515 
 
Table 4-21 Change in emissions per node in kg/hr, (CO2 = 10 or 15 $/ton) – (Base Case) 
 
Single Pass 
Two-Pass Social Cost of 
Carbon  First Pass Second Pass 
CA  (1,897)   -     (45,755)   (29,157)  
NW  -     -     -     -    
SW  3,976  -     92,631  61,128 
Total  2,080  -     46,876  31,972 
 
Table 4-22 Change in emissions per node in kg/hr, (CO2 = 20 $/ton) – (Base Case) 
 
Single Pass 
Two-Pass Social Cost of 
Carbon 
Social Cost of 
Carbon 
(25 $/ton)  First Pass Second Pass 
CA  -     -     54,741   16,599   94,644  
NW  -     -     (23,560)  -     (33,590) 
SW  -     -     (57,470)  (35,745)  (119,904) 
Total  -     -     (26,289)  (19,146)  (58,850) 
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4.5 DISCUSSION  
A region that values an externality more than its neighbors faces challenges when both 
regions engage in a common market. This question has come to the forefront with the 
implementation of California carbon emissions trading and concerns over carbon leakage. It can 
generally arise between any two or more countries with different pollution trading or penalty 
mechanisms. In the case examined in this chapter, California established a cap-and-trade system; 
it values reducing carbon emissions from power plants and imported power. The rest of the 
West has yet to implement a similar scheme, which has resulted in stakeholders being concerned 
that expansion of power markets in the West will result in increased imports of coal-based power 
to California and will weaken the effectiveness of California’s emissions limits [184], [185]. The 
Western grid is well connected, and a real-time integrated market operates every 5 minutes with 
many Western utilities and the CAISO. California is often dependent on surrounding states for 
power, and similarly would prefer to export renewable power if it has excess. However, 
exporting or importing power while effectively reducing emissions can be a challenge.  
Although it is the first best option, the social cost of carbon method cannot be implemented 
in the West given current state policies. Residents and legislators in neighboring regions would 
need to opt to dispatch their own system based on greenhouse gas costs, and similarly pay for 
the allowances (either generators would be required to pay for allowances or customers would be 
required to pay a premium for electricity). Until neighboring states enact a greenhouse gas policy, 
second best options must suffice. At present, British Columbia has a carbon policy [186], and 
other Western states have proposed [187] or failed to pass [188] carbon legislation. However, 
enacting legislation in some but not all neighboring regions will also complicate the dispatch of 
the system, since each region would require its own constraints and variables.  
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4.5.1 Results Summary 
By imposing a carbon price (in the form of an allowance requirement) upon generation 
within one jurisdiction that exists within a larger electricity market region, leakage and contract 
shuffling can occur. In other words, the overall emissions reduction in the entire region may be 
less than the apparent emissions reduction in the target jurisdiction.  There are several existing 
proposals to manage trade and leakage from centralized power dispatch, each with benefits and 
downsides. Three main proposals are compared against simulations without an emissions price 
(No-GHG) and with a system-wide emissions price (social cost of carbon) in Section 4.2.14.4.2. 
A summary of results can be found in Table 4-23. 


















Costs ($/hr, other 
than CO2 charges) 
$34,642 $34,677 $36,983 $35,472 $35,310 $36,983 $35,373 
Total Emissions 
(tons/hr) 
1373.4 1371.4 1285.8 1323.3 1333.2 1285.8 1283.1 
Total Social Cost 
($/hr, including 
socialized CO2 costs) 
$57,990 $57,989 $58,843 $57,969 $57,973 $58,843 $57,184 
Cost to CA 
Consumers ($/hr) 
$29,682 $33,820 - $33,820 $33,820 $33,820 $33,820 
Incremental Cost to 
CA Consumers* 
($/ton)  
N/A -2,069 - -83 -103 -47 -46 
Incremental Total 
Cost** ($/ton) 
N/A -17.5 - -17 -17 -27 -8.1 
Leakage Definition 
(2)*** 
N/A 98.5% 0.0% -63.0% 70.1% 0.0% 33.4% 
*Incremental Cost to California Consumers = (CA Cost/Total Emissions) 
**Incremental Total Cost = (Operating Cost with GHG Costs/Total Emissions) 
***Leakage Definition (2) = 1 – Tot/RegI, defined in 4.4.2.e where RegI is the accounted for regulated 
emissions 
 
I hypothesized that the lowest cost and highest emissions solution would be the No-GHG 
case, while the lowest emissions solution would be the social cost of carbon case. The remaining 
three GHG proposals would then fall somewhere between the two extremes. The results 
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confirm this hypothesis and show each of the three proposals increase costs beyond the No-
GHG simulation and also yield higher emissions than the social cost of carbon solution (in 
which a single price is applied to all emissions throughout the West), as shown in rows 1 and 2 of 
Table 4-23. The first best option, the social cost of carbon case, produces the lowest emissions, 
but that does not imply it will also be the highest cost simulation. If carbon costs are considered 
for all plants (assuming allowances must be purchased), the social cost of carbon case is actually 
the lowest cost solution, seen in row 3, and its fuel costs are about the same as the ineffective tax 
solutions. But if only California plants must purchase emissions allowances, then the social cost 
of carbon model produces the highest cost solution. Whether or not these allowances are 
purchased or provided will have a significant impact on generator profits, and should be 
considered when analyzing model formulations.  
The example in this chapter is based on California issues, but is not a direct representation 
of the California system. The conclusions drawn are representative of one type of constrained 
system, and not intended to directly suggest policy implications of AB32. The system shown in 
this chapter is an extreme case examining how emissions can be accounted for when imports are 
constrained. Although California imports are not generally constrained, it might apply to other 
networks or future bottlenecks. Future work can assess different system states. For instance, 
other simulations can include a case where imports are not constrained due to congestion, a case 
with different load levels throughout the network, or different types of supply (such as renewable 
energy). A case that will be of special interest to California would examine the impacts of the 
duck curve, or the high penetration of solar energy midday that reduces net demand resulting in 
a large ramp event in the early evening hours. Using a variety of systems states will allow for a 
holistic assessment of impacts to both the regulated and unregulated system.  
If a system operator prioritizes lowering operating costs, the simulations indicate the single-
pass method would be the best alternative. However, it is also the method that produces the 
highest emissions (that includes carbon pricing); very little emissions reductions take place. The 
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single-pass method also has the highest carbon leakage, 98.5%, since it does not encourage 
emissions reductions in the network, even though the regulatory system’s account appears to 
take credits for large reductions in imported carbon. The two-pass method is better able to 
capture emissions associated with imports by simulating the market without California and 
adjusting based on the first pass. The resulting second pass reduces emissions compared to the 
single-pass while increasing costs, at an incremental cost per ton of about twice what can be 
achieved by an efficient West-wide system (social cost of carbon method). It has negative 
leakage, because there are more actual reductions than accounting reductions, i.e., California is 
counting a reduction of 30 tons, whereas the total reduction was 50 tons. This might be 
problematic when assessing the efficacy of the emissions reductions.  
The tax model results in two separate cases, one in which the tax limits imports and one in 
which the tax eliminates imports (does not allow trade between California and the West). The 
effective tax (one that limits imports) results in total costs and emissions similar to the two-pass 
method. Although not every network will show such similar results for the two models, the 
similarities show the tax might be able to reduce system-wide emissions.  The ineffective tax (one 
that eliminates imports) stops all trade between the regions. Emissions are low due to low 
emitting resources in California, but operating costs and consumer payments are high. Although 
the magnitude will change, a tax that eliminates imports makes the West-wide market (EIM) 
worthless.  
The optimal tax for a particular system will be different depending on imports, and can vary 
between neighboring systems. For instance, the tax on imports from the Northwest might be 
different than a tax on imports from the Southwest because congestion results in generators in 
both regions being on the margin (“basic”, in the terminology of optimization). If implementing 
a tax model, the regulated region can assess if the taxes should be adjusted depending on 
location. In theory, the tax could reflect the marginal emissions rate in the surrounding region, 
which can differ due to congestion in the network. In the example in this chapter, the optimal 
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rate was the difference between the marginal and greenhouse gas costs in California and the 
marginal cost of the marginal resource outside of California. Optimal taxes will likely also need 
to be reassessed and adjusted over time.  
Turning to price impacts for the West-wide test case, prices are very similar, but the total 
cost to California customers varies due to imports. The No-GHG case costs California 
consumers the least, while the social cost of carbon model and ineffective tax cost the most. 
Both the social cost of carbon and ineffective tax cost $38/MWh, which is the cost of the 
marginal generator in California. Among the GHG models, the single-pass method costs the 
least for California consumers, because California imports cheaper power from both the 
Northwest and the Southwest. An effective hurdle rate or tax produces similar emissions and 
costs compared to the two-pass method, and costs the California consumers the least slightly less 
than the two-pass method. Consumers might prefer the tax to the two-pass; however, if the tax 
is too high, consumers must pay for high cost in-state resources.  
As discussed in Section 4.2.3, many in industry believe the two-pass method presents 
incorrect incentives for generators. Due to the two passes, a generator might construct an offer 
that avoids dispatch in the first pass but ensures dispatch in the second. This might encourage 
dishonest bidding, which is not modeled in this chapter. Because this analysis assumes truthful 
bidding, future work can examine the impact of dishonest bidding in each case; emissions and 
costs might differ greatly if generators are inflating their bids. These concerns led the CAISO to 
modify their proposal further, eliminating the two-pass method. While it will not be 
implemented in a market, the two-pass solutions can lead to certain insights. For modeling 
purposes, the first pass establishes base generation needed in each region, before trade occurs. 
Identifying resources that increase or decrease output due to trade is difficult without a variable 
identifying that information. However, this model may still be useful as a baseline for future 




4.5.2 Policy Recommendations 
None of the three second-best regulatory methods dominate the other in that none can both 
lower costs and lower emissions more than any other method. This emphasizes the difficulty in 
finding the second-best method for pricing carbon, assuming that the first best method of 
implementing a social cost throughout the West is not politically feasible. The single-pass 
method might not reduce emissions to the same extent as the other methods, but it is simple to 
implement. Each resource bids its allowance cost, and one linear model is used. As discussed in 
Section 4.2.3, the two-pass method identifies the carbon dispatch due to California, but might 
have poor long-term impacts on bidding strategies. The tax reduces emissions, but is difficult to 
determine. A tax that is too high will stop all trade while a lower tax has higher leakage compared 
to the two-pass method. No one method is without fault, a point emphasized on a Feb. 22nd, 
2018 CAISO stakeholder call.34 In comparing the methods there is a conflict between 
appropriate prices, low costs, and reducing emissions.  
It should also be noted that the three methods plateaued in response to higher carbon prices, 
i.e., the dispatch did not change as the price increased. Only the social cost of carbon method 
continued to adjust dispatch in response to higher carbon prices. Although the carbon price has 
been low in cap-and-trade auctions, allowance prices might continue to rise as renewable 
penetration increases, as was implemented in British Columbia. In choosing a method, the 
operator will need to prioritize characteristics of the method that are most important to 
stakeholders. There might not be a single second-best, or a single dominant method that can 
reduce carbon emissions cost-effectively subject to the constraint that California cannot impose a 
tax or shadow price on all carbon emissions by power plants in other states.  
In assessing different carbon methods, there are several criteria decisions makers can use to 
determine which second-best method is best suited for their needs. A list of possible criteria is 
                                                     





given in Error! Reference source not found.. The first two criteria are the axes of Figure 4-2: 
total operating costs and emissions. These are the criteria that indicate whether a policy is 
efficient (has the lowest cost of achieving the target), the focus for most economists.  
Table 4-24 Criteria that can be used to assess GHG models 
Category Sub-categories  
Operating Costs 
Including only marginal costs 
Including greenhouse gas costs (allowances) 
Emissions 
Greenhouse gas emissions 
Local air pollution 
Leakage & contract shuffling  
Economic efficiency 
Changes in consumer and producer surplus 
Opportunities for gaming, exercising market power 
Prices 
What costs should be incorporated in prices 
Ensuring prices are supporting 
Political impact 
Region/state viewed as green leader 
Legal concerns (interstate commerce) 
Environmental justice  
Logistics 
Ease of implementation (administrative, legislative, software) 
Transparency  
 
Operating costs must be assessed for all parties involved, in both the regulated region and 
the unregulated region. However, the regulated region will also need to assess the social 
outcome: if all regions include a greenhouse gas cost, will the total social cost also decrease? 
Since the impact of carbon emissions is regional, total reduction in emissions can be more 
important than a local reduction in emissions. While not directly related to carbon emissions, 
local air pollution can be estimated along with greenhouse gas emissions. Increasing harm to 
public health is likely to primary concern if power plants are located in populated areas. 
Another aspect of emissions that is crucial to consider is how emissions are counted, both in 
assessing leakage and contract shuffling [147]. California does not want to increase carbon 
emissions in outside regions due to their own carbon regulations. Similarly, replacing slightly 
cleaner imports with high emitting resources outside of the EIM would also counter carbon 
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reduction goals. Assessing any new carbon model should calculate leakage using both the 
traditional and proposed definitions.  
The third type of criterion is distribution of benefits and costs. Any new model should ask 
who wins and who loses (among the regions and between producers and consumers), calculating 
gains or losses in consumer surplus and producer surplus [146], [189]. It should further analyze 
the opportunities for gaming or strategic behavior, and any increased opportunities for a 
participant to exercise market power. Related, a fourth category for assessment is pricing [143]. 
Each method must ensure that resulting prices are supporting for both regulated and unregulated 
participants [27]. It must also determine how prices will be calculated. What part of the GHG 
costs will be incorporated and who will pay for the additional costs?  
The last two criteria are political impact and logistics. Neither necessarily produce 
quantitative results, but are necessary for actual implementation. Whether or not a region 
implements a cap-and-trade scheme or a carbon tax is highly dependent on the political will of 
the legislators and voters [160], [190]. If a region would like to be seen as a green leader, or even 
an independent state leader, implementing GHG models might be easier. There can be legal 
challenges, such as concerns about the Commerce Clause of the US Constitution [191], or a push 
for environmental justice. Logistically, ease of implementation is a primary concern. What are the 
costs to campaign for the change, to educate participants and consumers, and to implement it in 
software? Finally, it is more likely to take effect if the process and outcomes are transparent.  
Trade and coordination are a challenging task for system operators, one made all the more 
difficult due to renewable energy integration and emissions targets that are not coordinated 
among sub-regions in an electricity market. This chapter modeled and simulated electricity and 
emissions markets that directly incorporate emissions allowances and attempt to reduce carbon 
leakage. Although no one method dominates the rest, the framework used and criteria discussed 
can be applied to investigate new methods as they are proposed. The results from this simple 
example show that the system state can have a significant impact on calculations of leakage. Any 
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future comparisons of different proposed models will benefit from analysis of a range of 
conditions within the network. Given interest in cap-and-trade schemes across the U.S., further 




CHAPTER 5  
COORDINATION OF TRADE 
BETWEEN BALANCING AREAS  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Managing the flow of electricity between adjacent electric grids is a challenging task for any 
system operator. Difficulties can arise when determining rules for trade, ensuring each side see 
benefits, and coalescing contradicting policies. These difficulties are inflated when renewable 
energy and environmental concerns are involved. Wind and solar energy are prevalent in 
different parts of the country, and not necessarily co-located with load centers. Trading that 
power across regional boundaries can create problems for system operators, who aim to 
maximize market surplus given local policies and rules on emissions reductions.  
This chapter focuses on two aspects of trade and coordination between regions: trade 
between time periods and trade considering externalities. Within a single market there are many 
difficulties to modeling trade, difficulties that are exacerbated by the existence of multiple market 
auctions in time. Markets in the U.S. operate a day-ahead market cleared on an hourly basis and a 
real-time market cleared on a five and/or fifteen minute basis. As discussed in previous chapters, 
electricity is sold in both day-ahead markets and real-time or balancing markets. Trade between 




In order to accommodate the variability and uncertainty from renewable energy, many in the 
literature have proposed changes to operations, including increasing the size of balancing areas 
(BAs). Balancing areas are regions that balance their supply and demand independently; they can 
be connected through intertie lines, but still operate their own set of resources. Larger areas will 
see less variability compared to small balancing areas, making it advantageous to optimize over 
one large area [9]. The trend toward making larger balancing areas will allow more efficient 
utilization of resources (e.g., scheduling of reserves, unit commitment, etc.), decrease peak 
generation requirements, and increase the minimum load level. However, there are trade-offs 
that are made when network size increases. This chapter focuses on economic trade-offs, but 
enlargement also involves computational challenges. Larger system sizes create bigger models 
with more nodes and variables, which make incorporating additional complexities into system 
operations difficult. Furthermore, as system size increases, it becomes more difficult to solve 
scheduling models to optimality (larger duality gaps, etc. become necessary because of the model 
size), so the putative efficiency improvements of enlarging balancing areas might not be realized.  
Consolidating balancing areas will increase the number of variable resources and the extent 
of the geographic area where the resources are located. While this might reduce the impact of 
output variability, it might not significantly impact the effects of forecast uncertainty. Renewable 
energy will produce uncertainty in the day-ahead forecast, which will increase as the penetration 
of renewables grows. In order to assess the impacts of balancing area consolidation in the 
presence of a high penetration of renewable energy, models for resource scheduling are created 
and compared. By comparing market models from different time frames, it can become apparent 
which types of coordination provide the greatest benefits and lowest costs. The questions of 
coordination and consolidation are especially relevant in the Western U.S. today; there are 




The second half of the chapter concentrates on balancing area coordination considering the 
complicating factor of externalities, particularly, cases when each balancing area values an 
externality asymmetrically. An externality is a cost or consequence that is incurred outside of the 
market setting. Environmental externalities can be challenging to price. If they are local like 
particulate matter pollution, the surrounding community is harmed. However, externalities like 
carbon emissions from power plants do not stay local and are not necessarily created locally; they 
impact the region and even global communities. If one balancing area aims to reduce its 
consumption of carbon emissions, it must consider all imports, and not solely the power plants 
in the target region. The challenge becomes ensuring imports do not also increase emissions, 
especially if the exporting balancing area does not aim to reduce emissions to the same degree.  
Similar to the first half of the chapter, the Western U.S. is an ideal case study. California has 
implemented a cap-and-trade system for carbon emissions while also completely consolidating 
the real-time market with surrounding balancing areas. These regions have not implemented a 
carbon reduction scheme, but still want to sell to California customers. Several proposals for 
coordinating the trade have been proposed, and each will be evaluated for its ability to reduce 
carbon emissions, maximize market surplus, and price energy consistent with economic 
incentives. The proposals are compared against a first-best and do-nothing model.  
This chapter contributes to current literature through modeling of balancing area 
coordination in time – between market auctions, and in space – through incorporation of 
externalities. Simulations in the first half reveal that increased trade in one market does not mean 
overall economic efficiency increases; all temporal interactions must be evaluated. Market models 
in the second half judge proposals for incorporating carbon emissions, finding all have 
downsides without any one dominating for both cost and emissions reduction. Both simulations 
use hurdle rates to model trade, demonstrating their simplicity as a modeling tool and 
disadvantage as a means to capture complexity.  
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5.2 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Research on balancing areas, and more generally seams issues, is an ongoing and prevalent 
topic in the power systems literature [193]. Although some issues are specific to particular areas 
or regions, many issues span countries and markets. Much of the literature can be divided into 
those that accept a means of coordination and simulate policies or assess costs, and those that 
attempt to optimize coordination. This project chooses to accept the current coordination 
mechanisms as given, and simulate different schemes.35 Literature on each topic shows the depth 
of complexity that exists at the seams.  
With increased integration of renewable energy, many in the literature have turned to 
balancing area coordination. There are many types of coordination among regions, with two 
extremes being complete consolidation and no trade or harmonization. The former refers to two 
areas joining or merging together; in an electricity market context, it entails optimizing both 
networks together in a single optimization problem. As an example, in 2013, Entergy joined the 
Midcontinent ISO [194]. MISO was then tasked with the joint optimization of the Entergy utility 
regions along with their existing footprint.  
While there are many economic rationales for consolidation, renewable energy is increasingly 
encouraging regions to consider the benefits of consolidation, or at least further coordination.  
An early review paper on wind integration methods referenced balancing area coordination and 
consolidation as being important to minimizing the cost of renewable integration [136]. They 
suggest that increasing the size of balancing areas will help small systems balance variability, and 
will lead to fewer hours when expensive peaking units are needed. The proposal did not specify 
how areas should consolidate; however [195] emphasizes that consolidation does not need to 
                                                     
35 The later area of literature considers the different modeling techniques to improve passing 
information across seams. Seminal work in the area uses decomposition techniques proposed by 
Kim and Baldick [242], [243] for solving large scale optimal power flow problems (OPF). 
Additional work of interest can be found in [244] and [245], which focus on the type and amount 




solely come from physical consolidation, but also from what they call virtual consolidation, 
meaning sub-hourly scheduling, preforming economic dispatch in larger regions, and dynamic 
scheduling. In discussing the key drivers for large-scale wind integration, [196] also argues for 
better inter-regional coordination, which includes ancillary service markets, imbalance 
settlements and capacity calculations. An NREL report on the Western Interconnection showed 
that when balancing areas are aggregated, both the average and the maximum ramping needed 
are significantly less than each area individually [88]. Kirby and Milligan have written a series of 
papers concerning balancing areas as it relates to wind integration: analyzing ramping capability 
in regions with high penetration [197], utilizing sub-hourly markets to ease  integration [198], 
and analysis of results in a 2008 NREL report [199]. Although the conclusions are insightful, 
these studies differ in methodology from this project, as they do not perform a rigorous power 
flow analysis of the consequences.  
The literature specific to the European network is extensive, largely due to the continual 
integration of the European day-ahead market. An examination of centralized market clearing for 
coordinating power exchanges and pools in Europe can be found in [200], [201] and [202]. The 
authors in [203] describe problems that arise when using an LMP through simple market 
coupling examples, such as price ranges and single prices in networks without congestion. An 
additional detailed discussion of the European market coupling and modeling, especially 
considering the cooperation of the transmission system operator, can be found in [204]. The 
impacts of renewable variability across Europe are analyzed in [205], where the impacts of 
increasing transmission infrastructure vary depending on the penetration of renewables. The 
research on integration in Europe is often specific to a set of countries; for example, studies on 
coordination studies have been done for Northern Europe [113] and the Netherlands/Belgium 
[206]. Although their study is based in Europe, the authors in [207] propose a generalized day-
ahead and real-time coordination model to analyze the interactions between regions, solved as 
stochastic mixed complementarity problem.  
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While the comparisons are similar to those proposed in this project, the solution method 
and analysis differ. Both compare two-period two-zone models, and this project further extends 
that analysis to include impacts of renewable policies in each region and uses modeling that is 
not just theoretical, but could currently be implemented by a system operator. This project 
differs from general balancing literature because it uses a power flow market model to assess the 
impacts of coordination. It also contrasts from much of the European literature because it 
explores the impacts of renewable policies and specific U.S. inter-regional barriers.  There is a 
distinct difference between European market design and markets run by regional transmission 
operations in the U.S.; rigorous analysis has not been previously performed considering 
characteristics of a U.S. market, such as nodal pricing and real-time coordination of markets. 
5.3 BENEFITS OF SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL COORDINATION  
Combining balancing areas will increase the number of variable resources and the geographic 
area where the resources are located. While the resulting diversity of sources and loads might 
reduce the impact of output variability, it does not necessarily reduce the economic costs of 
forecast uncertainty. Day-ahead forecasts of renewable energy are uncertain, and this uncertainty 
will increase as the penetration of renewables grows [208]. This section assesses costs and prices 
for different levels of coordination between adjacent balancing areas, and also considers the 
influence of variable renewables and flexible resources on system costs. In particular, the 
question addressed here is: 
What are  the  e conomic  and re l iabi l i ty - r e lated  bene f i t s  and cos t s  o f  al t e rnat ive  
approaches  to  coupl ing  ne ighbor ing  ba lanc ing  areas ,  rang ing  f rom comple t e  merger  to  
part ia l  coord inat ion o f  e l e c t r i c i ty  markets?  
Three different levels of coordination are compared for both day-ahead and real-time 
markets, which are the two most common types of power markets. Most coupling proposals 
address one or the other those market types. Complete consolidation and minimal coordination 
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are compared against the use of a hurdle rate to control trade between the regions. This 
comparison on a test (hypothetical) system will reveal the drawbacks, both economic and 
reliability-related, of each coordination type, and act as a basis for further comparisons of 
renewable policies. The two models used for the day-ahead and real-time market are described 
below.  
The unit commitment (UC) model commits and schedules all generation resources for each 
hour in the following day and is sometimes used to model several weeks of commitments. 
Generator constraints are included in the UC model to allow for the binary on/off commitment 
decisions. Each generator submits a two-part or three-part bid, where one part is the marginal 
cost of operating the generator and the other two are fixed costs, such as the expense of starting 
up and maintaining minimum load. Variable resources submit estimated production output, and 
system operators often input additional forecasts to reduce uncertainty. After the UC is run, the 
system operator will announce the committed generators and the resulting prices. The 
mathematical formulation for the day-ahead model is a typical unit commitment model with 
generator characteristics and network constraints, the formulation is in Section 5.4.2.a. 
The real-time (RT) or dispatch model (called a balancing model in the European context) 
dispatches generators for the following 5-minute period up to several hours. Depending on the 
type of resources available, the model can commit fast-start units and dispatch resources such as 
demand response and energy storage. Units that have been previously committed can be 
dispatched up or down, and their cost functions now only reflect the marginal cost of delivering 
power without the fixed cost components. Variable resources can submit updated forecasts, as 
the market is closer to real-time; although day-ahead forecast errors will be higher, real-time 
forecasting errors exist as well. Like the day-ahead market, the simulation also outputs a 
commitment schedule, dispatch level, and set of prices for each node. The mathematical 
formulation for the real-time market makes modifications to the day-ahead market, and similarly 
does not contribute to literature or understanding of coordination research; the model can be 
 
 172 
found in Section 5.4.2.b. The following section describes additions made to the two-market 
models in order to simulate coordination.   
5.4 DAY-AHEAD AND REAL-TIME MARKETS 
5.4.1 Description 
In order to analyze the economic impact of coordination between markets, three different 
simulations are proposed for each time scale (day-ahead commitment and real-time 
dispatch/short-start commitment) involving varying degrees of cooperation: complete 
coordination (consolidation), trade with hurdle rates, and minimal coordination (described in 
detail below). Each of these three types can be implemented in either the day-ahead or real-time 
markets, giving combinations of simulations, as seen in Table 5-1, which also gives actual 
examples of some of the combinations. The simulations involve both the day-ahead and real-
time markets, simulating how day-ahead decisions constrain real-time decisions, creating nine 
models in total, one for each possible combination.  
For U.S. markets, the simulation diverges from actual operation in several ways. First, there 
is a simple reserve requirement constraint rather than a side ancillary services market with 
multiple products (spinning reserves, non-spinning reserves, regulation up and down, and/or 
flexible ramping product). Second, there are no virtual bidders in either market, which can 
provide day-ahead/real-time arbitrage; as a result, expected day-ahead can diverge from real-time 
prices, which can lower market efficiency [209], [210]. Therefore, it is possible that some of the 







Table 5-1 Coordination between select markets in the U.S. and Europe 
  Real-Time 












ERCOT & Rest of U.S.   
Hurdle Rate 
Most of Western U.S., 
EU non-market splitting 










These degrees of coordination mimic existing markets, which are contained in the boxes of 
Table 5-1. For instance, the California Independent System Operator has a fully integrated real-
time market with many of its neighbors, called the Energy Imbalance Market (EIM). However, 
the day-ahead markets of these balancing authorities are not presently integrated and rely on 
rules and bilateral contracts to coordinate trade; therefore, it falls into the hurdle rate day-ahead / 
full integration real-time box. In Europe, markets are coupled in day-ahead, with a central market 
mechanism called EUPHEMIA [211]. In real-time, each transmission system operator balances 
their own region independently, which puts them in the full-integration day-ahead / minimal 
coordination real-time box. Some of the models are not necessarily practiced; for instance, if two 
markets have minimal coordination in the day-ahead market, it might be impractical to then fully 
integrate in real-time. This list in Table 5-1 not exhaustive but provides some real-world 
relevance to the simulations since most markets trade to some degree with their neighbors 
and/or use bilateral contracts, at least day-ahead. 
The models can be simulated for any number of regions or countries. Many regions, 
especially in Europe, must balance interactions with many neighbors. In the U.S., there are often 
pairs of regions interacting due to the size of markets. New England-ISO shares a U.S. border 
with only New York ISO; California shares many state borders, but they are the only organized 
auction market (at present) in the Western U.S. This chapter chooses to model only two regions 
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so that the outcomes and benefits can be easily distinguished. The following subsection describes 
the mathematical formulations for a basic unit commitment and real-time market model.  
5.4.2 Mathematical Formulations 
5.4.2.a Basic Day-Ahead Unit Commitment Market Model 
Equations (5-1)–(5-22) are considered the basic day-ahead unit commitment model for this 
project and will be used as the base model for the various comparisons. The basic formulation is 
based on [212], [213], with minimum up time constraints and ramping constraints from [214]. 
The objective of the model is to minimize operating costs, which consist of fixed costs for 
startup and no-load conditions, as well as the marginal cost for the power dispatched. In this 
basic UC model, a simple objective is used; however, more complex formulations can be used 
depending on the cost function of the generators. Constraints (5-2)–(5-4) limit the power 
capacity, line generation limits, and voltage angle limits respectively. The dc power balance 
equation is shown in (5-5), which is a linear approximation of the ac real power flow equation. 
The origin and destination nodes are represented by m and n respectively.36 Constraints (5-6) and 
(5-7) define the startup and commitment status of the generator, where the variable v can either 
be 1 (startup occurs in that interval) or 0 (otherwise). The ramping capability of the generators is 
defined in (5-8) and (5-9), where (5-8) limits ramping up and (5-9) limits ramping down. 
Constraints (5-10) and (5-11) define the minimum up and down times for the generators during 
the 24 hour commitment period.  
                                                     
36 The real power transferred on line k from bus m to bus n is 
𝑃𝑘 = 𝑉𝑚
2𝐺𝑘 + 𝑉𝑚
2𝐺𝑚 − 𝑉𝑛𝑉𝑚(𝐺𝑘 cos(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛) + 𝐵𝑘 sin(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛)). For the linearized expression 
(dc power flow), we assume voltage magnitudes are close to one per unit, the shunt conductance 
is negligible, the susceptance is defined as 𝐵𝑘 = −1/𝑋𝑘, and the voltage angle difference on the 
line between the buses is small so that sin(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛) ≈ 𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛 and cos(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛) ≈ 1. The real 
power equation can then be reduced to 𝑃𝑘 = 𝐺𝑘 − 𝐺𝑘 − 𝐵𝑘(𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑛) = 𝐵𝑘(𝜃𝑛 − 𝜃𝑚). Many 
textbooks provide some explanation of the dc power flow, I find the book appendix chapter by 
Seifi and Sepasian to be the most similar to the notation I prefer [246].  
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Similar to the dispatch model, the wind injection can be curtailed in the node balance 
constraint (5-12), and is limited by the day-ahead forecast in (5-13). Demand can also be shed at 
a high cost, shown in (5-14), often called the value of lost load (VOLL). The reserve capacity of 
each generator in the system is shown in (5-15) and (5-16) for spinning reserve, and (5-17) for 
non-spinning reserve. Constraints (5-18)–(5-19) define the reserve requirements for spinning and 
non-spinning reserves. The first requirement is based on the NREL 3+5 rule, where 3% of 
demand and 5% of variable generation is required. The two percentages are represented by 𝛼 
and 𝛽, which can be adjusted as necessary depending on the system size, penetration, and risk 
aversion. The second requirement states there must be enough reserve to withstand the loss of 
the single largest generator A small percentage of wind is also included in these constraints to 
ensure enough reserve is available in case of a wind contingency. Spinning requirements must 
account for half of each rule (5-18) and (5-20), while spinning and non-spinning together 
account for the full reserve requirement (5-19) and (5-21). Finally, the commitment variable 
defining the status of a generator is restricted to be a binary variable in (5-22). The variable and 
parameter definitions can be found in the Notation section at the beginning of the dissertation.  







Subject to  
𝑝𝑔,𝑡 ≥ 𝑢𝑔,𝑡𝑃𝑔
min, ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡      (5-2) 
𝐹𝑘
min ≤ 𝑓𝑘,𝑡 ≤ 𝐹𝑘
max, ∀ 𝑘, 𝑡    (5-3) 
−𝜃max ≤ 𝜃𝑖(𝑘),𝑡 − 𝜃𝑗(𝑘),𝑡 ≤ 𝜃
max, ∀ 𝑘, 𝑡   (5-4) 
𝑓𝑘,𝑡 = 𝐵𝑘(𝜃𝑛(𝑘),𝑡 − 𝜃𝑚(𝑘),𝑡), ∀ 𝑘, 𝑡  (5-5) 
𝑣𝑔,𝑡 ≥ 𝑢𝑔,𝑡 − 𝑢𝑔,𝑡−1, ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡  (5-6) 
0 ≤ 𝑣𝑔,𝑡 ≤ 1, ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡  (5-7) 
𝑝𝑔,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑔,𝑡−1 ≤ 𝑅𝑔𝑢𝑔,𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝑔
SU(𝑣𝑔,𝑡), ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 > 1  (5-8) 
𝑝𝑔,𝑡−1 − 𝑝𝑔,𝑡 ≤ 𝑅𝑔𝑢𝑔,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑔





≤ 𝑢𝑔,𝑡 , ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 ≥ 𝜏𝑔




𝑟=𝑡+1 ≤ 1 − 𝑢𝑔,𝑡 , ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡 ≤ |𝑇| − 𝜏𝑔
DT  (5-11) 
∑ 𝑓𝑘,𝑡 −∀𝑘∈𝛿+(𝑖) ∑ 𝑓𝑘,𝑡∀𝑘∈𝛿−(𝑖) + ∑ 𝑝𝑔,𝑡∀𝑔∈𝑔(𝑖) + 𝑤𝑖,𝑡
inj





≤ 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 , ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡  (5-13) 
0 ≤ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
max , ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡  (5-14) 
𝑟𝑔,𝑡
SP ≤ 𝑢𝑔,𝑡𝑃𝑔
max − 𝑝𝑔,𝑡 ,   ∀𝑔, 𝑡  (5-15) 
𝑟𝑔,𝑡
SP ≤ 𝑅𝑔
10𝑢𝑔,𝑡 ,   ∀𝑔, 𝑡  (5-16) 
𝑟𝑔,𝑡
NSP ≤ 𝑅𝑔






[𝛼 ∑ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡∀𝑖 + 𝛽 ∑ 𝑊𝑖,𝑡∀𝑖 ],   ∀𝑡  (5-18) 
∑ (𝑟𝑔,𝑡
SP + 𝑟𝑔,𝑡







SP + 𝛽 ∑ 𝑊𝑖,𝑡∀𝑖 ],   ∀𝑔, 𝑡   (5-20) 
∑ (𝑟𝑔′,𝑡
SP + 𝑟𝑔′,𝑡
NSP)∀𝑔′ ≥ 𝑝𝑔,𝑡 + 𝑟𝑔,𝑡
SP + 𝛽 ∑ 𝑊𝑖,𝑡∀𝑖 ,   ∀𝑔, 𝑡   (5-21) 




5.4.2.b Basic Real-Time Market Model 
Equations (3.0)-(3.11) are a basic economic dispatch model or an imbalance model. This 
program is used for real-time simulations and fixes the commitments of the slow generators 
from the day-ahead model (𝑢𝑔,𝑡
∗ ). The fast generators are not fixed, and allowed to turn on during 
the day, for example, 15 minutes ahead of being dispatched. The objective of the model 
minimizes dispatch costs, which consist of the product of the linear cost and the power 
dispatched. Constraints (3.1)-(3.3) limit the power capacity, line generation limits, and voltage 
angle limits respectively. The dc power balance equation is shown in (3.4), which is a linear 
approximation of the ac real power flow equation. Constraints (3.1)-(3.4) are the same as (1.1)-
(1.4) in the UC model. The ramping capability of the generators is defined in (3.5). Since the 
commitment of the slow generators is fixed, (3.6) specifies that the commitment variable cannot 
vary from the fixed schedule. The wind generation is deterministic, since the model mimics real-
time; however, wind curtailment is allowed. The node balance constraint is in (3.8). Constraints 
(3.9) and (3.10) limit the wind injected into the system, 𝑤𝑖,𝑡
inj
, and the demand between zero and 
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their respective maximums, forecast and load. Finally, the commitment status variable is 
constrained between 1 and 0 in (3.11); this will only affect the fast generators. 








Subject to  
𝑢𝑔,𝑡𝑃𝑔
min ≤ 𝑝𝑔,𝑡 ≤ 𝑢𝑔,𝑡𝑃𝑔
max, ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡  (5-24) 
𝐹𝑘
min ≤ 𝑓𝑘,𝑡 ≤ 𝐹𝑘
max, ∀ 𝑘, 𝑡  (5-25) 
𝜃min ≤ 𝜃𝑖(𝑘),𝑡 − 𝜃𝑗(𝑘),𝑡 ≤ 𝜃
max, ∀ 𝑘, 𝑡  (5-26) 
𝑓𝑘,𝑡 = 𝐵𝑘(𝜃𝑛(𝑘),𝑡 − 𝜃𝑚(𝑘),𝑡), ∀ 𝑘, 𝑡  (5-27) 
−𝑢𝑔,𝑡𝑅𝑔 ≤ 𝑝𝑔,𝑡 − 𝑝𝑔,𝑡−1 ≤ 𝑢𝑔,𝑡𝑅𝑔, ∀ 𝑔, 𝑡  (5-28) 
𝑢𝑔,𝑡 = 𝑢𝑔,𝑡
∗ , ∀𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑤 , 𝑡 (5-29) 
∑ 𝑓𝑘,𝑡 −∀𝑘∈𝛿+(𝑖) ∑ 𝑓𝑘,𝑡∀𝑘∈𝛿−(𝑖) + ∑ 𝑝𝑔,𝑡∀𝑔∈𝑔(𝑖) + 𝑤𝑖,𝑡
inj
= 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ,   ∀𝑖, 𝑡  (5-30) 
0 ≤ 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐷𝑖,𝑡
max , ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡  (5-31) 
0 ≤ 𝑤𝑖,𝑡
inj
≤ 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 , ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡  (5-32) 
𝑢𝑔,𝑡 ∈ {0,1} ∀𝑔, 𝑡  (5-33) 
  
5.5 SIMULATIONS OF COORDINATED MARKETS  
5.5.1  Simulation 1: Consolidation  
 As an ideal benchmark for efficiency, the first simulation treats the two systems as one 
single balancing area, which would apply to both types of markets. This would occur if two 
adjacent regions combined balancing needs for all generation and load, and decided to schedule 
resources together in either the day-ahead or real-time. The Energy Imbalance Market, which 
includes the California ISO and several neighboring utilities, is such an example for the real-time 
market. The model would consist of the objective and constraints in the Appendix (0, equation 
numbers below refer to the equations in that appendix). The generator set would include 
generation from both areas as a single input and all intertie lines would allow power to flow 
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following Kirchhoff’s laws and the transmission line limit. The output of the model would show 
the schedule and operating cost for a single deterministic balancing area.  
The below outlines in schematic form the two versions of this model 
Consolidation Model  
Day-ahead version        Real-time version 
Objective    (5-1)       Objective    (5-23)  
Constraints (5-2)-(5-22)       Constraints (5-24)-(5-33) 
 
5.5.2  Simulation 2: Minimal Coordination  
The second simulation models a case where the two areas are solved with minimal 
coordination. Although the worst case scenario would likely result from solving the two areas as 
completely independent (i.e., open breakers on the intertie lines), that is not realistic for the 
present power system. The minimal coordination case likely the best case without direct trade, 
since there is some cooperation between where flows occur. The network modeling assumed ac 
linkages, therefore coordination within one of the three interconnections in the U.S.37 Although 
dc linkages could be modeled, the use of dc lines can be directed, and would require different 
assumptions about contracts within the region.  
The model is similar to the basic UC with the addition of a constraint and a change to the 
reserve. The additional constraint, (5-34), limits the sum of the flows on the intertie lines to be 
zero; this same constraint is added to the real-time model (notation can be found at the 
beginning of the dissertation in a section called Notation). Power can flow between the two 
                                                     
37 The U.S. is divided into three major interconnections, meaning all power operates at the same 
frequency within the region [247]. The Western Interconnection reaches from Canada to Mexico, 
from the Pacific Ocean to the Rocky Mountains. The Eastern Interconnection is comprised of 
many sub-regions for reliability, also extending into Canada and from the Atlantic Ocean to the 
Rockies. Finally much of Texas is electrically isolated, with a single market and balancing 
authority called ERCOT.  
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systems on individual lines, but the net across all lines for each hour must sum to zero. Any 
flows due to previous transactions would also necessarily sum to zero, leaving a zero net 
imbalance. The reserve requirements for this system are determined for each area individually. 
Instead of a system wide requirement, the amount of additional contingency reserve is 
determined with requirement by area. The requirement itself does not change, but the generators 
available to meet the requirement are limited by area, as was examined in Section 3.3.2.d.  
∑ 𝑓𝑘,𝑡
∀𝑘∈𝐾IT
= 0,   ∀𝑡 (5-34) 
 
Minimal Coordination Model  
Day-ahead version        Real-time version 
Objective    (5-1)       Objective    (5-23)  
Constraints (5-2)-(5-22),(5-34)     Constraints (5-24)-(5-33),(5-34) 
 
5.5.3  Simulation 3: Trade with Hurdle Rates 
5.5.3.a Factors that Lead to the Use of  Hurdle Rates 
In reality, there are many types and degrees of coordination beyond consolidation and the 
minimal coordination model. Inter-region coordination can occur between individual parties or 
through the system operator (a market operator or a utility). Individual participants in a balancing 
area can create bilateral contracts with one another to hedge the risk of day-ahead and real-time 
price spikes. These contracts are private information, and usually extend for long terms. For 
example, a solar farm in Nevada can sell its output to a city in California for the first ten years 
after it is commissioned; agreements like this are known as Power Purchase Agreements, and can 
help finance renewable projects. On the demand side, a utility that wants to ensure customers 
have a stable price might sign a bilateral contract with a supplier who then bears the risk of price 
volatility and provides power through a mix of its own output and purchases from the spot and 
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bilateral bulk markets. These contracts tend to make up a large part of the energy market; in 
2016, the PJM market was composed of 12.9% bilateral contracts [215].  
From the system operator perspective, there are several opportunities for coordination with 
neighboring regions. As a means of partial consolidation, operators can establish transfers 
through dynamic scheduling or pseudo-tie lines [216]. When a resource is physically located 
outside of a balancing area, it can serve load in that balancing area by using a dynamic schedule. 
The dynamic schedule depends on communication and metering between the areas to account 
for changes in energy. If no physical ties exist between the resource and the balancing area, a 
pseudo-tie line can be used to transport energy. It relies on adjusting controls between the two 
areas, called Area Control Error (ACE),  called Area Control Error (ACE), to account for 
changing energy use. The resource is used as if it was part of the target balancing area; in this 
way, a wind farm in Montana to be dispatched to serve California load as if it were a California 
resource. 
Both bilateral contracts and operator actions can cause issues because they rely on 
availability of inter-tie capacity. Each has a means of reserving and paying for transmission across 
the network, but the use of these different products can cause complications when modeling. To 
ease the strain of modeling many types of products and reservations on lines, hurdle rates can be 
used as a proxy.  
5.5.3.b Defining Hurdle Rates 
Modeling trade between neighbors can be difficult for both technical and political reasons. 
The model must make assumptions about how much information is shared between the two 
areas and the depth of detail. Realistic modeling might take many iterations to determine an 
appropriate hurdle rate, which can be time intensive for an operational market. Each BA can also 
have its own set of rules, making a generic model nearly impossible. Due to the many 
complexities that arise between regions, most models choose to model inter-regional trade with a 
hurdle rate [217]. A hurdle rate is a simple price per megawatt that is placed on the intertie line(s) 
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from one region to another. The price is determined exogenously, which can act as “resistance” 
to flow on the line; it represents the minimum price difference that will cause power to flow on 
the line or a minimum benefit for a transaction to take place.   
A hurdle rate can be simply modeled with an addition to the objective and constraint (5-37), 
where 𝑆𝑡
AB and 𝑆𝑡
BA are the net flow on the intertie lines in one direction, and 𝐻𝑡 is the hurdle 
rate. The initial simulations used a $3/MWh hurdle rate, which is in the range of hurdle rates 
used in power flow simulations of the West [170], [218] (which can range from $0.53/MWh to 
$14/MWh). The same constraint flow constraint in (5-37) is added to the real-time model. 
 






























Hurdle Rate Model  
day-ahead objective    (5-35)     real-time objective    (5-36) 
day-ahead constraints (5-2)-(5-22), (5-37)   real-time constraints (5-24)-(5-33), (5-37)  
 
5.6 RESULTS  
A basic unit commitment model was created using AIMMS modeling software, version 3.13. 
The model is a deterministic model with two balancing areas, and a total of 73 buses. The input 
electrical system for the network is adapted from the three-zone Reliability Test System 1996 
from [219], shown in Figure 5-1. The wind input data is developed from historical wind speed 
data from NREL wind site 3776 in California [220]. The bus, generator, and load data are in the 
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Appendix. A total of nine simulations were run, including all combinations described in Table 
5-1.  
 
Figure 5-1 IEEE RTS 96 test case 
 
The total cost of the IEEE Test System can be found in Table 5-2. The hurdle rate and full 
integration models (lower 2x2 quadrant) were almost the same, resulting in costs within the MIP 
gap. The cases where each market was not coordinated in the day-ahead but was coordinated in 
real-time (first row) resulted in higher costs, the highest being when real-time was also not 
coordinated. The worst cases of the nine resulted when there was minimal coordination in real-
time, but some coordination in the day-ahead market (either a hurdle rate or consolidation). 
These cases resulted in a large amount of load shedding, leading to a considerable amount of lost 
load costs in the objective. Note that these cases would have been infeasible without including 
load shedding as a variable.  
A similar result occurs when we look at average prices over the 24-hour time period from 
the day-ahead and real-time markets in Table 5-3. The hurdle rate and integration cases, in any 
combination, result in the same averages over the course of the day for each of the markets. 
Similarly, when there is minimal coordination in the day-ahead market and any amount in real-
time, the average prices remain the same for each of the markets. The significant difference 
occurs when there is minimal coordination in real time and any amount of coordination in the 
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day-ahead market. Again, the models would have been infeasible without lost load. With a high 
cost of lost load (often referred to as the value of lost load or VOLL), the prices reflect the 
demand that cannot be met. 
Models using a higher hurdle rate are simulated, and the resulting prices for day-ahead and 
real-time are in Figure 5-2. The diagonal simulations are compared (minimal coordination in 
both day-ahead and real-time, full integration in both, etc.) against hurdle rates of $6/MWh and 
$10/MWh. Both increased rates had little impact on prices, lowering the percent change between 
day-ahead and real-time by a percentage.  
Table 5-2 Real-time total costs over 24 hours (million$) 
  Real-Time 












3.07 2.73 2.73 
Hurdle Rate 292 2.18 2.18 
Full Integration 308 2.18 2.17 
 
Table 5-3 Day-ahead and real-time prices ($/MWh) 
  Real-Time 












52 /   47 52 / 47 52 / 47 
Hurdle Rate 45 / 5240 45 / 32 45 / 32 
Full Integration 45 / 6214 45 / 32 45 / 32 
 
 
Figure 5-2 Change between day-ahead and real-time prices  
9% 

























































Finally, total costs can be compared against the total amount of trade occurring throughout 
the two regions. Figure 5-3 shows the nine simulations with total cost in $ and trade in MWh 
values for each, excluding the cost of load shedding (assuming emergency generators where 
turned on in response to added need). The day-ahead cost/trade value is shown as a square for 
each of the three types of coordination. The triangles show full integration, and have the lowest 
cost and highest trade values in the comparison. The hurdle rate simulation is close behind or 
takes on the same value in the case of minimal coordination in day-ahead.  The figure shows 
even with some kind of coordination in real-time, the lack of coordination in day-ahead leads of 
higher costs and less trade.  
 
 
Figure 5-3 Total costs compared net trade as a percent of demand  
5.7 DISCUSSION  
This chapter analyzes trade and coordination between neighboring balancing areas. The first 
part, Section 5.3, examines the interactions between balancing areas in time (through the day-
ahead and real-time markets) and space (through a spectrum of coordination). The second part, 
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Section 4.2.1, evaluates models for trading externalities (emissions) in a spot market. Each 
compares different models for trade; the first part aims to find inefficiencies between markets, 
while the second focuses on a second-best model for trade considering externalities. The 
simulations use simple models for ease of understand the results, and the lessons might show 
broad trends, but are also dependent on the system and data utilized. 
Trade between balancing areas can cause issues for most regions throughout the world with 
liberalized markets. Frequent problems have arisen between countries in Europe and states in the 
U.S. because each region can establish different laws and policies. Those policies can vary 
depending on the time frame. As explained in Section 5.3, the rules for day-ahead markets can 
differ from the rules for real-time or balancing markets. In Europe, there is centralized market 
clearing in day-ahead and independent balancing in real-time. In the West the opposite occurs; 
the day-ahead market sees trade between regions and there exists a real-time fully consolidated 
market, the Energy Imbalance Market, operated by California ISO. While each region has 
progressed over time, each chose to coordinate inversely across time. Coordination will become 
more important as the penetration of wind energy grows. Spatial diversity is an important aspect 
for successful wind integration, and increased trade between regions can help accommodate 
wind.  
Section 5.3 analyzes methods for coordination in time and with a simple model, finds that 
not all means of coordination produce the same results. Results from the IEEE Test Case find 
the amount of coordination in the day-ahead market has a direct impact on the efficiency of the 
real-time market. With either full integration or use of a hurdle rate in the day-ahead market and 
either type of coordination in real-time, the market outcomes are very similar. Both sets of 
simulations see similar costs and prices.  
However, with some kind of coordination in day-ahead and minimal coordination in real-
time (like some areas in European), the real-time simulation for the Test Case is infeasible. As 
the model allows for load shedding, costs skyrocket due to the high value placed on shedding 
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customers. This simple case shows manual commitment of generators or used of expensive 
emergency generation would be necessary since there is not enough generation online. Since 
there are not massive blackouts in regions with this trading scheme, these results do not 
necessarily scale to real systems. They are a reminder for policy makers that decisions to 
coordinate trade in one time scale might benefit that market, but might not benefit the system as 
a whole. It is important to evaluate the impacts markets can have on each other, rather than a 






CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSIONS 
The four projects that make up this dissertation attempt to identify and improve 
inefficiencies in the electric power grid. Some of the inefficiencies are due to existing market 
issues while others have arisen due to the influx of renewable energy and the implementation of 
policies addressing greenhouse gas emissions. The electric power system is extremely complex 
and making any one change can have great and unexpected impacts on other parts of the grid. 
Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 each take a complex market or operational issue and use optimization-
based operations planning and market simulation models to suggest solutions and efficiency 
improvements.   
Chapter 2 begins with a basic model of day-ahead system operations and explains how even 
a simple model produces great complexity. Pricing from the unit commitment problem is not 
straightforward, and any change to current practice must consider how incentives for both 
supply and demand are impacted. The Dual Pricing Algorithm is a proposed model that attempts 
to satisfy certain economic criteria concerning efficiency and allocation of prices, while 
maintaining the efficient generator and demand schedules. Its development recognizes the need 
for rules to accompany any proposed pricing mechanism, since pricing rules should be enacted in 
cooperation with procedures ensuring incentive compatibility. The necessity for rules also 
impacts Chapter 3, where reserve coordination must follow a set of rules. The simulations in 
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Chapter 3 identified reserve coordination between countries as having the greatest net 
improvement compared to the other proposed adjustments. However, in order to appreciate the 
benefits of coordinated reserve procurement, each country must agree to a set of rules. 
Disagreement over rules or procedures can decrease trade, lessening the potential surplus due to 
coordination.  
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 all compare proposed and existing models to identify their relative 
economic and efficiency benefits. The purpose of each chapter is different, but the evaluation 
metrics they share are financial benefits and integration of renewable energy. Chapter 3 finds 
coordinating reserves in the balancing or real-time markets of neighboring systems lowers system 
costs for the case study. Chapter 4 shows how modeling dispatch and environmental costs under 
alternative carbon and electricity trade policies can tradeoff emissions reductions for higher 
costs. Finally, the test case in Chapter 5 shows coordination in day-ahead markets without 
coordination in real-time might lead to higher system costs due to balancing actual operations in 
real-time. 
Power system operations and markets tie each chapter together, where the unit commitment 
model is a linchpin for analysis for three out of the four chapters. Chapter 2 proposes a new 
method for pricing, using the simplest unit commitment problem in order to better analyze the 
impacts of modeling changes on prices. The unit commitment problem is what drives the new 
pricing proposal, which modifies the dual formulation of the classic unit commitment model in 
order to satisfy certain economic criteria. Chapter 4 also uses a simple model (dispatch only for a 
real-time market) to best evaluate how simple changes to pricing carbon between neighbors can 
impact costs and emissions. Chapters 3 and 5 use a more complex, dynamic unit commitment 
model including many generator characteristics to address system wide impacts of reserve and 
trade models respectively. Using an operations model in each chapter shows the importance of 
tailoring the model for the application at hand. Simple models can offer deep insights, and 
complex models allow for numerical answers in the context of practical applications. 
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Future work on the topics addressed in these chapters must account for technology 
innovations or market changes that will take place in the coming years and decades. Many 
tangible technologies will influence operation of the power grid; decreasing battery costs, smart 
grid devices to control ac power flow, and use of transmission switching might show significant 
improvements to power operations. Technology innovation can also greatly impact demand-side 
participation in markets. It is in its infancy, and extensive investments in physical technology and 
control software are underway to support further development in demand-side participation. 
Research into the role of aggregators has increased. Third-party companies might soon be able to 
submit a single offer on behalf of many smaller customers to wholesale market auctions, where 
participation from small customers might not be possible otherwise.  
The concept of a distribution system operator (DSO), to complement the ISO, has also 
gained popularity [221].  A DSO operator can have greater insight into the state of the 
distribution system to either take a passive or active role in coordinating distributed energy 
resources, such as rooftop solar. Finally, the increased use of blockchain technology might 
increase the ease of bilateral trades between neighbors, allowing a secondary market for “local” 
renewable energy [248]. These ideas and technology can provide means for demand to 
understand and participate in wholesale markets, finally achieving the demand side participation 
conceived by Schweppe et al. in Spot Pricing of Electricity [13].  
Thinking broadly about all market design issues raised in this dissertation, future work could 
reimagine existing market design; if a group of electricity experts started with a blank slate, would 
they imagine the market we have today? Without any existing infrastructure, what could 
electricity markets look like? Would this group still propose a wholesale spot and capacity 
market? Should a market with mostly zero cost resources look meaningfully different than the 
market today? These questions are of interest to many in the industry and would be a very 
worthwhile continuation of this research. 
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In the remainder of this chapter, I suggest some potentially useful and intellectually 
challenging research directions for each of the four problems addressed in my dissertation. Most 
suggestions are specific to the chapter’s topic, but some can apply to electricity market research 
generally. For instance, Chapters 2, 4, and 5 would benefit from larger test cases. Simple 
examples are necessary to learning the fundamental attributes of a model, but larger more 
complex systems can elucidate the trends that can be seen over time or alternate participant 
behavior. The proposed future work for Chapters 2-5 are described in Sections 6.1-6.4 
respectively.  
6.1 FUTURE WORK ON PRICING 
Electricity market pricing is complex and can often involve conflicting goals. Providing a 
transparent price might also incentivize generators to overbid. Ensuring non-confiscation of 
demand might interfere with incentive compatibility in elastic consumers, causing pay-as-bid 
incentives. The incentives for supply and demand given the complex cost structure of electricity 
and its lack of largescale economic storage make developing and implementing a single pricing 
method difficult. The method developed in Chapter 2, the Dual Pricing Algorithm, improves on 
several issues with current methods but does not solve all problems inherent in electricity 
pricing.  
Since the design of electricity pricing is a multi-objective problem, it can be useful to elicit 
expert and stakeholder opinions regarding the relative importance of different aims (e.g., signals 
for investment, marginal cost pricing), and then apply those value judgments to the ranking of 
different proposals. This approach is not exclusive to Chapter 2, seeking expert feedback to rank 
methods can be applied to any of the market design questions addressed in this dissertation. As 
future work, such a multi-objective comparison of pricing system alternatives could be carried 
out with different ISO employees, generator operators, financial investment firms, demand 
aggregators, economists, and regulators. By explicitly considering and valuing tradeoffs, better 
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justified recommendations concerning pricing mechanisms might emerge that are more 
consistent with stakeholder values [222], [223].  
More specifically for the proposed DPA method, several studies can be carried out to 
continue the work. One question that has arisen concerns strategic bidding. An ideal pricing 
system would incent truth-revealing, i.e., truthful bidding of costs would be the dominant 
strategy. However, this is an unattainable ideal for practical pricing systems. New pricing 
methods will change the bidding behavior of the players, so the exploration of exactly how each 
pricing method changes bidding behavior would be of great value to the industry. This can be 
accomplished through use of a game-theoretic model in which bidding is a strategic variable. 
This might be structured as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints [224], or by 
simulating the profit consequences of specific options for strategic bidding.  
For long-term planning, future work on pricing can include a study of investment decisions 
given different pricing mechanisms [47]. In Chapter 2, one motivation for the DPA is increasing 
price transparency in order to send a stronger investment signal. This is based on the assumption 
that having more information about a pricing point of entry (or the lowest cost point at which a 
generator can enter a market and recover costs) will be a stronger signal than the marginal cost 
alone. As future work, it would be beneficial to simulate investment decisions under DPA, 
ELMP, and other proposed methods. As mentioned in the literature review, there have been 
some studies of the investment incentives for other pricing methods and replicating or advancing 
on one of these studies would help establish the long-term incentives of different proposals. 
Some new resources have high marginal costs and low or no fixed operating costs. For instance, 
the investment cost of batteries is high, and they are not yet considered economically viable at a 
large scale [225]. If prices were higher in certain locations, it might incent investment in such 
resources, especially if they can act as both a generation and consumption resource. Simulations 
using different pricing mechanisms might change welfare dynamics, and it will be important to 
assess who wins and who loses in the long-run.  
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Over the past several years I have thought a great deal about pricing and its interaction with 
economics and engineering. As engineers, we must learn the principles that economists hold 
dear, fundamental theories that govern the markets. The economists I speak with about pricing 
either shudder at the notion of fixed ‘operating’ costs, exclaim at the idea of moving away from 
marginal cost pricing, or throw up their hands and declare there might not be a supporting price 
for electricity. Many of the issues discussed in Chapter 2 can have theoretical solutions, but as an 
engineer, I am constantly concerned with implementation.  
Given the constraints of the system as it stands in 2018, I am left with the belief that to 
uphold the principles in Chapter 2, pricing mechanisms need both an algorithm and associated 
rules. Rules, such as rules for uninstructed deviations described in Section 2.5.6, are needed to 
balance incentive incompatibility. For instance, a pricing method that moves away from marginal 
cost pricing might incentivize a generator to deviate from the optimal dispatch; when the price 
on its own does not incentivize staying on dispatch, a rule must be implemented to ensure 
compatibility. Any move away from marginal cost pricing raises concerns (and often panic). 
Because of the non-convexities in electricity markets, a pricing algorithm without rules is not 
likely to be enough to ensure markets remain incentive compatible for both supply and demand. 
As new proposals arise, both rules and algorithms should be assessed together. The methods and 
examples in this chapter can be used an initial framework to test the pricing outcomes.  
6.2 FUTURE WORK ON RESERVE IMPROVEMENTS 
As renewable penetration continues to grow, uncertainty and variability in the supply mix 
will increase. Although forecasting will improve over time, better reserve requirements will still 
be important for system reliability. The reserve study in Chapter 3 analyzed three improvements 
for reserve sizing, allocation, and activation. The improvements were chosen based on the 
perceived need in each area, but could be extended to include other concerns.  
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Instead of analyzing a simple reserve requirement, future work for the sizing phase could 
focus on some of the reserve proposals in the literature, such as probabilistic requirements. This 
could be especially useful since the comparison of a daily and seasonal requirement did not 
produce a significant difference in cost. Another possible improvement would be a separate 
coordination scenario where capacity on the lines was allocated for shared reserve. Both [92] and 
[114] found securing transmission line space to be an important aspect of trade, otherwise 
allowing increased trade between countries might not reduce costs. The simulations in Chapter 3 
do not hold any capacity on the lines, possibly understating the impact of reserve coordination. 
Simulating the reservation of transmission capability could confirm the results from existing 
studies with additional quantitative analysis, and show greater impacts of coordinated reserve.  
There are several areas where improved data or a different dataset can advance the analysis. 
For the contract-based analysis, gaining data on the quality, quantity, and price of existing 
contracts would enhance the comparison to the market-based case. The current comparison 
likely overestimates the costs, since the reserves were contracted based on a rule; however, there 
is no guarantee that the existing contracts would result in less costly solutions, since the details of 
those deals are private. Another area where additional data would enrich the simulations is the 
day-ahead wind forecast and actual wind generation data for multiple sites, along with 
contemporaneous load data. Newer data would reflect new wind sites and any changed inter-
country correlations between wind farms. There is also more planned offshore wind than 
currently exists, and additional data might provide more insight into the value of offshore wind 
compared to onshore farms.  Finally, simulations did not consider error in load forecasts, only 
wind forecasts. As discussed in Section 3.5.2, simulations with load forecast error would 
demonstrate the impacts of correlated wind and load on costs.  
The comparison of alternative adjustments would also be improved with additional 
generation data, specifically, data on individual generators in countries surrounding the 
Netherlands. While generation data for all of Europe would be difficult to obtain, additional 
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granularity on generators in Central Western Europe would provide more insight into the 
coordinated approaches. It might also change the reserve outcome; further correlation between 
countries might increase or decrease the requirement or increase congestion between countries. 
Finally, additional network data might provide further understanding to the amount of reserve 
that would be deliverable in real-time. Since the model only connects countries through a single 
line, actual delivery might increase or decrease depending on actual network congestion. A 
secondary real-time model with a granular network can answer questions on reserve deliverability 
and trade.  
The three improvements studied in Chapter 3 were specific to the European market and 
relevant to the needs of the Netherlands. Future studies could use this same framework to 
analyze other regions or countries around the world. A similar study could be done in the 
Western U.S. to analyze the benefits of coordinating reserves in the day-ahead market between 
the California market and Western states. Such a study would complement the EIM in the real-
time market and desire to form a west-wide ISO. Other regions can also use this framework to 
evaluate the benefits of making one or more improvements to existing reserve sizing, allocation, 
and activation.  
6.3 FUTURE WORK ON EMISSIONS TRADING IN REGIONS 
WITH ASYMMETRICAL POLICIES 
This chapter internalizes the cost of greenhouse gas emissions in markets with asymmetric 
policies and can benefit from further modeling options. Three approaches to accounting for and 
regulating carbon emissions associated with power imports were compared against two baseline 
(best and worst case) models, but other models are in development. Although many areas of the 
world have asymmetrical carbon or emissions policies, only recently has there been an increase in 
analytical and quantitative results. The modeling proposal in California has been modified several 
times since the inception of this dissertation chapter, and will likely continue to change in the 
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future. As methods are proposed, the criteria developed in Section 4.5.2 can be used to evaluate 
and compare the new proposals against the existing second-best methods described in this 
chapter. If other regions in the U.S. decide to implement similar policies, these same criteria can 
be used to evaluate other systems. The results from Chapter 4 found tradeoffs between 
emissions and total cost for the second-best methods; however, the social cost of carbon method 
will always dominate. Although beyond the scope of optimization modeling, political analyses 
can evaluate what policies and political will would be necessary to implement a carbon tax 
through the U.S. (to produce the first-best, social cost of carbon result).  
The project could also benefit from larger test cases. When initially investigating, it is 
important to begin with a small model so the results are easy to analyze and understand. 
However, as regions propose to implement these methods, it is important to recognize how the 
models scale-up. With more participants and a more complex network, behavior is likely to be 
qualitatively different; regions will sometimes be exporters and sometimes be importers. A West-
wide model could provide much deeper insights into the actual emissions reductions and total 
system costs. A system with a more than one hour, so that a range of system load and renewable 
output conditions are represented, should also be studied, since it is average performance over a 
long period of time that matters the most, not performance in a single hour.  A large system 
could also provide better understanding of the tax-at-the-border method, since the current 
simulation results jump between three options rather than a possibly smoother response when 
there are more plants and a diversity of load and renewable generation patterns over the year. A 
similar study can be performed in the mid-Atlantic region for RGGI and in Europe, possibly in 
collaboration with the existing COMPETES model used in Chapter 3.  
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6.4 FUTURE WORK ON COORDINATION AMONG BALANCING 
AREAS 
Many countries and regions throughout the world have separately controlled but 
interconnected power systems, obliging system operators to coordinate the flow of electric 
power and trade. Because renewable energy is not always plentiful in areas with large 
populations, it can be important to improve trade between regions with abundant renewable 
generation and those with large load centers. Moving towards a majority renewable future, 
enabling trade can make all participants better off. Better off, of course, is relative to the aims of 
the organization or government in charge of operations.  
The studies in Chapter 5 analyze trade across time and between regions with differing 
amounts of coordination. As renewable integration is increasing, there are many opportunities 
for model extensions. Foremost, would be extending the examples to more realistic test cases 
and testing against real system data. Many regions have existing hurdle rates (such as the WECC 
region), and use of actual hurdle rate data would produce results that mimic actual operations. 
Additionally, more than two regions can be simulated. Although the dynamics and constraints 
linking the systems would change, simulations using more than three balancing areas can 
demonstrate the challenges faced by highly interconnected grids. Larger systems might also allow 
simulation of game theoretic models to determine if a company that owns generators in multiple 
balancing areas can influence outcomes in either market.   
The project can also extend modeling of trade to more complex mechanisms, some of which 
were discussed in Section 5.2. Both pseudo-tie lines and dynamic transfers can ease the 
integration of renewable energy from one balancing area to another. By explicitly modeling each 
mechanism, simulations can determine which would integrate a greater penetration of renewable 
energy or reduce costs. They can also be simulated in networks that use hurdle rates, to assess 
the relative benefits of using pseudo-tie lines and dynamic transfers.  
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Lastly, an empirical study of trade between regions using different mechanisms might 
identify causes and quantitative estimates of transaction costs that can be translated into hurdle 
rates. With the additional modeling, it can help address the question of the worth of hurdle rates. 
Is the mechanism too simple or does it adequately capture the complexity of inter-BA trade? 
When are hurdle rates useful as economic friction? Studies can assess current systems to 
determine if reductions to hurdle rates can increase gains from trade. As renewable integration 
grows, interconnection issues grow and become more important for ensuring the penetration is 
as high as possible. 
 
In total, the four analyses provided in this thesis examine trade-offs between economic 
efficiency, simplicity of trade, integration of renewable energy, and emissions reductions. The 
dissertation contributes a framework for assessing market design improvements, and 
demonstrates that coordination between neighboring regions can increase economic efficiency. 
However, it is also important to remember the now infamous George Box quote, “All models 
are wrong but some are useful” [226].  Each chapter’s models cannot exactly mimic real power 
system operation, but the insights provided can assist decision makers, researchers, system 







Data used in Chapter 5 can be found in this Appendix. The tables show generator 
characteristics, line information, an hourly load profile, and bus/load levels.  













1 1 163.020 75.850 1138.680 15.8 
2 1 163.020 75.850 1138.680 15.8 
3 1 19.640 1060.880 130.630 15.2 
4 1 19.640 1060.880 130.630 15.2 
5 2 163.020 75.850 1138.680 15.8 
6 2 163.020 75.850 1138.680 15.8 
7 2 19.640 1060.880 130.630 15.2 
8 2 19.640 1060.880 130.630 15.2 
9 7 75.640 4754.400 839.450 25 
10 7 75.640 4754.400 839.450 25 
11 7 75.640 4754.400 839.450 25 
12 13 74.750 6510.000 1159.930 68.95 
13 13 74.750 6510.000 1159.930 68.95 
14 13 74.750 6510.000 1159.930 68.95 
15 14 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
16 15 94.740 571.200 72.680 2.4 
17 15 94.740 571.200 72.680 2.4 
18 15 94.740 571.200 72.680 2.4 
19 15 94.740 571.200 72.680 2.4 
20 15 94.740 571.200 72.680 2.4 
21 15 15.460 1696.340 252.670 54.25 
22 16 15.460 1696.340 252.670 54.25 
23 18 5.460 2400.000 215.080 100 
24 21 5.460 2400.000 215.080 100 
25 22 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
26 22 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
27 22 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 















29 22 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
30 22 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
31 23 15.460 1696.340 252.670 54.25 
32 23 15.460 1696.340 252.670 54.25 
33 23 15.890 7953.040 358.230 140 
34 25 163.020 75.850 1138.680 15.8 
35 25 163.020 75.850 1138.680 15.8 
36 25 19.640 1060.880 130.630 15.2 
37 25 19.640 1060.880 130.630 15.2 
38 26 163.020 75.850 1138.680 15.8 
39 26 163.020 75.850 1138.680 15.8 
40 26 19.640 1060.880 130.630 15.2 
41 26 19.640 1060.880 130.630 15.2 
42 31 75.640 4754.400 839.450 25 
43 31 75.640 4754.400 839.450 25 
44 31 75.640 4754.400 839.450 25 
45 37 74.750 6510.000 1159.930 68.95 
46 37 74.750 6510.000 1159.930 68.95 
47 37 74.750 6510.000 1159.930 68.95 
48 38 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
49 39 94.740 571.200 72.680 2.4 
50 39 94.740 571.200 72.680 2.4 
51 39 94.740 571.200 72.680 2.4 
52 39 94.740 571.200 72.680 2.4 
53 39 94.740 571.200 72.680 2.4 
54 39 15.460 1696.340 252.670 54.25 
55 40 15.460 1696.340 252.670 54.25 
56 42 5.460 2400.000 215.080 100 
57 45 5.460 2400.000 215.080 100 
58 46 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
59 46 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
60 46 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
61 46 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
62 46 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
63 46 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
64 47 15.460 1696.340 252.670 54.25 
65 47 15.460 1696.340 252.670 54.25 
66 47 15.890 7953.040 358.230 140 
67 49 163.020 75.850 1138.680 15.8 
68 49 163.020 75.850 1138.680 15.8 
69 49 19.640 1060.880 130.630 15.2 
70 49 19.640 1060.880 130.630 15.2 
71 50 163.020 75.850 1138.680 15.8 
72 50 163.020 75.850 1138.680 15.8 
73 50 19.640 1060.880 130.630 15.2 
74 50 19.640 1060.880 130.630 15.2 
75 55 75.640 4754.400 839.450 25 
76 55 75.640 4754.400 839.450 25 















78 61 74.750 6510.000 1159.930 68.95 
79 61 74.750 6510.000 1159.930 68.95 
80 61 74.750 6510.000 1159.930 68.95 
81 62 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
82 63 94.740 571.200 72.680 2.4 
83 63 94.740 571.200 72.680 2.4 
84 63 94.740 571.200 72.680 2.4 
85 63 94.740 571.200 72.680 2.4 
86 63 94.740 571.200 72.680 2.4 
87 63 15.460 1696.340 252.670 54.25 
88 64 15.460 1696.340 252.670 54.25 
89 66 5.460 2400.000 215.080 100 
90 69 5.460 2400.000 215.080 100 
91 70 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
92 70 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
93 70 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
94 70 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
95 70 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
96 70 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
97 71 15.460 1696.340 252.670 54.25 
98 71 15.460 1696.340 252.670 54.25 
99 71 15.890 7953.040 358.230 140 
 














1 20 20 1 1 Oil/CT 
2 20 20 1 1 Oil/CT 
3 76 20 4 8 Coal/Steam 
4 76 20 4 8 Coal/Steam 
5 20 20 1 1 Oil/CT 
6 20 20 1 1 Oil/CT 
7 76 20 4 8 Coal/Steam 
8 76 20 4 8 Coal/Steam 
9 100 70 8 8 Oil/Steam 
10 100 70 8 8 Oil/Steam 
11 100 70 8 8 Oil/Steam 
12 180 30 10 12 Oil/Steam 
13 180 30 10 12 Oil/Steam 
14 180 30 10 12 Oil/Steam 
15 0 0 1 1 N/A 
16 12 10 2 4 Oil/Steam 
17 12 10 2 4 Oil/Steam 
18 12 10 2 4 Oil/Steam 
19 12 10 2 4 Oil/Steam 
20 12 10 2 4 Oil/Steam 














22 155 30 8 8 Coal/Steam 
23 400 200 24 24 Nuclear 
24 400 200 24 24 Nuclear 
25 50 50 1 1 Hydro 
26 50 50 1 1 Hydro 
27 50 50 1 1 Hydro 
28 50 50 1 1 Hydro 
29 50 50 1 1 Hydro 
30 50 50 1 1 Hydro 
31 155 30 8 8 Coal/Steam 
32 155 30 8 8 Coal/Steam 
33 240 40 24 24 Coal/Steam 
34 20 20 1 1 Oil/CT 
35 20 20 1 1 Oil/CT 
36 76 20 4 8 Coal/Steam 
37 76 20 4 8 Coal/Steam 
38 20 20 1 1 Oil/CT 
39 20 20 1 1 Oil/CT 
40 76 20 4 8 Coal/Steam 
41 76 20 4 8 Coal/Steam 
42 100 70 8 8 Oil/Steam 
43 100 70 8 8 Oil/Steam 
44 100 70 8 8 Oil/Steam 
45 180 30 10 12 Oil/Steam 
46 180 30 10 12 Oil/Steam 
47 180 30 10 12 Oil/Steam 
48 0.000 0 1 1 N/A 
49 12 10 2 4 Oil/Steam 
50 12 10 2 4 Oil/Steam 
51 12 10 2 4 Oil/Steam 
52 12 10 2 4 Oil/Steam 
53 12 10 2 4 Oil/Steam 
54 155 30 8 8 Coal/Steam 
55 155 30 8 8 Coal/Steam 
56 400 200 24 24 Nuclear 
57 400 200 24 24 Nuclear 
58 50 50 1 1 Hydro 
59 50 50 1 1 Hydro 
60 50 50 1 1 Hydro 
61 50 50 1 1 Hydro 
62 50 50 1 1 Hydro 
63 50 50 1 1 Hydro 
64 155 30 8 8 Coal/Steam 
65 155 30 8 8 Coal/Steam 
66 240 40 24 24 Coal/Steam 
67 20 20 1 1 Oil/CT 
68 20 20 1 1 Oil/CT 
69 76 20 4 8 Coal/Steam 














71 20 20 1 1 Oil/CT 
72 20 20 1 1 Oil/CT 
73 76 20 4 8 Coal/Steam 
74 76 20 4 8 Coal/Steam 
75 100 70 8 8 Oil/Steam 
76 100 70 8 8 Oil/Steam 
77 100 70 8 8 Oil/Steam 
78 180 30 10 12 Oil/Steam 
79 180 30 10 12 Oil/Steam 
80 180 30 10 12 Oil/Steam 
81 0 0 1 1 N/A 
82 12 10 2 4 Oil/Steam 
83 12 10 2 4 Oil/Steam 
84 12 10 2 4 Oil/Steam 
85 12 10 2 4 Oil/Steam 
86 12 10 2 4 Oil/Steam 
87 155 30 8 8 Coal/Steam 
88 155 30 8 8 Coal/Steam 
89 400 200 24 24 Nuclear 
90 400 200 24 24 Nuclear 
91 50 50 1 1 Hydro 
92 50 50 1 1 Hydro 
93 50 50 1 1 Hydro 
94 50 50 1 1 Hydro 
95 50 50 1 1 Hydro 
96 50 50 1 1 Hydro 
97 155 30 8 8 Coal/Steam 
98 155 30 8 8 Coal/Steam 
99 240 40 24 24 Coal/Steam 
 
Table 0-3 IEEE RTS Test Case Line Data 
Bus 
Number From To Susceptance 
Line 
Capacity 
1 1 2 -7142.8571 175 
2 1 3 -473.9336 175 
3 1 5 -1176.4706 175 
4 2 4 -787.4016 175 
5 2 6 -520.8333 175 
6 3 9 -840.3361 175 
7 3 24 -1190.4762 400 
8 4 9 -961.5385 175 
9 5 10 -1136.3636 175 
10 6 10 -1639.3443 175 
11 7 8 -1639.3443 175 
12 7 27 -621.1180 175 
13 8 9 -606.0606 175 




Number From To Susceptance 
Line 
Capacity 
15 9 11 -1190.4762 400 
16 9 12 -1190.4762 400 
17 10 11 -1190.4762 400 
18 10 12 -1190.4762 400 
19 11 14 -2380.9524 500 
20 12 13 -2083.3333 500 
21 12 23 -1030.9278 500 
22 13 23 -1149.4253 500 
23 13 39 -1333.3333 500 
24 14 16 -1694.9153 350 
25 15 16 -5882.3529 500 
26 15 21 -2040.8163 500 
27 15 21 -2040.8163 500 
28 15 24 -1923.0769 500 
29 16 17 -3846.1538 500 
30 16 19 -4347.8261 500 
31 17 18 -7142.8571 500 
32 17 22 -952.3810 500 
33 18 21 -3846.1538 500 
34 18 21 -3846.1538 500 
35 19 20 -2500.0000 500 
36 19 20 -2500.0000 500 
37 20 23 -4545.4545 500 
38 20 23 -4545.4545 500 
39 21 22 -1470.5882 500 
40 23 41 -1351.3514 500 
41 25 26 -7142.8571 175 
42 25 27 -473.9336 175 
43 25 29 -1176.4706 175 
44 26 28 -787.4016 175 
45 26 30 -520.8333 175 
46 27 33 -840.3361 175 
47 27 48 -1190.4762 400 
48 28 33 -961.5385 175 
49 29 34 -1136.3636 175 
50 30 34 -1639.3443 175 
51 31 32 -1639.3443 175 
52 32 33 -606.0606 175 
53 32 34 -606.0606 175 
54 33 35 -1190.4762 400 
55 33 36 -1190.4762 400 
56 34 35 -1190.4762 400 
57 34 36 -1190.4762 400 
58 35 38 -2380.9524 500 
59 36 37 -2083.3333 500 
60 36 47 -1030.9278 500 
61 37 47 -1149.4253 500 
62 38 40 -1694.9153 350 




Number From To Susceptance 
Line 
Capacity 
64 39 45 -2040.8163 500 
65 39 45 -2040.8163 500 
66 39 48 -1923.0769 500 
67 40 41 -3846.1538 500 
68 40 43 -4347.8261 500 
69 41 42 -7142.8571 500 
70 41 46 -952.3810 500 
71 42 45 -3846.1538 500 
72 42 45 -3846.1538 500 
73 43 44 -2500.0000 500 
74 43 44 -2500.0000 500 
75 44 47 -4545.4545 500 
76 44 47 -4545.4545 500 
77 45 46 -1470.5882 500 
78 49 50 -7142.8571 175 
79 49 51 -473.9336 175 
80 49 53 -1176.4706 175 
81 50 52 -787.4016 175 
82 50 54 -520.8333 175 
83 51 57 -840.3361 175 
84 51 72 -1190.4762 400 
85 52 57 -961.5385 175 
86 53 58 -1136.3636 175 
87 54 58 -1639.3443 175 
88 55 56 -1639.3443 175 
89 56 57 -606.0606 175 
90 56 58 -606.0606 175 
91 57 59 -1190.4762 400 
92 57 60 -1190.4762 400 
93 58 59 -1190.4762 400 
94 58 60 -1190.4762 400 
95 59 62 -2380.9524 500 
96 60 61 -2083.3333 500 
97 60 71 -1030.9278 500 
98 61 71 -1149.4253 500 
99 62 64 -1694.9153 350 
100 63 64 -5882.3529 500 
101 63 69 -2040.8163 500 
102 63 69 -2040.8163 500 
103 63 72 -1923.0769 500 
104 64 65 -3846.1538 500 
105 64 67 -4347.8261 500 
106 65 66 -7142.8571 500 
107 65 70 -952.3810 500 
108 66 69 -3846.1538 500 
109 66 69 -3846.1538 500 
110 67 68 -2500.0000 500 
111 67 68 -2500.0000 500 




Number From To Susceptance 
Line 
Capacity 
113 68 71 -4545.4545 500 
114 69 70 -1470.5882 500 
115 73 21 -1030.9278 500 
116 66 47 -961.5385 500 
117 71 73 -11111.1111 722 
 






























































































1 67 1909.5 
2 63 1795.5 
3 60 1710 
4 59 1681.5 
5 59 1681.5 
6 60 1710 
7 74 2109 
8 86 2451 
9 95 2707.5 
10 96 2736 
11 96 2736 
12 95 2707.5 
13 95 2707.5 
14 95 2707.5 
15 93 2650.5 
16 94 2679 
17 99 2821.5 
18 100 2850 
19 100 2850 
20 96 2736 
21 91 2593.5 
22 83 2365.5 
23 73 2080.5 
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